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Preface
User application data moves through the Internet encapsulated in network data packets.
These packets have a well-defined format containing several layered protocol headers and
possibly trailers which encapsulate user data. The vast majority of Internet traffic uses the
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP). The TCP implementation on the sending host di-
vides user application data into smaller transmission segments and manages the delivery of
these segments to remote systems. The protocol stack on the remote system is responsible
for reassembling the segments back into the original data set, where it is presented to the
user or the application.
Extensible networking services, like those that detect and eliminate Internet worms
and computer viruses as they spread between machines, require access to this user appli-
cation data. These services need to process the various protocols in order to reassemble
application data, prior to performing any detection or removal operations. TCP processing
operations similar to those which occur in protocol stacks of end systems are necessary.
Large, high-speed routers and switches are used to route data through the interior
of the Internet because they are capable of handling traffic from millions of end systems
at multi-gigabit per second data rates. To operate within this environment, extensible net-
working services need to process millions of packets per second. Existing services which
block Internet worms and computer viruses do not have sufficient throughput to operate on
a network backbone.
This dissertation investigates the problems associated with high performance TCP
processing systems and describes an architecture that supports flow monitoring in exten-
sible networking environments at multi-gigabit per second data rates. This architecture
provides stateful flow tracking, TCP stream reassembly services, context storage, and flow
manipulation services for applications which monitor and process TCP data streams. An
FPGA-based implementation of this architecture was used to analyze live Internet traffic.
xxii
1Chapter 1
Introduction
Studies show that over 85% of the network packets on the Internet utilize Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) [112]. Content-aware networking services, like data security and
content scanning, need to look inside of TCP flows in order to implement higher levels of
functionality. In order to accomplish this, the TCP processing must be capable of recon-
structing data streams from individual network packets. TCP processing systems capable
of achieving this in gigabit speed networking environments do not currently exist.
New protocol processing systems are necessary to satisfy the current and future
needs of content-aware network services. These services will have a greater impact on
network traffic when located with large routers processing traffic on high-speed network
connections exceeding 2Gbps. These types of routers are also most likely to contain exten-
sible networking technology.
The concept of extensible networking implies that reconfigurable and reprogram-
mable elements exist within the network which can be altered, or extended, during the nor-
mal operation of the network. Extensible networking switches may employ application-
specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), network
processors, or general purpose microprocessors which can be programmed or configured
to operate on the network traffic which transits the switch. Extensible networking environ-
ments can enhance the end user’s experience by incorporating value-added services into
the network infrastructure. In order to be effective, services which operate in these envi-
ronments require access to the application level data which traverses the network. This
research involves the design and implementation of a TCP processing system which makes
application data available to high-speed network services. A simple, hardware-based ap-
plication interface provides the means by which data processing circuits can easily access
the payload contents of TCP flows.
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Figure 1.2: IP(v4) and TCP Headers
Data in TCP flows moves through the Internet encapsulated in network packets.
Every packet contains a header section and possibly a payload section. The header section
can be further subdivided to provide information about encapsulated protocols. Figure 1.1
shows the layout of TCP packets moving through the network. Each packet contains an
Internet Protocol (IP) header, a TCP header, and possibly a data payload section.
To exchange information over a network, a TCP connection is established between
two end systems. Information placed in the payload section of one or more packets is
delivered to the remote system. As these packets traverse the Internet, they can be dropped,
reordered, duplicated, or fragmented while they make their way to the destination host. It
is the responsibility of the TCP implementation on the end systems to provide end-to-end
reordering and retransmission services.
Figure 1.2 shows a diagram of the header fields for TCP and IP version 4. The IP
header fields include packet routing information which is used by network equipment to
deliver packets to the proper end destination. The information contained in the IP header is
similar in function to the address on traditional courier-based mail. The TCP header fields
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provide information needed to reconstruct data streams from individual network packets. In
addition, these header fields contain data needed to perform connection setup and teardown,
packet retransmissions, and localized packet delivery information.
Network monitors can be classified as either out-of-band or in-band, as illustrated
in Figure 1.3. An out-of-band network monitor is a passive device and is typically imple-
mented with a cable splitter, a network tap, port replication or other content duplicating
technique which delivers a copy of the network traffic to the monitor. Passive monitors
have no means by which to alter network content. In contrast, an in-band network monitor
resides within the data path of the network and can alter network traffic by either inserting,
dropping, or modifying packets. As an in-band network monitor, the TCP processing sys-
tem presented in this dissertation provides a flexible platform upon which either passive or
active extensible networking services can be developed.
Processing higher level protocols, such as TCP, is a complex task. This complexity
is increased when operating on multi-gigabit links in high-speed networking environments,
potentially dealing with millions of packets per second and processing millions of active
TCP connections in the network at any one time. Data monitoring and processing appli-
cations are varied and have a broad range of resource requirements. Simple applications
like those that count data bytes or represent traffic patterns may have relatively small im-
plementations. In contrast, applications which detect and eliminate many different types
of Internet worms and viruses may utilize substantially more resources. Specialized appli-
cations which implement custom network security features may also require complex pro-
cessing operations for every packet on the network. Limitations in chip densities prevent
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these large, complex applications from being completely implemented in a single device.
A system using multiple processing devices would support these complex applications. In
order for this type of design to work, efficient mechanisms are required for coordinating
tasks amongst the multiple devices.
This dissertation presents a hardware circuit called the TCP-Processor which is ca-
pable of reassembling TCP data flows into their respective byte streams at multi-gigabit
line rates. The reference implementation contains a large per-flow state store which sup-
ports 8 million bidirectional TCP flows. Additional logic enables the payload contents of
a TCP flow to be modified. To support complex flow processing applications, a flexible
and extensible data encoding system has been developed which enables data passing and
task coordination between multiple devices. This technology enables a new generation of
content-aware network services to operate within the core of the Internet.
1.1 Problem Framework
A large heterogenous network, such as the Internet, provides network connectivity between
a vast number of end systems and autonomous environments. Figure 1.4 shows a represen-
tative network topology. The interior of the network is made up of core routers - responsible
for routing data through the interior of the network - and gateway routers. Each gateway
router provides a single point of entry into the network for an external organization. Many
different types of organizations, including government agencies, corporations, municipal-
ities, and universities connect to the network by interfacing with a gateway router. Cell
phones and handheld computers connect to the network through cellular towers to carriers
which provide access to the Internet. In addition, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) pro-
vide communication services to individual and organizational customers, and satellite and
fiber-optic links interconnect wide-area networks.
Due to the vast number of end systems which communicate over the Internet and
the relatively small number of routers which forward traffic in the interior of the network,
communication between these routers occurs at a very high bandwidth. Currently, intercon-
nects typically operate over communication links ranging in speed from OC-3 to OC-768.
Network routers capable of communicating at 160 Gigabits/second are expected in the fu-
ture. Table 1.1 compares the various types of communication links, their corresponding
data rates, and the rate at which packets of different sizes can be transmitted over those
links.
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Figure 1.4: Heterogenous Network
1.2 Problem Statement
There are distinct advantages associated with consolidating common network services. In
addition to running data security, data compression, intrusion prevention, and virus elimi-
nation applications on end systems, applications can be moved into the network at gateway
routers. Running these applications in the network reduces the administrative overhead of
managing the number of installation points. Large organizations may have thousands of
end systems to manage. Instantly updating virus filters on all end systems in the face of
a new worm or virus outbreak can be a daunting task. In contrast, updating a few well-
placed network appliances positioned within the network can provide protection from the
virus outbreak in a fraction of the time required to update all end systems.
Universities and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) have networks where the network
administrators do not have access to or control of the machines connected to the network.
Student computers and client ISP systems are connected to these networks, but the network
6Table 1.1: Optical links and associated data rates
40 byte 64 byte 500 byte 1500 byte
Link type Data rate pkts/sec pkts/sec pkts/sec pkts/sec
OC-3 155 Mbps .48 M .3 M 38 K 12 K
OC-12 622 Mbps 1.9 M 1.2 M .16 M 52 K
GigE 1.0 Gbps 3.1 M 2.0 M .25 M 83 K
OC-48 2.5 Gbps 7.8 M 4.8 M .63 M .21 M
OC-192/10 GigE 10 Gbps 31 M 20 M 2.5 M .83 M
OC-768 40 Gbps 125 M 78 M 10 M 3.3 M
OC-3072 160 Gbps 500 M 312 M 40 M 13 M
operations staff has no ability to patch or upgrade the end systems. In these types of envi-
ronments, data security, intrusion detection, and worm and virus preventions systems have
to occur within the fabric of the network. Furthermore, with the widespread acceptance
of cellular and wireless technologies, computer systems can quickly appear and disappear
from the network, only to reappear later in a different part of the network.
Data security applications which prevent the dissemination of proprietary or confi-
dential documents to outside parties are ideally suited for placement at the interface to the
external network. This type of security solution would allow confidential and proprietary
documents to be passed freely amongst computers within an organization, but prevents
their transmission to non-trusted systems outside the organization.
Most existing network monitoring systems which perform data security and intru-
sion prevention tasks are software-based. These systems have performance limitations
which prevent them from operating within high-speed networked environments. The re-
search associated with this dissertation addresses the performance limitations associated
with existing network services.
This dissertation presents an architecture for a high-speed TCP processing system
which provides access to TCP stream content at locations within the network. The archi-
tecture is capable of processing traffic at multi-gigabit per second data rates and supports
the monitoring and processing of millions of active TCP flows in the network.
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1.3 Contributions
The main focus of this research involves the design, development, and implementation of
hardware circuits which are able to process TCP flows within the context of multi-gigabit
per second communication links. The primary contributions of this research are:
• The definition of a high-performance TCP flow processing architecture, called TCP-
Processor, capable of processing large numbers of active TCP connections traversing
multi-gigabit network links. A hardware implementation of this architecture sup-
ports the processing of 8 million simultaneous TCP connections on a network link
operating at 2.5Gbps.
• An architecture that coordinates high-performance packet processing circuits operat-
ing on separate devices by defining an inter-device transport protocol. This protocol
is extensible, which allows for future enhancements and extensions without requiring
modifications to the underlying protocol specification. The self-describing nature of
the protocol allows previous versions of the processing circuits to work with newer
extensions which do not pertain to that specific component.
• An analysis of live Internet traffic processed by hardware circuit implementations of
the TCP processing architecture. Network traffic travelling between the Washington
University campus network and the Internet was processed by the TCP flow moni-
toring circuits outlined in this dissertation. Statistics collected while processing this
traffic are analyzed and presented.
Additional contributions presented in this dissertation include the development of
two sample TCP flow monitoring applications, PortTracker and Scan, which illustrate how
to interface with the TCP-Processor to perform TCP flow processing on large numbers of
active flows at multi-gigabit data rates. Furthermore, it defines a common statistics packet
format which is used by the TCP flow processing circuits and by other researchers at the
Applied Research Laboratory. It also presents extensible data collection and charting util-
ities which have been developed to aid in the collection and presentation of the monitored
statistics. Detailed documentation on the design, layout, and operation of the various TCP
processing circuits is provided. The appendices include setup, configuration, and usage
instructions so that other investigators have the information necessary to either reproduce
or extend this research.
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1.4 Organization of Dissertation
Chapter 1 provides introductory material and an overview of the problem domain. The
problem framework and a problem statement are discussed along with the contributions of
the dissertation and the organization of the dissertation.
Chapter 2 provides background and motivation information for the dissertation. It
discusses the currently available computing platforms along with their relative merits for
use in high-performance network data processing systems. This chapter also covers a thor-
ough review of the challenges associated with protocol processing in high-speed networks.
Chapter 3 examines related work in network monitoring and processing systems. It presents
a taxonomy of network monitors to show the problem domain of the research relating to this
dissertation. It also discusses other software-based and hardware-based network monitors,
along with their features and shortcomings. In addition, this chapter presents current re-
search in packet classification techniques and covers information on other types of network
devices. These devices include load balancers, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) accelerators,
intrusion detection systems and TCP offload engines; all of which require protocol process-
ing operations similar to those presented in this dissertation. Finally, this chapter presents
current research involving hardware-accelerated content scanners to showcase a class of
applications which are ideal candidates for integration with the TCP-Processor.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the TCP processing architectures developed as
part of this research. Initial investigations into high-performance TCP processing in hard-
ware circuits led to the development of the TCP-Splitter technology. The knowledge gained
through this research contributed to the development of the TCP-Processor technology.
This chapter describes both of these architectures.
Chapter 5 provides information regarding the testing environment where the TCP-
Processor was developed, refined, and analyzed. This environment includes hardware plat-
forms, circuit designs, and control software. This chapter discusses each of the components
of this environment.
Chapter 6 provides detailed descriptions of the implementation and internal oper-
ation of the TCP-Processor circuit. Implementation details of each circuit component are
discussed separately, providing insight into the operation and interaction among the various
components. This chapter also describes the lightweight client interface which provides
easy access to TCP stream content for large numbers of TCP connections in an efficient
manner.
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Chapter 7 examines the StreamExtract circuit. This circuit forms the basis for all
multi-device TCP processing designs. This chapter includes a description of the data en-
coding and decoding techniques which allow annotated network traffic to pass easily be-
tween devices. It describes the encoded data format, highlighting the extensible and ex-
pandable features of the protocol.
Chapter 8 discusses the TCP-Lite Wrappers which provide access to TCP stream
content in multi-device TCP processing environments. These wrappers include lightweight
hardware circuits which decode and re-encode TCP stream traffic. This includes exposure
of a client interface which is identical to the interface of the TCP-Processor. In addition
to the TCP-Lite Wrappers, this chapter presents PortTracker and Scan as example circuits
which use this wrapper to perform TCP flow processing. The PortTracker circuit keeps
track of the number of packets sent to or received from various well known TCP ports. The
Scan circuit searches TCP stream content for up to four 32-byte signatures.
Chapter 9 analyzes live Internet traffic using the TCP flow processing technology
presented in this dissertation. It consists of the examination of the Internet traffic for the
Washington University campus network during a five week period.
Chapter 10 summarizes the work and contributions of this dissertation and provides
concluding remarks. It presents information regarding the lessons learned while processing
live Internet traffic along with information on some of the tools developed to aid in the
debugging process. Finally, it presents information on the utility of the TCP-Processor.
Chapter 11 describes future directions for high-performance TCP processing re-
search. This includes extensions to the TCP-Processor, increasing the current capabilities
and performance. It also covers integration with TCP flow processing applications.
Appendix A describes usage information for the various TCP processing circuits. It
provides specific information on how to build, configure and use the TCP processing cir-
cuits described in this dissertation. This information will enable other researchers to easily
reproduce and validate the results of this research and provide a starting point for perform-
ing other advanced TCP flow processing research in high-speed networking environments.
Appendix B discusses several different methods of capturing traffic and generating
simulation input files. It describes several hardware circuits and software-based tools de-
veloped as part of this research to provide the functional debugging and verification tools
required to validate the operation and performance of the TCP Processor. These include
hooks added to all of the TCP processing circuits which allow network traffic and asso-
ciated context data to be stored into external memory devices. In addition, this appendix
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includes a description of software routines that can extract and format this data from mem-
ories so it can be used easily by the hardware circuit simulation tool, ModelSim. Finally,
this appendix describes the operation and use of these hardware and software data capturing
and formatting tools.
Appendix C describes the statistics gathering and charting routines used in conjunc-
tion with the circuits described in this dissertation. A StatsCollector application collects
statistics information generated by the various TCP processing circuits and writes the data
to daily disk files. A Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) sub-agent captures
this same statistics information, accumulates ongoing event counters, and republishes the
data as SNMP variables which can be accessed easily using industry standard network
management tools. A configuration file for the Multi Router Traffic Grapher (MRTG) com-
mands MRTG to generate daily, weekly, monthly and yearly charts of each of the statistics
values produced by the TCP processing circuits.
Appendix D contains additional traffic charts obtained by analyzing the Washington
University Internet traffic. The charts examine traffic collected on August 27th, 2004 and
September 16th, 2004.
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Chapter 2
Background and Motivation
Existing network monitors are unable to both (1) operate at the high bandwidth rates and
(2) manage the millions of active flows found in today’s high-speed networks. Instead,
network monitors typically perform monitoring activities on end systems or in local area
networks where the overall bandwidth and the total number of flows to be processed is low.
In the future, many other types of network services will require access to the TCP stream
data traversing high-speed networks. Such services may include the following applications:
• Worm/virus detection and removal
• Content scanning and filtering
• Spam detection and removal
• Content-based routing
• Data security
• Data mining
• Copyright protection
• Network monitoring
The research outlined in this dissertation enables these services to operate at multi-
gigabit speeds by defining and implementing a hardware-based architecture capable of
high-performance TCP processing. The resulting architecture provides a flexible environ-
ment in which any high performance data processing application can be implemented.
A service which detects and prevents the spread of Internet worms and computer
viruses is ideally suited for this technology. Since worms and viruses spread very quickly,
prevention techniques which involve human interaction are essentially ineffective. Humans
are not capable of reacting quickly enough to stop worm and virus attacks from spreading.
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These types of attacks require automated prevention techniques for containment and pre-
vention of widespread infections [140]. In addition, the direct costs associated with these
attacks could negatively affect the global economy. Table 2.1 provides analysis of the costs
associated with several recent attacks on the Internet.
Table 2.1: Cost of Internet Attacks [22, 86, 5, 34, 56, 33, 1, 85]
Worldwide
Economic Impact Representative
Year ($ U.S.) Attacks (cost)
2003 $236 Billion Sobig.F ($2 Billion)
Blaster ($1.3 Billion)
Slammer ($1.2 Billion)
2002 $118 Billion KLEZ ($9 Billion)
Bugbear ($950 Million)
2001 $36 Billion Nimbda ($635 Million)
Code Red ($2.62 Billion)
SirCam ($1.15 Billion)
2000 $26 Billion Love Bug ($8.75 Billion)
1999 $20 Billion Melissa ($1.10 Billion)
Explorer ($1.02 Billion)
Detection of intrusions embedded within TCP data flows requires stream reassem-
bly operations prior to scanning for virus signatures. Network-based Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) typically operate by searching net-
work traffic for digital signatures which correspond to various types of known intrusions,
including worms and viruses [67]. To detect intrusions, IDS appliances must perform Deep
Packet Inspections (DPI) which scan packet payloads and process packet headers [51].
In recent years, Internet-based worm and computer virus attacks have caused wide-
spread problems to Internet users. This is due to the fact that large numbers of homo-
geneous computers are interconnected by high-speed network links. When attacks occur,
they can rapidly reach epidemic proportions. The SoBig.F virus infected over 200 million
computers within a week and accounted for more than 70% of all email traffic on Aug 20,
2003 [76]. The Code Red virus infected 2,000 new machines every minute during its peak
[87]. The MSBlast worm infected more than 350,000 computers [75]. Internet worms and
viruses typically spread by probing random IP addresses, searching for vulnerable com-
puters. At its peak, the Slammer worm performed over 55 million scans per second [86].
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Internet worms and computer viruses consume huge amounts of computing and networking
resources and place an enormous burden on the Internet as a whole.
Moore et al. analyzed the behavior of self-propagating worms and viruses [88].
They performed simulations using two different containment methodologies in order to
determine the relative effectiveness of each approach. The first containment methodol-
ogy performed address blacklisting (or address filtering) and the second performed content
scanning and filtering. They determined that the content scanning and traffic filtering tech-
nique is far superior at preventing the spread of malicious code than address blacklisting.
Their results also show that content filtering is much more effective at stopping the spread
of viruses when filters are distributed throughout the Internet on high-speed links between
ISPs. If placed closer to the periphery of the Internet, these filters were ineffective in stop-
ping widespread infection from worms and viruses. Their results highlight the need for
devices capable of high performance content filtering and virus containment. The authors
of [88] also lament the fact that virus prevention systems of this nature are not currently
available.
Several problems currently limit the effectiveness of monitoring end systems for
viruses. Popular operating systems, such as Windows, consist of a large volume of soft-
ware that is often in need of security updates and patches. The end user must diligently
apply updates in a timely manner since network-based attacks can be initiated within days
of a vulnerability being detected. For a large institution which may have thousands or
tens of thousands of end systems at many locations, the task is even more complex. In-
stalling patches and software updates is typically a serial operation, so the time required
to distribute new software or configuration information scales linearly with the number of
computers that need to be updated. In addition, a central authority may not have complete
access to control all of the machines operating in the network. Even if it did, a security hole
remains when, for example, a computer is powered off during an update cycle and fails to
receive the new version of the software. Universities and Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
represent two types of networks where the network administrator does not have adminis-
trative control over machines connected to the network. Further, the proliferation of laptop
computers, wireless networks and dynamic addressing allow computers to have great mo-
bility which makes network management even harder. Laptops can appear and disappear
from the network, only to reappear a short time later at different locations in the network.
This complicates the task of securing networks from attacks.
Monitoring flows in high performance networks requires new methodologies of
stream scanning. Moore’s Law predicts that the number of transistors that fit on a chip
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Figure 2.1: Gilder’s Law versus Moore’s Law
will double every eighteen months [89]. Since transistor count is directly related to com-
puting power, this law implies that computing power will double every eighteen months.
This exponential gain is not sufficient to keep pace with advances in communication tech-
nology. Gilder’s Law of Telecom predicts that bandwidth will grow at least three times
faster than computing power [44]. As time progresses, it is reasonable to expect that the
gap between network bandwidth and computing power will continue to widen. Moore’s
Law will cease to hold within the next 10 years due to quantum effects which occur when
transistor gate sizes approach 10 nanometers, further exacerbating this gap. The discrep-
ancy between network bandwidth and processing power can clearly be seen in Figure 2.1.
2.1 Hardware Processing Technologies
Three classes of processing technologies can be used to satisfy the computational needs of
a high performance TCP processing system. The first is a microprocessor, the second is
an Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), and the third is a Field Programmable
Gate Array (FPGA). Network processors are considered a subtype classification of micro-
processors. Although these processors have been customized for networking applications,
they have performance limitations similar to general purpose processors.
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2.1.1 Microprocessors
The current generation of general purpose microprocessors is capable of operating at clock
frequencies of 3GHz. There is an important distinction, however, between clock frequency
and the amount of work performed per unit of time. The ratio of the number of instruc-
tions executed versus the number of clock cycles required to execute those instructions
( instructions
clock cycle
) provides an indication of the amount of work performed per unit of time. For
older Complex Instruction Set Computers (CISC), this ratio was less than one, indicating
that multiple clock cycles were required to complete the processing for a single operation.
In the 1980s, Reduced Instruction Set Computers (RISC) were developed to increase this
ratio to 1 such that an operation was completed every clock cycle. The instruction set of
a RISC machine typically contains a load and store type architecture with fewer memory
addressing modes. In general, a RISC machine requires more instructions than a CISC
machine when performing the same amount of work [28].
Pipelining a processor core is a common technique for increasing the amount of
work completed per unit of time. By breaking the execution of an instruction into multiple
stages (such as fetch, decode, execute, and store), microprocessors operate at higher clock
frequencies while still performing the same amount of work per clock cycle. Depending
on the instruction sequence, a pipelined architecture can execute one instruction per clock
cycle at a much higher clock frequency than can be achieved when there is no pipelin-
ing. There are disadvantages associated with a pipelined architecture. The efficiency of
a pipeline is not realized until the pipeline is full of instructions. Prior to this point, no
work is accomplished for several clock cycles while the pipeline is being primed. Other
inefficiencies arise from context switches [97], pipeline stalls, and mispredicted branches
[11]. These events cause caches and pipelines to be flushed, which in turn accounts for
additional clock cycles where no work is completed. In addition, the more stages there are
to a pipeline, the larger the impact of flushing and refilling the pipeline. Super-pipelined ar-
chitectures [113] further increase the number of pipeline stages by taking long or complex
operations and breaking them into several smaller steps. This supports even faster clock
frequencies over normal pipelined architectures. Breaking the previous example into the
following eight stages is an example of super-pipelining: fetch1, fetch2, fetch3, decode,
execute1, execute2, store1, and store2.
Superscalar processing technology [116] allows multiple operations to be performed
on each clock cycle which further increases the work per clock cycle. Superscalar architec-
tures have multiple execution units within the core of the microprocessor. Processors which
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contain multiple execution units are less likely to keep all execution units busy doing useful
work, thus reducing the amount of real work performed at each clock cycle.
Regardless of the caching subsystem, the number of pipeline stages, or the number
parallel execution units, virtually every processor-based computer ever built is based upon
the design principals of the von Neumann architecture [103]. This architecture defines a
computer as containing a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a control unit, a memory unit,
and input/output units [94]. Combined, these units read and execute a stored sequence of
instructions. The Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) forms the core of the CPU and performs
all operations which manipulate data. Since a von Neumann architecture executes a stored
program, larger amounts of external memory are required for processor-based systems as
compared to systems based on other hardware processing technologies. Processors also
operate slower than other technologies because program instructions must be loaded from
memory prior to performing any operation. In addition to program data, input data, tem-
porary variables, intermediate data, computation results and output data are all typically
stored in the same external memory devices. This can lead to congestion while accessing
external memory devices.
2.1.2 Application Specific Integrated Circuits
Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) are devices which have been custom-
designed to perform very specific sets of operations. These devices can contain processor
cores, memories, combinatorial logic, I/O components or other specialized circuitry which
are dedicated to solving a particular problem. Because an ASIC is developed for a specific
application, it can be customized to give optimal performance. These devices offer superior
performance over other processing technologies. They have smaller die sizes, lower heat
dissipation, a smaller footprint, lower power consumption, and higher performance.
One disadvantage of ASIC devices is that a large nonrecurring engineering cost
must be amortized over the total number of devices produced. This causes these devices
to be extremely expensive during initial development phases, or when production runs are
small. If total device counts number in the hundreds of thousands or greater, ASIC devices
become the most affordable hardware processing technology.
2.1.3 Field Programmable Gate Arrays
Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) devices offer another hardware platform for net-
working application development. They contain a large matrix of logic blocks, memory
17
blocks and Input/Output (I/O) blocks which are interconnected via a programmable signal
routing matrix. An FPGA logic block has multi-input look-up tables which can be dynam-
ically configured to implement a variety of boolean logic operations. Each Configurable
Logic Block (CLB) in a Xilinx Virtex E series FPGA has four Logic Cells (LC) [137].
Each LC contains a 4-input look-up table, an additional carry chain logic, and a 1-bit stor-
age element. A CLB can be configured to implement any boolean logic operation with 5
inputs. FPGAs typically contain additional logic to manage and transport multiple clock
domains through the switch fabric. [139] provides an overview of FPGA technology and
implementation details.
A Hardware Description Language (HDL) such as Verilog HDL or Very Large Scale
Integrated Circuit (VLSIC) HDL (VHDL) produces either a behavioral or structural de-
scription of the intended circuit operation. This description language is compiled down
into a configuration file that configures the reprogrammable elements of the FPGA fabric
to produce the desired operational behavior. Because the FPGA fabric is reprogrammable,
design changes are easily accomplished by changing the HDL, generating a new configu-
ration file, and reprogramming the FPGA.
FPGA-based systems provide distinct advantages over processor-based and ASIC-
based systems designed to perform identical tasks. Table 2.2 shows a comparison of
the three hardware platform technologies and the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Processor-based systems are preferable when cost is the overriding concern. ASICs are
advantageous when performance is paramount. FPGA devices have the flexibility of a pro-
cessor combined with the speed of a hardware implementation, providing high performance
and fast development cycles. These devices provide an ideal environment for implementing
high-performance network processing systems like the TCP-Processor.
FPGA devices are configured to determine the operation of each CLB and how
logic, memory and I/O components are connected to each other. Once configured, the
FPGA device exhibits the specified behavior until the device is either reprogrammed or
reset. FPGAs are more configurable and less costly than ASIC-based implementations
when dealing with small quantities of devices.
When compared with microprocessors, FPGA devices maintain flexibility, but also
provide a significant increase in performance. This is due to the inherent parallelism in
the FPGA fabric which can be exploited to achieve greater amounts of work completed
per clock cycle. Additionally, FPGA devices lend themselves to pipelined logic operations
which further increase the work performed per clock cycle. FPGA-based implementations
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Table 2.2: Comparison of Hardware Processing Technologies
Hardware
Technology Pros Cons
processor ease of development slower performance
short development cycle
low development cost
ASIC high performance high development cost
low power long development cycle
customized solution inflexible to changes
FPGA high performance not as fast or compact as ASIC
low power
customized solution
reconfigurable
short development cycle
product flxibility
low development cost
of the same algorithm, however, contain wired solutions which don’t require stored pro-
grams. In addition, processors must read operands from memory and write results back to
memory. FPGAs can be custom-coded to route the results of one operation directly to the
input of a subsequent operation.
2.2 Challenges
There are many challenges associated with monitoring TCP flows within the context of
high-speed networking environments. Packet sequences observed within the interior of the
network can be different than packets received and processed at the connection endpoints.
Along the way, packets can be fragmented, dropped, duplicated and re-ordered. In addition,
multiple routes from source to destination may exist throughout the network. Depending
on where a monitor is positioned within the network, it may only process a fraction of
the packets associated with a flow being monitored. TCP stacks manage the sequencing
and retransmission of data between network endpoints. Under some conditions, it is not
possible to track the state of end systems perfectly and reconstruct byte sequences based
on observed traffic [8]. This is due to inconsistencies in observed traffic with respect to
the data actually processed at the end system. No single monitoring node can reconstruct
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byte sequences if data packets take routes through the network which bypass the monitor.
Even when all packets pertaining to a particular flow are routed through the monitor, there
are still state transitions at an end system that cannot be fully known based on observed
traffic. For example, suppose a monitoring application was attempting to reconstruct a
two-way conversation occurring at an end application. By monitoring both inbound and
outbound traffic for a particular flow, a close approximation of the conversation could be
reconstructed, but there would be no guarantee that sequences of inbound and outbound
data corresponded directly to the data sequences processed by the end application.
2.2.1 Performance
One of the main roadblocks for implementing a TCP flow monitor that operates on high-
speed network traffic is the volume of work to be accomplished for every packet. The
TCP-Processor’s workload is driven by header processing. Larger packets have longer
transmission times, which translates into having more processing cycles available in which
to process the packet header. For minimum length packets, the TCP processor contends
with a steady stream of back-to-back packet processing events. Figure 2.2 shows the num-
ber of clock cycles available for processing minimum length packets for various high-speed
data rates. The arrow superimposed on the graph shows the technology trend for FPGA de-
vices which corresponds to higher clock frequencies, greater numbers of reconfigurable
logic blocks, and larger quantities of I/O pins. The operations required to perform flow
classification and state management require approximately 40 clock cycles to process each
packet. This processing time is dominated by the latency associated with accessing external
memory.
Based on this performance, a single FPGA-based TCP processor operating at a clock
frequency of 200MHz is capable of handling a steady stream of minimum length packets on
an OC-48 (2.5Gbps) network. Because the system is not constrained by memory through-
put, but by memory latency, performance can be doubled by instantiating parallel TCP
processing engines. By saturating the bandwidth on the memory interface, the clock fre-
quency required to process a steady stream of minimum length packets on an OC-48 link
can be dropped to 100MHz. For 100 to 1500 byte packets, a single TCP-Processor circuit
need only operate at 80MHz.
Figure 2.3 depicts the number of clock cycles available to process packets of differ-
ent lengths at various network link speeds, given an operational clock frequency. Analysis
of backbone connections within the interior of the Internet shows that the average packet
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Figure 2.2: Clock Cycles Available to Process 64 byte Packet
sizes are approximately 300-400 bytes [127, 40]. Assuming again that 40 clock cycles are
required to complete memory operations while processing each packet, a single TCP pro-
cessing circuit operating at 200MHz can monitor traffic on a fully loaded OC-192 network
link with average length packets. Including parallel TCP processing engines in the flow
monitoring circuit can reduce this operating clock frequency to 100MHz.
2.2.2 Packet Classification
It is often, at least in the current Internet, easier to implement flow monitors at the endpoints
of the network rather than at a monitoring node in the middle. The two main reasons for
this are (1) only a small number of active connections need to be tracked at any one time
and (2) the throughput is lower. However, neither of these assumptions hold true when the
TCP processing occurs in a high-speed network monitoring environment. At any one time,
there may be millions of active connections to monitor. Additionally, in order to process a
worst-case scenario of back-to-back 40 byte packets on an OC-48 (2.5Gbps) link, a TCP
processing circuit performs almost 8 million packet classifications per second.
A TCP connection is defined by the a 32-bit source IP address, a 32-bit destination
IP address, a 16-bit source TCP port, and a 16-bit destination TCP port. A TCP processing
system requires a 96-bit, four-tuple exact match using these fields in order to identify a TCP
21
1
10
100
1,000
10,000
100,000
64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096
Packet Size (bytes)
Cl
o
ck
 
Cy
cl
es

OC-12
OC-48
OC-192
OC-768
Figure 2.3: Clock Cycles Available to Process Packets of Various Sizes (200MHz Opera-
tion Frequency)
connection. The 8-bit protocol field of the IP header is usually included in this matching
operation, but is not required for this circuit since this system performs classification opera-
tions only on TCP flows. In contrast, solutions to the general packet classification problem
perform lookups based on a five tuple of source IP address, destination IP address, source
port, destination port and protocol fields. Packet classification is a more difficult problem
than exact matching and a large amount of research exists on enhancing packet classifica-
tion algorithms in routers. These classifications can include a longest prefix match where
rules containing more specific match criteria are selected over more general rules. An in-
dividual packet may match several entries, but only the results of the most specific match
will be associated with the packet. In addition to longest prefix matching, packet classifi-
cation employs priority schemes in which priorities assigned to overlapping rules resolve
the lookup conflict. Additionally, header fields can be defined as ranges. This means that
many packets can match a single rule during the classification process.
There are several distinct differences between general packet classification and the
exact matching required for a TCP processing engine. First, since the matching occurs
against an active network flow, there is no precomputation phase in which lookup tables
22
can be elegantly organized to reduce memory accesses associated with lookup operations.
At startup, the exact matching effort has no information about future TCP connections
which may appear in the network. This information has to be discovered at run time and
precludes any optimizations which could be gained by precomputation.
Lookup optimization techniques such as rule expansion and table compaction [120,
31] are not applicable to the exact matching problem. These optimizations are targeted
at performing longest matching prefix lookups by reducing the number of distinct prefix
lengths that need to be searched. This is accomplished by expanding prefixes to small
powers of two.
The complexity relating to the frequency and scope of lookup table changes for
the exact matching of TCP packets for flow monitors far exceeds that of existing packet
classification engines. Routers are subjected to route table updates at frequencies which
require millisecond processing times. A single route change may result in a burst of route
updates spreading through the network. The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) supports
the sending of multiple update messages to neighboring routers [54]. The vast majority
of these route changes are pathological or redundant in nature and involve the removal and
reinsertion of an identical route [68]. Route changes which only involve modification of the
lookup result do not affect the size or shape of the lookup table itself and greatly simplify
the update process. Conversely, an exact match lookup table for a TCP flow monitor is
subjected to a table change whenever a new connection is established, or when an existing
connection is terminated. A TCP processing circuit which processes data on a high-speed
network link has to manage millions of active flows. In addition, there may be bursts
of thousands, or tens of thousands of connections being established and torn down each
second.
Sustained levels of TCP connections being created or destroyed can exceed normal
traffic rates during Denial of Service (DoS) attacks and major events. DoS attacks occur
when the network is bombarded with high volumes of illegitimate traffic. Superbowl half-
time, natural disasters, and other global events can cause massive bursts in Internet traffic
where large numbers of users access the Internet at the same time. Existing TCP flow
classification and processing algorithms are not capable of handling the traffic loads which
occur in these circumstances.
In order to handle this problem, hashing provides an efficient mechanism for storing
N items in a table containing a total of M entries [79]. Hash functions are typically selected
which result in an even distribution of entries across the whole table. Hashing techniques
allow items to be accessed on average in O(1) time. The drawback to hashing is that
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performance degrades when two or more items map to the same entry, a condition known
as a hash collision. Worst-case performance for hashing algorithms result in O(M) time to
access an entry. A perfect hashing technique based on static keys [42, 23] enables lookups
to be completed with a worst-case of O(1) memory accesses. This type of solution cannot
be utilized by the TCP-Processor because the table entries are dynamic. Dietzfelbinger
et al. describe a dynamic perfect hashing algorithm [30]. Unfortunately, this algorithm
contains unrealistic space requirements and utilizes over 35 times the memory needed to
store a set of data.
The TCP-Processor utilizes a variation of the open addressing hashing technique
[63], originated by G. M. Amdahl in the 1950s [24]. This technique uses a direct indexed
array lookup based on hash values to achieve the same worst-case of O(1) memory accesses
for a lookup. Hash buckets contain a fixed number of identically-sized entries. Burst
memory operations which access sequential bytes of SDRAM devices are very efficient
when compared to multiple accesses of individual memory locations. For this reason, the
entire contents of the hash bucket can be accessed in a single memory operation. The exact
match operation is performed while entries are clocked in from memory devices. This
provides a single memory access flow classification solution.
2.2.3 Context Storage
A high-speed memory subsystem is required in order to maintain per-flow context infor-
mation. At minimum, a 32-bit sequence number pertaining to the current position of the
reassembly engine must be stored for each active flow. Realistically, keeping track of the
TCP processing state of the end systems requires more context information. If the TCP
flow monitoring service requires tracking data received by the end system, then it must
also store the 32-bit acknowledgment number. Flow monitoring applications will likely
require additional context information to be stored for each flow. Tracking both directions
of a TCP flow requires additional context information for managing the other half of the
connection.
Stateful inspection of network traffic was first introduced in the mid-1990s as a
mechanism for providing better firewall and intrusion prevention capabilities [51]. The
stateful inspection of TCP flows involves parsing protocol headers and tracking state tran-
sitions to ensure that the network packets are following proper TCP state transitions. For
example, a data packet associated with a particular flow should never be received without
first receiving TCP SYN packets initiating the connection. To perform stateful inspection
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of TCP flows, the flow monitor needs to store additional context information for each flow
so that information pertaining to the current state of a flow can be saved and retrieved when
processing other packets associated with the same flow.
The need to update stored context information after processing each packet adds ad-
ditional complexity to maintaining a per-flow state store. Under these circumstances, once
packet classification has been completed, a read-modify-write memory access sequence
will be issued. A delay occurs between the read and write memory operations when pro-
cessing large packets to ensure that updates take place only after the complete packet has
been processed. Updates to the flow context information should not occur if the TCP check-
sum for the packet fails and the checksum calculation does not complete until the last byte
of data has been processed. This implies that the write cycle cannot start until after the
complete packet has been processed. When dealing with back-to-back packets, the write
operation of the previous packet can interfere with the lookup operation of the subsequent
packet, which reduces throughput of the flow monitor. Additional delays can be caused by
the memory devices themselves during memory refresh cycles and when requests are not
distributed across memory banks. Without prior knowledge of packet sequences, it is im-
possible to design an algorithm which optimally distributes memory access across SDRAM
devices.
2.2.4 Packet Resequencing
As noted earlier, TCP, a stream-oriented protocol, traverses the Internet on top of IP data-
grams. Individual packets can be dropped or reordered while moving through the network
toward their destination. The protocol stack at the end system is responsible for reassem-
bling packets into their proper order, presenting the original data stream to the client appli-
cation. Existing TCP stacks are tuned to process packets in their proper sequence and to
degrade their performance when packets are received out of order [6].
TCP stream reassembly operations can require large amounts of memory. The TCP
window size is negotiated by the endpoints at connection setup and has a maximum value
of 65,535. The window scale factor can increase the window size by a factor of 214, which
means the maximum possible window size is one GByte (65535 ∗ 214 = 1 billion) [57].
Given that the maximum window size is used for both directions of a TCP connection, an
ideal TCP flow monitor which buffers packets for reassembly would require two Gigabyte
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size buffers, one for handling traffic in each direction. A TCP flow monitor handling 1 mil-
lion bidirectional flows would require two PetaBytes (2 ∗ 1015 bytes) of memory in order
to store the state of all flows, which is not practical for implementations.
Recent analysis of backbone Internet traffic shows that only about 5% of packets
generated by TCP connections are out of sequence [58]. With approximately 95% of TCP
packets traversing the network in order, it is unlikely that worst-case patterns of retransmis-
sions will ever be encountered. The arrival of packet sequences out of sequence requires
packet buffering in order to passively track TCP stream content.
If all frames for a particular flow transit the network in order, the need for reassem-
bly buffers can be eliminated. Ordered packet processing by the monitor can be guaranteed
by actively dropping out-of-order packets. If it detects a missing packet, the TCP processor
can drop subsequent packets until the missing packet is retransmitted. This methodology
forces the TCP flow into a Go-Back-N retransmission policy where all data packets are
retransmitted, thus eliminating the need for the receiving host to buffer and reassemble
out-of-sequence packets [13].
When an end system receives an out-of-order packet, the action taken depends on
which retransmission policy has been implemented. If the receiving system uses the Go-
Back-N Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ), all out-of-order packets will be dropped and
only packets in-order will only be processed. The transmitting system then resends all
packets starting with the packet that was lost. Current implementations of the TCP stack
utilize a sliding window ARQ and accept out-of-order packets within the window size ne-
gotiated at connection startup. Out-of-sequence packets are stored until the missing packets
are received, at which time the buffered data is passed to the client application. Many oper-
ating systems, including Windows 98, FreeBSD 4.1, Linux 2.2 and Linux 2.4, still perform
Go-Back-N ARQ [49].
Different extensible networking applications impose additional constraints on the
TCP processing system. For instance, a security monitoring application may require that
every byte of every flow that transits the monitoring device be properly analyzed. If a sit-
uation arises in which packets cannot be properly monitored due to resource exhaustion,
packets should be dropped rather than passed through the device without analysis. In con-
trast, an extensible network application that monitors performance at an ISP may mandate
that network throughput not be degraded during periods of duress.
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Figure 2.4: Overlapping Retransmission
2.2.5 Overlapping Retransmissions
During any TCP conversation, overlapping retransmissions can occur. While overlapping
data is normal behavior for TCP, it can cause problems when performing flow reconstruc-
tion if not properly handled. In the example of overlapping retransmission illustrated in
Figure 2.4, the character string ”The Internet virus ravaged the campus network” traverses
the network in two separate data packets. The first packet contains the 24 byte string ”The
Internet virus ravag” and the second packet contains the 24 byte string ”vaged the cam-
pus network”. The three characters "vag" in the word ”ravaged” are transmitted in both
the first and the second packets. In order for a TCP flow monitoring service to operate
correctly, it must be presented with an accurate reconstruction of the TCP data stream.
When the second packet from the example is received, the shaded characters should not
be processed by the monitoring application. To accomplish this task, the TCP processing
engine must keep track of what data has been passed to the monitoring application and if
overlapping retransmissions occur, needs to indicate which data in each packet should be
processed and which data should be ignored.
2.2.6 Idle Flows
TCP supports the notion of an idle flow. An idle flow is a valid TCP connection between
two end systems where the connection is idle and no packets are transmitted or received.
The TCP specification places no limits on the duration of a silent period. The idle period
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can last minutes, hours, or even days. For network monitors, an idle flow occupies moni-
toring resources even though there is no traffic. In addition, it is impossible for the network
monitor to differentiate between a flow which is idle and a flow which has been abnormally
terminated for reasons of computers crashing, a network or power outage, or a change in
routing tables which sends packets along a different path through the network. In all of
these cases, the network monitor must apply a heuristic to manage these flows.
A TCP flow monitor can handle idle flows in several ways. One way is to main-
tain state until observance of a proper shutdown sequence. If shutdown sequences are not
processed by the TCP flow monitor, then resource reclamation will not occur which will
in turn lead to the eventual exhaustion of all the resources used to track network flows.
Another way to handle idle flows is to have the TCP flow monitor drop all packets associ-
ated with flows that cannot be monitored due to unavailable resources. This guarantees that
all data passing through the monitoring station will be monitored, but has the potential to
eventually shut down the network by not allowing any packets to pass in a situation where
all resources are consumed with improperly terminated flows. A third option would be to
implement an aging algorithm with a timer. A flow is removed from the monitor after a pre-
defined period of idle time. A network monitor which employs this method, however, can
easily be circumvented if the end user alternately sends pieces of a message and then waits
for a long idle period before transmitting another segment. A fourth method is to reclaim
resources when all available resources are utilized. The process of reclaiming resources
can induce delays during normal operation due to the extra memory operations required
to reclaim the resources. These additional memory operations induce delays in the system
and can, in turn, cause other resource utilization problems.
2.2.7 Resource Exhaustion
Stream reassembly services constitute a key component of the TCP processing engine.
Utilizing buffers to store and re-order network data packets requires a strategy to cope with
depleted buffers. A time-ordered list of packet buffers is maintained by the packet storage
manager. If all of the packet storage resources are utilized, the oldest entry in the list is
reassigned to store the new packet data.
The critical nature of resource exhaustion and its likelihood demands clarification.
Several resources associated with a high performance TCP flow monitor have the poten-
tial to be over-utilized. These include the flow classifier, the context storage subsystem,
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the stream packet buffers used in stream reassembly, the computing resources, and other
internal buffers and FIFOs.
High throughput rates should be maintained during worst-case traffic loads. As pre-
viously noted, 100% utilization of the context storage subsystem can result from idle flows
and improperly terminated flows. Timer-based maintenance routines which periodically
sweep these tables to free up idle resources can be employed to reduce the probability that
resources will be exhausted. However, during periods of exceptionally high connection vol-
ume, context storage resources can still be oversubscribed. In addition, some maintenance
operations require exclusive access to memory resources while performing reclamation op-
erations. This can cause memory contention issues and adversely affect throughput. An
alternative approach is to maintain a linked list of least-recently-used flows. When all re-
sources are utilized, the flow at the bottom of this list is reclaimed so that the new flow can
be processed. Maintaining this link list structure adds the additional overhead of perform-
ing six memory operations for each packet processed. As shown in Figure 2.2 on page 20,
there are a limited number of clock cycles available in which to process a small packet.
The TCP-Processor handles cases of the exhaustion of flow classification resources with a
least-recently-used recovery mechanism.
Applications which process the data streams provided by a TCP processing service
require the ability to store context information for each flow. After processing the payload
section of an individual network packet, the current state of the application processing
subsystem has to be stored for later use. In addition, prior to processing data from a packet,
context information has to be retrieved and loaded into the application. This implies that
the application requires a memory read operation at the start of every packet and a memory
write operation at the end of every packet. The size of this context information is dependant
on the specific requirements of the application. In order to maintain processing throughput,
the total amount of per-flow data should be minimized. This limitation also applies to the
per-flow context information maintained by the TCP processing engine.
2.2.8 Selective Flow Monitoring
A TCP flow monitor which reconstructs byte streams for application processing should be
flexible and provide support for multiple service levels which can be assigned and altered
on a per-flow basis. Different types of services require different mechanisms to process
flows. For high volumes of traffic, flow monitoring may only be needed for a subset of the
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total traffic. An ISP, for example, may want to offer different value-added TCP flow pro-
cessing services to different clients. To do this, a TCP flow monitor must perform different
operations for different flows. For example, connections originating from a particular sub-
net may be configured to bypass the monitoring subsystem altogether. Other flows may
be subjected to best effort monitoring while a third subset of the traffic requires complete
monitoring. In this context, complete monitoring means that packets are not allowed to
pass through the monitor without first being scanned by the monitoring service. An ad-
ditional constraint is that the monitoring requirements for a flow may change during the
lifetime of that flow.
2.2.9 Multi-Node Monitor Coordination
Gateway routers act as a single entry point for smaller isolated networks connecting into
a larger mesh network, and the TCP flow monitors discussed until now have been placed
at this point. A TCP processing engine placed at a gateway router is guaranteed to see all
packets associated with any communications between machines on either side of the router.
In contrast, core routers are usually connected in mesh-like patterns consisting of multiple
traffic paths through the core network. To illustrate this distinction, Figure 2.5 shows an
example network with both core and gateway routers. Two end systems identified as A and
B are connected to gateway routers at different locations in the network. Communication
between nodes A and B can travel over two different paths through the network as indicated
by the thick router connections.
Placed at core routers, TCP flow monitors may receive some, but not all, of the total
traffic for an individual flow. A robust TCP monitoring service must coordinate monitor-
ing across multiple core routers. Through coordination, multiple flow monitors can work
together to provide comprehensive monitoring of traffic. If packets associated with a partic-
ular flow are detected bypassing the monitoring node by another core router, they could be
rerouted to the appropriate monitoring station. A challenge to coordinating multiple flow
monitors is that excessive amounts of traffic can be generated. In addition, route changes
by network administrators, fiber cuts, and device failures lead to dynamic changes in the
normal flow of traffic.
2.2.10 Fragmentation
Packet fragmentation, the splitting of a larger packet into several smaller packets, occurs
below the TCP layer at the IP layer. Fragmented packets need to be reassembled before the
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processing of the TCP packet can be completed. Similar to the Packet Resequencing prob-
lem (page 24), IP packet fragments can be reordered or dropped from the network, compli-
cating the task of defragmentation. The IP header in each fragment contains information
about how to reassemble the fragments into the original packet. Packet defragmentation
normally occurs prior to entering the TCP processing subsystem.
There are three possible methods of dealing with fragmented packets. The first
would be to have the IP processing subsystem perform packet defragmentation services.
Since the TCP flow monitor only receives fully formed TCP packets, no changes would be
necessary. A pool of temporary buffers would hold fragments. When all of the individ-
ual IP fragments had been received, the IP processing engine can then rebuild the original
packet and pass it along to the TCP processing layer. This method of performing packet de-
fragmentation at the IP layer is almost identical to that associated with packet resequencing
at the TCP layer.
The second method of dealing with fragmented packets would be to enhance the
TCP-Processor to deal with multiple IP fragments containing a single TCP packet. The
TCP processing engine would still require that the fragments be processed in order, but
would not require that they be reassembled. This complicates the flow classification pro-
cess because a lookup would have to be performed for each of the fragments based on the
IP source address, IP destination address, and IP identification fields. In addition, all frag-
ments would have to be held until the last fragment is received so that the TCP checksum
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can be updated. Only then could the data contained within the fragments be passed along
to the monitoring application.
The third method would be to develop a slow path which is reserved for handling low
occurrence events. Algorithms which process network packets are frequently optimized so
that the majority of packets are processed in a highly efficient manner. The term slow
path refers to the more time consuming sequence of operations required to process low
occurrence events, such as packet fragments. This slow path would utilize a microprocessor
and/or additional logic along with SDRAM memory to perform packet defragmentation.
Once all of the fragments have been reassembled, the resultant packet would then be re-
injected into the fast path for normal processing. Since the slow path would only be utilized
for exception processing, it could have a much lower throughput capacity.
Processing efficiencies can be gained when packet storage capabilities are shared
between the packet defragmenting logic and the TCP packet resynquencing logic. The
second method for handling fragmented packets describes a scenario where packet defrag-
mentation is handled by the TCP processing module, which locates resequencing logic and
defragmentation logic in the same module. This design supports the development of a
single packet storage manager capable of storing and retrieving arbitrary network packets.
2.2.11 Flow Modification
Extensible networking services, such as those which prevent the spread of Internet-based
worms and viruses, require advanced features which support the modification of flows. In
particular, intrusion prevention services require the ability to terminate a connection, block
the movement of data associated within a particular flow for a period of time, or modify
the content of a flow in order to remove or disarm a virus. To support the blocking and
unblocking of flows, a protocol processing engine must maintain enough per-flow context
information to determine whether or not the flow should be blocked and at which point
in the data stream traffic should be blocked. To support flow termination, a TCP FIN
packet should be generated. In addition, state information indicating that the flow is in a
termination state must be stored in case the generated TCP FIN packet is dropped at some
later point in the network. In order to handle this case properly, the processing engine
should enter a state where it drops all packets associated with the flow and regenerates TCP
FIN packets until the connection is properly terminated.
Supporting the modification of flows adds additional levels of complexity to the TCP
circuit. Two classes of flow modification are considered. The first involves altering content
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in data packets associated with a flow. In this case, since no data is inserted or deleted (i.e.,
the number of bytes traversing the network is the same), the modification can be supported
by processing traffic in a single direction. Additional per-flow state information is needed in
order to store the new data bytes along with the sequence number at which the replacement
took place. This information is vital to allow identical byte replacements to be performed
for any retransmitted packets that include altered sections of the data stream.
In order to support flow modifications where data is either added to or removed
from a TCP data stream, packets must be processed in both directions of the TCP connec-
tion. The reason for this is that acknowledgment sequence numbers contained in the return
packets must be modified to account for the data that was either inserted or removed from
the stream. The TCP flow monitor must also track acknowledgment packets and generate
TCP packets containing data which was inserted into the stream in accordance with the
TCP specification [53]. In addition, packets may need to be broken into several smaller
packets if the act of data insertion causes the packet to exceed the MTU for the flow. As
with the previous case, the per-flow context information should be expanded in order to
store the position of the flow modification, the number of bytes inserted or deleted, and a
copy of the data if an insertion has taken place. This information can be removed from the
context storage area once an acknowledgment is received for the modified portion of the
flow which indicates that the data has been received by the end system.
Another potential flow modification service alters response traffic based on content
observed in a preceding request. This feature is useful when filtering web requests. A TCP
flow monitor searches web requests for specific, predefined content. When the content
is detected, a properly formatted HTTP response is generated containing an appropriate
response. The request packet is then dropped from the network, preventing the request from
ever reaching the web server. Finally, the TCP connection is terminated to end the session.
Corporate firewalls can employ this technology to grant employees access to Internet search
engines, while limiting their searching capabilities.
2.2.12 Bi-Directional Traffic Monitoring
For certain content scanning and filtering services, monitoring outbound traffic indepen-
dently of inbound traffic is acceptable. The TCP flow monitor may need to reconstruct a
full TCP conversation for analysis which requires the processing of both directions of a
connection. Additionally, these services may want to process acknowledgment messages
in order to determine what data was actually received and processed by the end system. In
33
Cable splitter,
Port mirror, or
Network tap
Flow Monitoring
Applicaiton
TCP-Processor
Inbound
Outbound
Figure 2.6: Bi-directional Flow Monitoring
order to provide this capability, the TCP processing engine needs to process both directions
of a TCP connection utilizing a unified flow context block.
The TCP-Processor supports coordinated monitoring of bi-directional traffic by us-
ing a hashing algorithm that generates the same result for packets traversing the network
in both the forward and reverse directions. The state store manager stores inbound and
outbound context records in adjacent memory locations. The flow identifiers assigned to
the inbound and outbound packets pertaining to the same TCP connection differ only by
the low bit. This allows the monitoring application to differentiate between the inbound
and outbound traffic while performing coordinated flow monitoring. In order to monitor
traffic in this manner, data traversing the network in both directions must be passed to the
TCP-Processor. Figure 2.6 shows a passive monitoring configuration where bi-directional
traffic is monitored with the aid of a content duplicating device, such as a network switch
configured to do port mirroring.
Asymmetric routing can occur when data traverses through core routers. With asym-
metric routing, outbound traffic takes a different path through the network than inbound
traffic associated with the same connection. Hot potato routing can cause this type of be-
havior and is occasionally used by carriers wanting to limit the amount of transient traffic
they carry. In this instance, when packets are detected which neither originate nor ter-
minate within the carrier’s network, the packets are routed to a different network as soon
as possible. A TCP flow monitor capable of analyzing bi-directional traffic which has
an asymmetric data path through the network must employ additional logic to coordinate
events amongst multiple monitoring nodes in order to ensure that the conversation is prop-
erly monitored.
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Chapter 3
Related Work
This chapter reviews high-speed protocol processing efforts which are similar or related
to this research. It provides a brief overview of network monitoring systems, along with
examples of both software-based and hardware-based network monitors and their current
limitations. It describes various packet classification techniques and discusses related tech-
nologies which perform TCP flow processing. Finally, it presents related work in hardware-
accelerated content scanners, as these applications are ideal candidates for integration with
the TCP-Processor technology.
3.1 Network Monitoring Systems
There are many different types of network monitors and protocol analyzers available today.
These network monitors have a wide range of features and capabilities. Understanding the
differences between the various monitors is challenging because terminology is often vague
or misused. IP-based networks are commonly referred to as TCP/IP networks, although
TCP and IP are two separate protocols which perform different functions in a network.
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [53] is a stream-oriented protocol which maintains a
virtual bit pipe between end systems. Internet Protocol (IP) [52] is an unreliable datagram
delivery service which provides packet routing between two end systems.
Figure 3.1 shows a taxonomy of network monitors. The proposed TCP monitor
performs full flow analysis as indicated by the gray oval in the figure. TCP stream re-
assembly operations are required to fully process TCP flows, in addition to IP and TCP
header processing. This operation separates TCP flow monitors like the TCP-Processor
from other types of network monitors. For example, the tcpdump [83] program performs
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packet capturing and filtering services, but does not provide a full range of TCP moni-
toring features. Tcpdump maintains a minimal amount of per-flow state information in
order to display relative sequence numbers instead of absolute sequence numbers. Stream
reassembly and stateful inspection features, however, are not included in the utility.
The TCP-Processor takes a novel approach to network packet processing by provid-
ing full TCP flow analysis operating at multi-gigabit per second data rates while managing
millions of active connections. In addition, the TCP-Processor operates as an in-band data
processing unit, which enables active processing on network flows. This separates the
TCP-Processor from other types of packet processors which do not have the performance
or capacity to perform TCP stream processing on large numbers of flows in high-speed
networking environments.
3.2 Software-Based Network Monitors
A multitude of software-based packet capturing and network monitoring applications exist
today. These monitors offer a wide range of capabilities, but because they are software-
based, most have performance limitations that prevent them from effectively monitoring
high-speed networks. In order to improve performance, many software-based monitors
only inspect packet headers, ignoring the data payload.
Packet capturing tools such as tcpdump [83], Internet Protocol Scanning Engine
[46], and Ethereal [95] support the capture and storage of network packets. These types
of tools receive copies of network traffic by interfacing directly with lower layer network-
ing drivers. These applications work well for monitoring data at low bandwidth rates, but
36
because they execute in software, their capabilities are limited. Performance of these mon-
itors can be improved by limiting the number of bytes per captured packet. This tradeoff is
acceptable when examining only protocol header fields. TCP data stream analysis can be
performed as a post-processing operation if all data bytes associated with a particular flow
are captured.
HTTPDUMP is an extended version of tcpdump which supports the analysis of
web-based HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) traffic [105]. The extra filtering logic
required for processing the HTTP protocol reduces this tool’s performance. Since a single
type of TCP traffic is targeted, HTTPDUMP is unable to operate as a general purpose flow
monitor.
PacketScope [2] is a network traffic monitor developed at AT&T in order to
provide for the passive monitoring of T3 (45Mbps) backbone links. This monitor utilizes
a network tap which extracts a duplicate copy of the network traffic. Traffic is then routed
to the tcpdump application. The first 128 bytes of each packet are captured and stored
to support analysis. BLT [37] leverages the PacketScope monitor to perform HTTP
monitoring. It decodes the HTTP protocol along with packet headers and generates a log
file which summarizes the activity of these flows. PacketScope does not guarantee the
processing of all packets on the network. Instead, results are obtained by processing only
the majority of HTTP packets.
The Cluster-based Online Monitoring System [80] supports higher data rate HTTP
traffic monitoring. Even though this is also a software-based network traffic monitor, it
achieves higher throughput rates by utilizing a cluster of machines to analyze the network
flows. With eight analysis engines operating, however, traffic is not consistently monitored
at a full 100Mbps line rate. Software-based flow monitors are clearly unable to monitor
large numbers of flows at multi-gigabit per second line rates.
All of these software-based network monitors have problems monitoring traffic
flowing at a 100Mbps data rate. There are several reasons for this performance limitation.
Microprocessors operate on a sequential stream of instructions. This processing model dic-
tates that only one operation can occur at a time and many instructions may be required to
perform a single operation. Processing a single packet may require executing thousands or
tens of thousands of instructions. Software-based monitors with greater complexity require
more instructions, resulting in larger code sizes. Larger code sizes increase the likelihood
that instruction caches will have to be flushed and reloaded during the processing of a
packet. Software-based network monitors also require several data copies, which degrades
the overall throughput of the network monitor. For example, data first must be copied from
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the hardware into main processor memory. Then, an additional data copy may be made
during processing of the various protocol layers. Finally, the data must be copied from ker-
nel memory into an end user’s application data buffer. Application signalling, system calls
and interrupt processing expand the amount of processing overhead which further reduces
the throughput of the monitor.
To overcome the limitations associated with software-based packet processing sys-
tems, the TCP-Processor exploits pipelining and parallelism within a hardware-based pro-
cessing environment to achieve much higher levels of performance. Because there is no
operating system involved, the overhead associated with system calls, scheduling, and in-
terrupt processing is eliminated. Additionally, the TCP-Processor does not store network
packets in external memory prior to or during normal packet processing. This eliminates
processing delays due to memory latency, memory bandwidth, and memory management.
Furthermore, much like the assembly line approach to building automobiles, the TCP-
Processor employs pipelining to increase the throughput of the system. The various com-
ponents of the TCP-Processor can each operate on a different network packet at the same
time. The TCP-Processor also employs parallel processing techniques which allow sep-
arate logic blocks to perform processing on identical portions of a network packet at the
same time. These design choices combine to enable the TCP-Processor to process TCP
data streams at over 2.5 Gbps.
3.3 Hardware-Based Network Monitors
The performance advantages associated with a hardware-based TCP monitor close the gap
between the transmission speeds of high-speed networks and the silicon scaling predicted
by Moore’s Law (see Figure 2.1 on page 14). Necker et al. developed a TCP-Stream Re-
assembly and State Tracking circuit that is capable of analyzing a single TCP flow while
processing data at 3.2Gbps [91]. The circuit was tested utilizing an FPGA device which
tracks the state of a TCP connection and performs limited buffer reassembly. The current
implementation of the circuit only processes a one-way traffic for a single TCP connection.
The authors outline the components which need to be replicated in order to manage mul-
tiple flows. They suggest instantiating a separate copy of the Connection-State-Machine
for each reassembled TCP stream and sharing the logic of the Ack/Seq Tracking Unit by
storing connection specific data in multiplexed registers. Based on resource utilization, the
authors estimate 30 reassembly units can fit within a single Xilinx Virtex XCV812E FPGA.
There are inherent difficulties associated when moving from a single flow processor to a
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multi-flow processor. Signal fan-out delays, context storage and retrieval delays, and lim-
ited amounts of logic, memory and interconnect resources prohibit hardware-based flow
processors to be scaled in this manner above a few hundred concurrent flows.
Li et al. outline an alternative approach to FPGA-based TCP processing [72]. Their
design provides TCP connection state processing and TCP stream reassembly functions for
both client and server-directed traffic on a single TCP connection. It maintains a 1024 byte
reassembly buffer for both client and server side traffic and drops packets lying outside of
the reassembly buffer space on receipt are dropped. Portions of the circuit design have been
implemented and process data at 3.06 Gbps. Each individual TCP connection requires a
separate instance of this circuit. A maximum of eight TCP flows could be monitored using
a Xilinx Virtex 1000E FPGA. This type of system does not scale and is insufficient for
monitoring the large number of flows found on high-speed network links.
Unlike other FPGA-based TCP processors, the TCP-Processor was designed from
the ground up with the notion that it must support large numbers of simultaneous TCP con-
nections while operating at multi-gigabit data rates. The problems associated with context
storage and retrieval while operating in this environment were addressed from the start. To
accomplish this task, the internal structure of the TCP processing engine localizes packet
processing which requires persistent state information and optimizes the design so this in-
formation can be easily stored and reloaded with the processing of each network packet. A
separate state store manager component manages operations to an external memory device
which stores per-flow context information and completes the flow classification operation.
These techniques enable the TCP-Processor to process millions of simultaneous TCP con-
nections while processing data at multi-gigabit data rates.
3.4 Packet Classification
A large amount of effort has been applied to date to the problem of performing high-speed
packet classification [82, 98, 26, 119, 135, 126, 115, 100, 29]. Until the mid-1990s, most
work centered around performing a longest prefix match on a 32-bit destination IP address
field. Network equipment performing IP packet forwarding requires this type of operation.
More recent research examines the use of multiple header fields to perform packet clas-
sification. The various classification techniques can be broken into four separate groups:
CAM-based algorithms, trie-based algorithms, multidimensional or cutting algorithms and
other research which doesn’t fit into one of the other categories. The algorithms for per-
forming high-speed packet classification in each of these categories are summarized below.
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Content Addressable Memories (CAMs) provide a fast mechanism for performing
lookups which result from parallel comparison operations [82]. These devices perform bi-
nary comparisons that require large table expansions when wildcards are included in the
search field. Because CAM devices contain more support circuitry than SRAM devices,
they are more expensive, slower, have lower densities, and require more power than com-
modity memory devices. Ternary CAMs (TCAMs) provide an extension to the basic CAM
device by storing three possible states (0, 1, X-don’t care) for each bit. This feature is
typically implemented with a comparison value and a mask value. Since two values are
stored for each entry, TCAMs have twice the memory requirements of regular binary CAM
devices. This increases the cost and power consumption for these devices. Shah and Gupta
[111] introduced two algorithms, prefix length ordering and chain ancestor ordering, to re-
duce the number of memory operations required to perform incremental updates to TCAM
devices. Panigrahy and Sharma proposed paging and partitioning techniques in order to
improve throughput and reduce power consumption in TCAM devices [98].
Trie-based packet classification algorithms are based on tree structures in which
a single node is associated with every common prefix and exact matches are stored as
leaves under that node. Trie-type retrieval algorithms originated in the late 1960s [90].
Most notably, the BSD operating system employed a trie lookup mechanism in order to
perform next hop packet routing [60]. Enhancements to the basic trie algorithm used for
IP forwarding proposed by Degermark et al. can improve the lookup performance to 1
million IP packet classifications per second [26]. In addition, the grid-of-tries concept by
Srinivasan et al. extends the normal binary trie to support lookups on two fields [119].
Waldvogel et al. developed a high-speed prefix matching algorithm for router for-
warding which can process 10-13 million packets per second [135]. This algorithm intro-
duces mutating binary trees with markers and pre-computation in order to bound worst-
case lookup performance to logarithmic time. While extremely efficient when performing
lookup operations, this algorithm does not easily support incremental updates. The Fast In-
ternet Protocol Lookup (FIPL) architecture [125, 126] guarantees worst-case performance
of over 9 million lookups per second. FIPL maintains lookup performance while simulta-
neously handling 1,000 route updates per second. It is implemented in FPGA logic utilizing
one external SRAM module and operates at 100MHz. For testing, 16 thousand route en-
tries, requiring only 10 bytes of storage for each entry, were loaded into the FIPL engine.
More recently, complex routing instructions require routers to perform packet classi-
fication on multiple fields. This usually involves the 5-tuple of source address, destination
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address, source port, destination port, and protocol fields. The Recursive Flow Classifi-
cation (RFC) algorithm exploits structure and redundancy found in rule sets in order to
improve performance [47]. By mapping rule sets into a multi-dimensional space, a tech-
nique of performing parallel range matches in each dimension can improve classification
speeds to a million packet classifications per second [69]. The Aggregated Bit Vector
(ABV) scheme extends this algorithm by adding rearrangement and recursive aggregation
which compress tables and reduce the number of memory accesses required to perform
a lookup [3]. Gupta and McKeown describe a hierarchical cutting technique [48] which
utilizes rule preprocessing to build a tree whose nodes represent a subset of the rule sets.
HyperCuts extends this concept to allow simultaneous cutting in multiple dimensions and
reduces memory requirements by pulling common rules up to higher nodes within the tree
[115].
SWITCHGEN is a tool which transforms packet classification rules into reconfig-
urable hardware-based circuit designs [59]. The goal of this approach is to achieve 100
million packet classifications per second, or sufficient throughput to manage traffic on an
OC-768 data link. Prakash et al. propose a packet classifier which performs lookups uti-
lizing a series of pipelined SRAMs [100]. One billion packet classification lookups per
second could be supported with this technology.
Most recently, Dharmapurikar et al. describe a Bloom filter hashing technique to
perform packet classifications [29]. A Bloom filter involves hashing an input several times
using different hashing functions. The resultant values are used as direct memory indexes
into sparsely populated hash tables. These hash table lookups can be performed in a single
clock cycle utilizing on-chip memories. If all of the values from the lookups return true,
then there is a high probability that a match has been found. The Bloom filter technique is
subject to false positive matches which require an additional comparison in order to validate
the result, but a false negative will never be returned. It is capable of performing an average
of 300 million lookups per second, with worst-case performance of 100 million lookups per
second. By comparison, TCAMs operate at 100 million lookups per second, consume 150
times more power, and cost 30 times more than the commodity SRAM devices that can be
utilized in a packet classifier based on Bloom filter technology.
The TCP-Processor currently uses a modified open addressing hash scheme for
managing per-flow context information. This modification involves limiting the length
of hash chains in order to provide deterministic behavior when performing flow classifica-
tion and retrieving per-flow context information. While excessive hash collisions can lead
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to the incomplete monitoring of a TCP flow, the occurrence of hash collisions can be re-
duced by selecting hash algorithms which evenly distribute flows throughout memory and
appropriately sizing memory for the number of expected flows. In addition, flow classi-
fication operations are localized within the TCP-Processor so that new flow classification
algorithms can be easily incorporated without requiring major changes to the system.
3.5 Related Technologies
The technology employed by load balancers, SSL accelerators, intrusion detection systems,
and TCP offload engines is different than the TCP flow processing architecture described
in this dissertation. These devices do contain components that process the TCP protocol,
and therefore have related processing requirements. This section discusses the operation of
these devices and compares their TCP processing features to this research.
3.5.1 Load Balancers
Load balancing devices distribute the request load of a common resource among N number
of servers. They are useful in web farms where request loads exceed the capacity of a
single machine. Another advantage of load balancing devices is that they provide failover
support, masking the failure of a single backend server by routing requests that would
otherwise have failed to other functioning servers. In web farms, the load balancing device
is typically placed between a firewall router and a group of web servers. The firewall
router provides access to the Internet and the web servers provide content to the Internet
community. Figure 3.2 illustrates a typical web farm.
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Figure 3.3: Delayed Binding Technique
One of the features of load balancing devices is content-based (or cookie-based)
routing. In a content-based routing scenario, the load balancer directs requests to a spe-
cific server based on information contained within the request. Since a connection has to
be established before content can be delivered, load balancing devices employ a concept
called delayed binding. It allows the load balancing device to complete the TCP connection
and receive the web request. On receipt, the request can be parsed in order to determine
which of the backend servers should receive the request. The load balancer then initiates a
TCP connection with the appropriate web server and forwards the request. When the web
server generates a response, the load balancer adjusts the TCP header fields of the response
packets and returns the response to the end users. Figure 3.3 illustrates the TCP interaction
between the end users, the load balancer and the web server. Many commercial vendors of
load balancing equipment employ delayed binding [92, 35, 18, 39, 101].
A load balancing processes TCP header fields when performing content-based rout-
ing. The main differences between load balancing devices and the research presented in
this dissertation are:
• Load balancers are in close proximity to a web server or end system.
• Load balancers partially terminate the TCP connection.
• Load balancers only scan the initial part of the TCP flow.
• Load balancers only scan traffic in one direction.
• Load balancers are limited in the number of simultaneously flows that they can mon-
itor.
• The amount of traffic that current generation load balancers can handle is limited.
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In contrast to load balancers, the TCP-Processor is designed to perform full TCP
flow analysis for millions of flows at multi-gigabit data rates. In addition, there is no
requirement that the TCP-Processor be placed next to an end system and it is also capable
of processing bi-directional traffic. Load balancers fulfill a specific need for Web Servers
and are not capable of performing the functions of the TCP-Processor.
3.5.2 SSL Accelerators
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a protocol for providing an encrypted and secure data path
between two endpoints [43]. Web browsers employ this protocol to support secure com-
munication with a Web server, preventing eavesdropping, data tampering, and data forgery.
The processing overhead required to implement the SSL protocol demands SSL
acceleration. When a web server processes SSL, its encryption/decryption algorithms con-
sume much of the server’s processing power. Several network vendors offer SSL accelera-
tors as a solution to this problem [93, 36, 20, 84]. An SSL accelerator is an external device
which implements the SSL protocol, including key management, encryption, and decryp-
tion processing. An SSL accelerator frees up the web server or end processing system from
having to perform the compute-intensive operations required to provide a secure communi-
cations environment. Figure 3.4 shows the placement of an SSL accelerator in the network.
The SSL accelerator is tightly coupled with one or more web servers and provides secure
communication services for TCP connections at a single location.
An SSL acceleration device performs protocol processing on TCP connections. The
main differences between SSL acelerators and the research presented in this dissertation
are:
• SSL accelerators are in close proximity to a web server or end system.
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• SSL accelerators terminate and re-establish TCP connections.
• SSL accelerators act as protocol translators, communicating via secure connections
on one side of the device and via normal non-secure connections on the other side.
• The number of simultaneous flows SSL accelerators can process is limited.
• The amount of traffic that current generation SSL accelerators can handle is limited.
SSL accelerators terminate and re-establish a TCP connection with a back-end Web
Sever. They are designed to be placed in very close proximity to the Web Servers to which
they connect. The TCP-Processor does not terminate and re-establish TCP connections
and has flexible placement requirements. It is designed to perform full TCP flow analysis
for millions of flows a multi-gigabit data rates. SSL accelerators are designed for encyrp-
tion/decryption services and not general TCP flow processing like the TCP-Processor.
3.5.3 Intrusion Detection Systems
Most intrusion detection systems in use today have software-based implementations. Snort
[104] and other software-based intrusion detection systems have performance limitations
which prevent them from processing large quantities of traffic at high data rates. Software-
based intrusion detection systems contain performance limitations which prevent them
from being able to fully process traffic on a heavily loaded 100Mbps network link [107].
In order to improve performance, rule sets are tailored to reduce the amount of required
text searching. In addition, instead of performing TCP processing and stream reassem-
bly operations to accurately interrogate stream payloads, Snort, for example, is typically
configured to inspect only payloads on an individual packet basis. Virus scanners such as
VirusScan [81] and AntiVirus [123] operate on end systems where they monitor data as it
passes between the application and the TCP stack.
Li et al. have implemented portions of an intrusion detection system in reconfig-
urable hardware [71]. Header processing and content matching logic utilize FPGA-based
CAM circuits to search for predefined content in network packets. The content matcher
searches for a single signature based on the result of the header processing operation. Data
is clocked into a 160 bit wide sliding window matching buffer 32 bits at a time. This sup-
ports the matching of digital signatures of up to 16 ((160 − 32)/8) characters in length.
Although the circuit can process data at 2.68Gbps, there is no support for managing TCP
flows.
Granidt (Gigabit Rate Network Intrusion Detection Technology) combines a hard-
ware component and a software component to create an intrusion detection system [45].
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The hardware component utilizes multiple FPGA devices to perform header processing
and content matching using logic-based CAMs. A 32-bit PCI interface connecting the
FPGA devices to the main computer limits processing bandwidth to 696Mbps. The hard-
ware portion of the design can process data at 2Gbps. The Granidt system does not perform
TCP flow processing and only searches for content on a packet by packet basis.
Of the available commercial intrusion detection systems [55, 19, 38], none are ca-
pable of processing millions of data flows at multi-gigabit line rates. Accomplishing this
goal requires high performance TCP processing, flow classification, stream reassembly,
and content scanning techniques. Vendors apply heuristics which limit the stream reassem-
bly or content scanning operations in order to achieve higher throughput rates. Most of
these devices support lower traffic throughput rates (on the order of a few hundred Mbps)
and have limited capacity for supporting large numbers of simultaneous connections. The
target placement for these devices is typically within client networks where data rates and
the total number of connections are limited.
State-based processing languages aid in the definition and tracking of state tran-
sitions associated with network attacks [99, 64, 104]. Kruegel et al developed a stateful
intrusion detection system for use in high-speed networks which divides traffic on high-
speed links and disperses the processing load to an array of computers running software-
based analyzers [64]. This system employs an extensible state transition-based language
(STATL) and a state transition framework (STAT) which simplify the process of describing
and detecting network-based attacks [32, 134]. It also employs a static configuration for
splitting traffic amongst the monitoring systems and therefore cannot react to changes in
network traffic patterns. This can lead to overload conditions on individual flow monitors.
A single computer running STAT is capable of processing data at 200 Mbps.
WebSTAT also leverages the STAT framework to monitor HTTP requests [133].
Several web-based attacks were defined using their state transition definition language
and analyzed. Utilizing their WebSTAT state tracking software in conjunction with an
Apache web server, a stateful HTTP monitoring with a throughput of almost 100 Mbps
was achieved.
The Bro system [99] utilizes a state processing engine to scan for regular expres-
sions. This engine dynamically creates deterministic finite automata (DFA) states when-
ever a transition occurs into a state which does not already exist. Bro is able to reduce
the amount of system resources required for state processing because many states in the
DFA will never be reached. The Bro system has been extended to perform stateful process-
ing of bidirectional network flows [117]. Their tests involved the processing of disk files
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containing captured network data and tracking the total time required to process all of the
captured packets. The modified Bro system was measured to process a 667MB file in 156
CPU seconds, which gives an effective average throughput of 34Mbps.
The effectiveness of the Snort and Bro systems during heavy traffic loads was mea-
sured by Lee et al [70]. Their experiments showed that both systems become overloaded
and fail to detect intrusions when traffic loads exceed 40 Mbps. In order to improve per-
formance, the authors outline adaptive configurations which can be tuned dynamically in
response to differing traffic patterns. This type of adaptive IDS increases the probability
that an intrusion will be detected during heavy traffic loads.
Intrusion detection systems scan network packets searching for digital signatures
corresponding to Internet worms and computer viruses. Some of the more sophisticated in-
trusion detections systems perform TCP stream reassembly in order to scan for signatures
across packet boundaries. To accomplish this task, they need to perform similar flow pro-
cessing to that of the TCP-Processor. Existing intrusion detections systems are not capable
of processing data at multi-gigabit data rates nor are they capable of processing millions of
simultaneous TCP connections.
3.5.4 TCP Offload Engines
The main purpose of a TCP Offload Engine (TOE) is to enhance system performance by
processing TCP/IP protocol layers in an external device. This allows the main processor to
concentrate on application specific processing. As network speeds increase, a dispropor-
tionately high processing load will be placed on the main CPU when processing protocols
and communicating over these network links [25]. This is attributable to the large number
of interrupts handled by the main CPU and the protocol processing overhead incurred per
transmitted data byte. When using a normal Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size of
1500 bytes, current computer systems which process TCP in software are unable to saturate
a Gigabit Ethernet link [96]. A TOE equipped Network Interface Card (NIC) will allow
computer systems to communicate efficiently on future high-speed networks.
Due to the negative impact of software protocol processing on high-speed networks,
there has been a recent flurry of research activity [138, 50, 102] in the area of TCP offload
engines, resulting in two main research directions: placing a computing resource on the
NIC which handles protocol processing, and reserving one CPU in a multi-CPU system
for performing protocol processing. This activity stems from the realization that TCP pro-
cessing consumes a large portion of a main processor’s resources when dealing with high
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traffic rates. When data rates exceed 100Mbps, over half of the CPU processing time can
be utilized while processing interrupts, copying data, processing protocols, and executing
kernel routines. A TCP offload engine performs protocol processing operations, freeing up
the main processor to perform application level processing and user-assigned tasks.
Sabhikhi presents a discussion of the issues surrounding high performance TCP
implementations [106]. These issues include managing large numbers of connections, pro-
cessing data on high speed links, handling high connection rates, limiting instruction mem-
ory size, providing fast efficient access to memory, and selecting a programming model
(synchronous versus asynchronous, managing data movement, and maintaining the many
required timers). Four competing technologies are: (1) general purpose processors, (2) net-
work processors, (3) TCP processors, and (4) network storage processors. General purpose
CPUs are over burdened with processing protocols. TCP processing in software typically
requires 2GHz of processing power to manage an average mix of packets on a heavily
loaded 1Gbps link [10]. This severely reduces the number of compute cycles available for
application processing. Memory bandwidth, I/O throughput, and interrupt processing of
general purpose CPUs combine to limit overall throughput. Specialized network proces-
sors, such as those contained in the Intel IXP-1200 and the Motorola 8260 can perform
only limited protocol work. These devices are ideal for handling lower layer networking
protocols, but do not have the performance or resources to process TCP. Since these cores
execute software instructions, they require extremely high clock frequencies in order to
achieve the performance necessary to process traffic at high data rates. Network storage
processors support the termination of TCP so that storage devices can be placed anywhere
in the network while utilizing existing networking infrastructure. These processors are
targeted at providing high availability and high performance storage solutions utilizing ex-
isting protocols. The addition of TCP-based communications to network storage processors
is a new concept and commercial devices that use it are under development.
Intelligent Network Interface Cards (NICs) will support the processing of higher
level protocols in the future. The current focus of development on TOEs is on adding
TCP processing engines to NICs that operate at gigabit line speeds or higher. Many of the
NIC vendors, including Intel, NEC, Adaptec, Lucent, and others, are actively working on
this technology. These devices typically contain a microprocessor and high-speed mem-
ory in order to perform TCP state processing and stream reassembly. Data payloads can
then be Direct Memory Access (DMA) transferred into main memory for application level
processing. Very high performance embedded microprocessors are being developed specif-
ically for the task of offloading TCP processing [138, 50]. These microprocessors operate
48
at 10GHz clock frequencies in order to processes TCP connections on 10Gbps networks.
These processors contain specialized instruction sets which are optimized for the task of
performing protocol processing operations. CAMs are utilized in packet classification and
packet resequencing operations utilizing on-chip memories. Currently, the TCP offload
engine from Intel [138] is unable to process more than 8,000 active flows simultaneously.
The second approach that supports TCP termination on high speed networks is allo-
cating one CPU in a multi-CPU system solely for the task of processing network protocols.
Regnier et al. have made significant performance gains by partitioning processors in this
manner [102]. By segregating protocol processing operations and locking down tasks to
specific processors, the operating system avoids contending with issues such as resource
contention, lock management, scheduling, and the purging of instruction and data caches.
The stack, driver, and kernel accounted for over 96% of the CPU utilization on a 2 processor
SMP in a normal configuration. By reserving one processor to handle protocol processing,
this percentage was reduced to 53%.
Compared to the TCP-Processor, the main limitation of current generation TCP of-
fload engines is their inability to support large numbers of active flows simultaneously. Ad-
ditionally, these devices are concerned with terminating a TCP connection and therefore do
not provide the enhanced flow processing capabilities of the TCP-Processor. Similar to the
TCP-Processor, they perform flow classification and TCP stream reassembly operations,
and interact with data processing applications. Unlike the TCP-Processor, TCP offload en-
gines contain additional protocol processing logic required to terminate TCP connections.
The TCP flow classification and processing techniques employed by the TCP-Processor are
directly applicable to TCP offload engines.
3.6 Hardware-Accelerated Content Scanners
The TCP-Processor is designed to integrate with various types of stream processing ap-
plications. Hardware-accelerated content scanners are ideal applications for integration
because of their speed of operation and their ability to detect specific content within a TCP
flow or apply a regular expression to the TCP data stream. This section describes recent
research relating to hardware-accelerated content scanners. The following content scan-
ning architectures are organized in chronological order, with earlier work appearing first
and most recent research appearing last.
Sidhu et al. developed an FPGA circuit that detects regular expression matches to a
given input stream using Nondeterministic Finite Automata (NFAs) [114]. Their algorithm
49
minimizes time and space requirements in order to improve the efficiency of the implemen-
tation. NFAs are implemented as configured logic on an FPGA device. The performance of
their hardware-based content scanning architecture is dependant on the length of the regu-
lar expression being evaluated. Their system is faster than best case software performance
and orders of magnitude better in worst case scenarios.
Franklin et al. developed an FPGA-based regular expression compiler in Java using
JHDL [41]. They extended the work of Sidhu et al. implementing NFAs in reconfigurable
hardware and analyzed the regular expressions found in the Snort [104] rule database. For
small test cases, the performance of software implementations is similar to that of their
hardware implementation. For larger regular expressions, the hardware circuit had a 600x
performance improvement over software-based systems.
Cho et al. created a rule-based system where rules are transformed into VHDL struc-
tures [17]. These VHDL structures are loaded into FPGAs and processed in parallel to
exploit the independent nature of different rules. Signature matching is accomplished via
four parallel 8-bit comparators. Their implementation is capable of processing data at over
2.88 Gbps. This system has scaling problems because rule matching is performed directly
in FPGA logic and this logic area increases at a quadratic rate compared to the number of
rules processed.
Moscola et al. implemented a system which employs Deterministic Finite Automata
(DFA) to scan individual network packets for digital signatures. Their analysis indicates
that most regular expressions can be implemented with fewer states using DFA-based im-
plementations than with NFA-based implementations. Operating four scanners in parallel,
their circuit is capable of scanning network traffic at 1.184 Gbps. The performance of
this system degrades as the number of regular expressions increases. The reduction in
performance is caused by signal fan-out delays when routing the input stream to multiple
matching engines.
Dharmapurikar et al. introduced a hardware circuit which uses a hashing technique
to detect fixed-length strings in a data stream [29]. This technique is based on Bloom filters,
first described in 1970 [9]. The system uses on-chip static RAM to hold hash tables which
support single clock cycle memory accesses. The Bloom filter hashing technique for string
searching is subject to false-positives where a match is indicated where none exists. To
prevent false positives, additional logic is required to validate every match. The system is
capable of scanning for 10,000 strings at 2.4 Gbps.
Clark et al. developed an FPGA circuit capable of analyzing complex regular ex-
pressions against an arbitrary input data stream [21]. The design seeks to maximize pattern
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matching capacity and system throughput by reducing the circuit area required to perform
the character matches. The system is capable of scanning for 17,000 characters in over
1,500 rules of the Snort rule database at gigabit traffic rates.
Sourdis et al. employ fine grain pipelining in FPGA devices to perform high-speed
string matching [118]. They utilize multiple comparators and parallel matching to maintain
high throughput. A packet fan-out tree is implemented, allowing every rule to receive the
incoming packet at the same time. This improves the overall throughput of their system.
By performing four comparisons on each clock cycle, each shifted by one byte, their design
can scan 32 bits per clock cycle. A maximum throughput of 11 Gbps was achieved when
scanning for 50 Snort rule on a Virtex2 1000 FPGA device.
Baker et al. developed a linear-array string matching architecture for use in recon-
figurable hardware [4]. Their method uses a buffered, two-comparator variation of the
KMP [62] algorithm. The system is capable of processing data streams at 1.8 Gbps. Small
memory banks hold string patterns and jump tables which can be reconfigured at run-time,
without affecting the throughput of the system.
Lockwood et al. built a reprogrammable firewall using DFAs and CAMs imple-
mented in FPGA logic [77]. This system scans packet payloads using regular expressions
and processes a small number of packet headers using Ternary Content Addressable Mem-
ories (TCAM). The reprogrammable firewall, without the content scanning component,
can process data at 2 Gbps. The regular expression processing engine only operates at 296
Mbps. This performance can be increased by instantiating multiple copies of the regular
expression processing engine.
Sugawara et al. developed a multi-stream packet scanner [122]. The algorithm is
based on the Aho-Corasick algorithm which uses a trie structure that corresponds to the
longest pattern match [61]. A small amount of context information is maintained which
pertains to the current matching state of a flow. This context information can be swapped
in and out of the scanner. An implementation of this algorithm is capable of processing
data at 14 Gpbs when scanning for 2000 characters.
While the TCP-Processor is designed to integrate easily with any type of TCP stream
processing application, hardware accelerated content scanners are ideal integration candi-
dates because of their ability to process large quantities of data at very high speeds. The
majority of these research efforts focus on context scanning algorithms which operate on
a single data flow. The work by Sugawara et al. [122] focused on developing a content
scanner which minimizes per-flow context information. This simplifies the process of stor-
ing and retrieving scanning state so that multiple data flows can be processed by a single
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scanning unit. A content scanner capable of quickly swapping scanning state is most likely
to realize the benefits of high-speed flow processing by integrating with the TCP-Processor.
3.7 Summary
The TCP-Processor describes a new type of multi-context TCP flow processor that is ca-
pable of operating on the high-speed network links of today and tomorrow. The TCP-
Processor architecture overcomes the limitations of software-based implementations by
using multiple levels of pipelining for packet processing operations and exploiting fine
grain parallelism. The architecture is implemented in FPGA logic and does not incur any
operating system overhead. To improve the throughput and performance of the system,
packets are not stored in external memory during normal processing.
The TCP-Processor also provides distinct advantages over other hardware-based
TCP processors. The TCP-Processor’s main distinction from other research is its ability to
handle millions of simultaneous TCP flows. This is accomplished by maintaining a small
amount of per-flow context information stored in external memory which can quickly be
swapped in and out of the TCP state processing engine. Another of the TCP-Processor’s
advantages is its extensibility. Its modular architecture can be extended or modified to
incorporate different algorithms and new features. The application interface annotates net-
work packets which provides stream processing applications with full packet headers in
addition to TCP stream data.
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Chapter 4
Architecture
This chapter provides an overview of the TCP processing architecture. The first section re-
views the initial phases of research in order to provide a historical context for the develop-
ment of the TCP-Processor. This summary includes brief descriptions of the TCP-Splitter
circuit and early work on the TCP-Processor, which was incorporated into the StreamCap-
ture circuit. The next section provides an overview of the TCP-Processor which describes
its underlying components, their basic operation, and the data flow through the circuit.
The following section describes the application interface for the TCP-Processor, providing
definitions for each of the interface signals and an explanation of the interface waveform.
Finally, the chapter provides information on the extensibility of the architecture along with
a description of how this architecture can be employed in complex flow processing appli-
cations which require coordination among multiple FPGA devices.
4.1 Initial Investigations
This research work responds to the challenge of processing the data for large numbers of
TCP connections within the context of a high-speed network. This challenge is greatest
when dealing with the real-time packet processing constraints related to the computation
and memory operations required to analyze a single TCP packet. Existing TCP processing
systems, such as those that detect and filter Internet worms and computer viruses, have
severe performance limitations which prevent them from operating in this environment. To
be effective, data processing systems must have access to an accurate representation of the
application data transiting a network. Reconstructing byte streams from individual packets
is required when processing data contained in TCP packets.
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Figure 4.1: TCP-Splitter Data Flow
Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) contain large numbers of reconfigurable
logic units interconnected with an underlying routing fabric. These devices support parallel
operations, pipelined operations, and provide tightly-coupled access to high-speed memo-
ries. The initial research associated with this dissertation originated with the idea of using
FPGA devices to process TCP data flows in high-speed networked environments.
4.1.1 TCP-Splitter
Initial investigations of this problem resulted in a proof of concept design called the TCP-
Splitter [110, 109]. This technology splits the network data stream into two separate copies,
forwarding one on to the next hop router or end system and another copy to the monitoring
application. Figure 4.1 shows the flow of IP packets through the TCP-Splitter circuit and
the delivery of a TCP byte stream to a client application.
A produced and tested hardware circuit based on the TCP-Splitter design supports
the processing of 256 thousand TCP flows at 3.2Gbps. The TCP-Splitter maintains 33 bits
of context information per flow. This context data includes a one bit indication of whether
or not the flow is active and a 32 bit number specifying the next expected TCP sequence
number for connection.
A multiple device programmer [108, 65] showcases the viability of the TCP-Splitter
technology. This circuit extracts device configuration and programming information from
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a TCP connection and uses this information to program attached devices. Since the TCP-
Splitter processes network packets, remote devices can be programmed using this tech-
nology as long as there is network connectivity between the device and the programming
station. Figure 4.2 shows an example of a programmer located in New York programming
devices in Chicago, Denver, and Los Angeles. In this example, a TCP connection is estab-
lished with a computer acting as the connection end point. The TCP packets sent from the
programming computer to the end point computer travel through the intermediate locations
containing the devices to be reprogrammed.
The TCP-Splitter design contains several limitations which are addressed by the
TCP-Processor. These limitations are listed below:
• The number of TCP flows which can be concurrently processed is limited to 256
thousand. High-speed network communication links that operate at 2.5Gbps data
rates and above can support millions of simultaneous TCP connections. In order to
operate effectively in this environment, the TCP-Splitter needs to be able to handle
a larger number of concurrent connections. Because the TCP-Splitter uses limited
capacity SRAM devices for per-flow context storage, the TCP-Splitter has a bounded
limit on the number of simultaneous connections it can process relative to maximum
size of the available SRAM memory devices.
• The TCP-Splitter technology has a small amount of memory for storing per-flow
context information. It uses a 1MByte memory module to store per-flow context
information. Each memory location is 36-bits wide and represents the context storage
associated with a single TCP flow. This amount of memory is insufficient to store
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proper per-flow context information. Realistic storage requirements are in the tens of
bytes range.
• Hash collisions are not handled within the per-flow context storage area. The memory
device is too small to support direct addressing using a 96-bit index obtained by
concatenating the source IP address, the destination IP address, the source TCP port
and the destination TCP port. In addition, there is insufficient memory available to
store these items within each context record. Because of these memory limitations,
the TCP-Splitter cannot tell the difference between two TCP flows that hash to the
same memory location. When this situation occurs, the TCP-Splitter will continue to
process the first flow and treat packets from the second flow as either retransmitted
packets or as out-of-sequence packets.
• The TCP-Splitter only allows client applications to operate as passive monitoring
devices. This processing model is inadequate for classes of applications which need
to manipulate network traffic. Intrusion prevention systems are one such example.
Without the ability to alter, drop or generate network packets, a system of this nature
would not be able to stop the spread of malicious content.
• There is no support for the reordering of out-of-sequence packets. The TCP-Splitter
actively drops selective out-of-sequence packets from the network, counting on the
end hosts to detect and retransmit the missing data. This act of dropping out-of-
sequence network packets forces data to flow through the network in the proper se-
quence. Data is normally transmitted through the network in order. Under ideal
conditions, the packet dropping behavior of the TCP-Splitter has no effect on net-
work traffic. When route changes, network congestion, fiber cuts, router overloads
and other disruptions occur to the normal flow of network traffic, this packet drop-
ping behavior can have a severe negative impact of the performance of the network.
For this reason, the TCP processing circuit needs to support the re-ordering of out-
of-sequence packets without removing packets from the network.
4.1.2 StreamCapture
The StreamCapture circuit attempts to address the limitations of the TCP-Splitter technol-
ogy while adding enhanced processing features. This circuit is designed to be used in a
single chip implementation where the TCP processing logic and the client application re-
side on the same FPGA device. The close proximity between these circuits allows the
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StreamCapture circuit to provide context storage services to the client application without
requiring additional memory accesses.
The StreamCapture circuit also supports blocking and unblocking TCP data streams
at a client application-specified TCP sequence number. This feature is useful to applications
which need to block the flow of data on a particular connection while authorization and val-
idation operations take place. Once access has been granted, the flow of data is re-enabled
for that connection. There is also support for the termination of an active flow. This can
be accomplished by generating the appropriate TCP reset (RST) packets and transmitting
them to both end systems.
The StreamCapture circuit maintains 64 bytes of context for each TCP flow. Context
required for TCP processing is stored in the first 32 bytes of this area and includes the IP
and TCP header information required to uniquely identify this flow. This information is
used to differentiate separate TCP connections from each other when hash collisions occur
in the state store. To ease the processing burden on client applications, the StreamCapture
circuit also maintains application-specific context information in the other 32 bytes of the
per-flow record. Using burst read operations, this extra information can be retrieved from
external memory with a minimal amount of overhead.
In practice, maintaining per-flow context information for client applications was
more of a liability than a feature due to the time delay between the storage and retrieval of
application-specific context information. Figure 4.3 shows the layout of the StreamCapture
circuit. All per-flow context information is stored in an external memory device. When
processing a packet, the TCP Processing Engine retrieves application-specific context in-
formation and passes it to the client application with the network packet. After processing
the packet, the client application passes updated context information to the Enhanced Flow
Services module, which then updates external memory. To achieve high throughput, the
StreamCapture circuit is pipelined so different modules simultaneously process different
network packets. The time delay between the retrieval of application-specific context in-
formation from external memory and the updating of this context information leads to
inconsistencies in data processing. To resolve this issue, the StreamCapture circuit can
suspend processing until the application-specific context information is updated. This re-
duces the throughput of the circuit and can lead to dropped packets when buffers overflow.
Another possible solution requires the client application to maintain a cache of recently
processed flows. Since the client application has no direct access to external memory, this
configuration can lead to cache coherency problems and processing packets with improper
context information.
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Figure 4.3: StreamCapture Circuit
4.2 TCP-Processor
The architecture of the TCP-Processor contains a feature set derived from the preceding
work on TCP processing circuits. The feature set includes:
• Maintenance of 64 bytes of per-flow context for each TCP connection.
• Support for the processing of millions of simultaneous TCP connections.
• Easy integration of other classification and lookup algorithms.
• Processing of network traffic at OC-48 (2.5Gbps).
• A scalable design which can grow to support higher speed networks of the future.
• Allowance for the processing of bi-directional TCP flows by associating packets in
opposite directions of the same flow with each other.
The TCP-Processor consists of seven separate components: an input buffer, a TCP
processing engine, a packet storage manager, a state store manager, a packet router, an
egress processing component and a statistics component. This is shown in Figure 4.4. The
interfaces between each of these components are designed to simplify module integration,
modification and replacement tasks. In addition, integration efforts can utilize these internal
subcomponent interfaces to extend the capabilities of the TCP-Processor.
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Figure 4.4: TCP-Processor Architecture
The input buffer processes data as it enters the TCP-Processor, providing packet
buffering services during periods of downstream delay. Memory contention, management
overhead and flow control resulting from downstream congestion can cause these process-
ing delays. In addition, the client application has the ability to induce back pressure into
the TCP-Processor by driving its own flow control signal and cause additional delays. The
input buffer component also ensures that any data loss in the circuit occurs in whole packet
increments, thus protecting the rest of the circuit from having to process incomplete packet
fragments.
Data from the input buffer flows into the TCP processing engine, which manages
protocol processing operations. This module computes TCP checksums, tracks flow pro-
cessing state, and performs computations related to the flow classification operation. In
addition, it communicates with a packet store manager for storing packets. This provides a
slow path through the circuit where packets can be stored and later reinjected for continued
processing.
The state store manager manages all of the per-flow context storage and retrieval
operations through communications with the memory controller. It exposes a simple inter-
face to the flow classifier and the egress processing components for retrieving and storing
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context information. This modular design allows for the replacement of the memory sub-
system to support other memory devices or different lookup algorithms. The state store
manager communicates with large memories which hold the per-flow context information
for the TCP processing engine.
The packet storage manager provides packet buffering services for the TCP pro-
cessing engine. Packets received in an improper order by the TCP processing engine can
be passed off to the packet storage manager until packets containing the missing data ar-
rive. At that point, the stored packets can be re-injected into the TCP processing engine.
Consider the packet sequence 1, 2, 4, 5, 3. The packet storage manager stores packets 4
and 5 until packet 3 is received. At that time, packets 4 and 5 are re-injected into the data
path. This processing ensures that data is passed to the monitoring application in the proper
sequence.
The packet routing module determines where the current packet should be directed.
There are three possible routing choices. The normal flow of traffic is routed to the moni-
toring application component, where it is processed. Retransmitted frames and other non-
TCP-based packets can either be routed with the monitored TCP traffic to the monitoring
application or forwarded directly on to the egress processing module for transmission to
the end system or next hop router. Packets with invalid checksums are dropped from the
network. When the TCP-Processor is configured for in-order processing, packets which
reach this point whose sequence numbers are greater than what is expected by the TCP
processing engine are dropped in order to ensure that TCP flows traverse the network in
order.
The egress processing module receives packets from the monitoring application and
performs additional per-flow processing. If so directed by the monitoring application, the
egress processing module can block a selected flow by ensuring that packets which contain
data exceeding a specified blocking sequence number will be dropped from the network.
In this manner, a network flow can be temporarily blocked and re-enabled. The termination
of a selected flow can also be performed at this time by blocking the flow and generating
a TCP RST packet. TCP checksums are validated and can be corrected in situations where
the client application has modified packets or inserted new packets into the data stream.
Bypass packets received directly from the routing module are interleaved with packets re-
ceived from the monitoring application for transmission to the outbound interface. Statis-
tics packets are also interleaved into the outbound traffic.
All of the TCP-Processor’s components supply event triggers to the statistics com-
ponent. Internal counters accumulate the occurrence of these event triggers, providing a
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Figure 4.5: TCP Processing Engine
collection point for statistical information. On a periodic interval, the these counter values
are collected and inserted into a User Datagram Protocol (UDP) packet and passed to the
egress processing component. At this same time, the individual counters are reset to zero
and begin counting events in the next collection period.
The TCP processing engine consists of seven subcomponents. Figure 4.5 illustrates
a detailed view of the organization of these subcomponents. The input state machine is
the first to process data, provides the operating state, and keeps track of the current po-
sition within each packet. It also passes state information and packet data to the frame
FIFO, checksum engine, TCP state processing and flow classifier components. The frame
FIFO buffers packets while other computations are taking place. The checksum engine
computes the TCP checksum to validate the correctness of the TCP packet. The TCP state
processing module keeps track of the TCP processing state and determines whether packets
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are in-sequence or out-of-sequence. The flow classifier communicates with the state store
manager to save and retrieve per-flow context information. Results from the TCP state pro-
cessing module, the checksum engine, and the flow classifier are written to a control FIFO.
The output state machine extracts data from the control and frame FIFOs and passes it to the
routing module. The results of the protocol processing operations are delivered to down-
stream components synchronously with the start of each packet. The internal FIFOs allow
the inbound processing modules to work on the next packet while the outbound module
processes earlier packets. The interfaces to the flow classification subsystem are designed
for speed and efficiency while still supporting interchangeable classifiers. In this manner,
future enhancements to flow classification algorithms can easily be incorporated into this
architecture by only replacing the required component. This flexibility also supports the
testing of various classification algorithms.
4.3 Application Interface
One of the key goals of the TCP-Processor architecture is to provide a simple, but complete
mechanism for accessing TCP stream content that can be used by a wide range of extensible
networking applications. A clean interface hides the intricacies of the underlying protocol
processing and reduces the complexity associated with processing the TCP data streams.
The signals listed below are used to transfer TCP stream data to the monitoring application:
DATA 32 bit vector (4 byte wide) main data bus which carries all packet data and lower
layer protocol information.
DATAEN 1 bit signal indicating whether or not there is valid data on the DATA lines.
SOF 1 bit signal indicating the start of a new frame (packet). This signal is always asserted
in unison with the first word on the DATA bus.
SOIP 1 bit signal indicating the start of the IP header within the packet.
SOP 1 bit signal indicating the start of the IP payload (ie. the first word past the end of the
IP header). This signal can be used to indicate the first word of the TCP header.
EOF 1 bit signal indicating the end of the frame (packet).
TDE 1 bit signal indicating whether or not there is TCP stream content on the DATA lines.
BYTES 4 bit vector indicating which of the four bytes on the DATA lines contain valid
TCP stream data that should be processed by the monitoring application. One bit is
used for byte of the DATA word.
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FLOWSTATE 32 bit vector (4 byte wide) per-flow state information bus which carries
the flow identifier, next TCP sequence number, TCP data length, and a flow instance
number.
FLOWSTATEEN 1 bit signal indicating whether or not there is valid data on the FLOW-
STATE lines.
NEWFLOW 1 bit signal indicating that this packet represents the start of a new flow. This
signal is asserted for one clock cycle in unison with the SOF signal.
ENDFLOW 1 bit signal indicating that this packet represents the end of an existing flow.
This signal is asserted for one clock cycle in unison with the SOF signal.
TCA 1 bit flow control signal which the client application can use to suspend the flow
of data. It is always assumed that the TCP-Processor can finish sending the current
packet.
The client interface contains network data packets and control signals which anno-
tate the packets to the monitoring application. This simplifies the logic required to process
TCP data streams while providing the application with access to the complete network data
packet. Monitoring applications will likely require access to protocol header fields in order
to determine things like the source and destination addresses. Passing the full contents of
the packet eliminates the need for extra interface signals which provide this type of data.
Control signals assist the monitoring application in navigating to specific locations within
the packet. For instance, if the monitoring application were interested in obtaining the
source and destination TCP ports, instead of tracking the protocol headers, the SOP signal
indicates that the TCP ports are on the DATA lines.
The TCP-Processor maintains per-flow context information for the TCP flow mon-
itoring service. The FLOWSTATE bus contains this additional flow context information
which is passed to the monitoring application at the start of each packet. This predefined
sequence of data includes a unique flow identifier, the next expected TCP sequence number
following the processing of this packet, the TCP data length in bytes, and a flow instance
number which can be employed to prevent conflicts when flow identifiers are reused.
Figure 4.6 includes a timing diagram showing the transmission of a single TCP
data packet to the monitoring application. The DATA and FLOWSTATE busses contain
an indication of the data that is present at each clock cycle during normal processing. The
various components of the IP and TCP headers are shown with the control signals. In
this example, the NEWFLOW signal indicates that the data contained within this packet
represents the first few bytes of a new data stream and that the monitoring application
should initialize its processing state prior to processing this data. Additional information is
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Figure 4.6: Timing Diagram showing Client Interface
clocked through the data bus before and/or after the packet data. This allows for lower-level
protocols, such as Virtual Circuit Identifier (VCI), Ethernet Media Access Control (MAC)
addresses, other lower layer protocol information, or ancillary data (like packet routing
information) to pass through the hardware along with the packet. For example, the AAA
data value represents one word of control information prior to the the start of the IP packet.
The BBB and CCC labels represent trailer fields that follow the IP packet. The AAA, BBB,
and CCC content should be ignored by the monitoring application and passed through to
the client input interface of the TCP-Processor for use in outbound packet processing.
4.4 Extensibility
The TCP-Processor contains a modular set of components which support integration with
other technologies. This enables development of new components that simply plug into the
existing inter-component interfaces.
As chip-making technology advances, the TCP-Processor architecture can scale to
operate within devices that exploit higher gate densities and faster clock frequencies. It
was designed using a 32-bit wide main data path for network traffic which will easily port
to future generations of FPGA and ASIC devices maintaining this property. Increasing the
width of the main data path to 64 or 128 bits could double or quadruple the throughput
64
of the circuit, although it would require reworking the protocol processing subsystems,
widening of internal buffering FIFOs, and modifying interface specifications.
The state store manager supports the easy implementation of alternative flow clas-
sification algorithms. This allows a design engineer using the TCP-Processor to specify
the algorithm which most closely matches the requirements of their TCP flow monitoring
service. In addition, the state store manager can be modified to utilize different types of
memory managers and cache subsystems.
Interaction with external memory is separate from the logic of the state store man-
ager. This enables an easy migration path to future performance enhancing improvements
in technology. As the name suggests, Double Data Rate (DDR) memories support two
memory operations per clock cycle thereby doubling the rate at which data can be trans-
ferred to/from external memory devices. Increasing the data bus width when communicat-
ing to external memories will improve memory performance, but will require additional
changes to the state store manager to support the larger bus size.
4.5 Multiple FPGA Coordination
Complex monitoring applications may require multiple hardware devices to perform addi-
tional TCP flow processing functions. For example, the whole Snort [104] rule database
contains approximately 2000 rules, each with header and content match criteria. Due to
the size of this rule set, complete processing of the full rule set cannot be performed within
a single FPGA device. Fortunately, Snort rule processing can be broken down into three
distinct logical steps: (1) header processing, (2) content scanning, and (3) rule matching.
The complete process can be implemented by assigning these separate tasks to multiple
hardware devices.
Figure 4.7 illustrates two different configurations of a hardware-based Snort im-
plementation which utilize multiple hardware devices. The first demonstrates a routing
configuration where higher levels of flow processing occur above the TCP-Processor. The
monitoring application passes data back to the TCP-Processor for final processing which
forwards it on to the end station or next hop router. In this configuration, each device
provides a reverse channel so data can be passed back the the TCP-Processor. This is the
normal data path for the TCP-Processor.
The second example shows a straight-through routing configuration where the TCP
processing engine consists of two components: one for ingress processing and one for
egress processing. These two components exist on separate devices to enable data to be
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routed linearly through multiple devices. The advantage of this type of configuration is that
data is always moving in a single direction.
A set of flexible serialization and deserialization components efficiently moves data
between devices when data processing functions are partitioned across multiple devices.
All of the data presented at the TCP-Processor client interface is serialized into an encoded
data format which is transmitted to other devices. The deserialization process, in turn,
converts this encoded data back into the client interface signals of the TCP-Processor. Fig-
ure 4.8 shows a layout of the TCP-Processor circuit components which support multiple
board TCP flow monitoring. The dotted line indicates that the ingress portion of the TCP-
Processor circuit can be separated from the egress portion of the circuit; a useful feature in
straight-through processing configurations.
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Chapter 5
Environment
This dissertation presents research performed at the Applied Research Laboratory (ARL) at
Washington University in St. Louis. Development of the TCP-Processor relied on previous
research performed at this facility. The following sections briefly describe some of the
hardware, software, and circuit designs which contributed to the development of the TCP-
Processor.
The TCP-Processor was designed, implemented and tested within the context of the
Field-Programmable Port Extender (FPX). While the circuit is not limited to this specific
hardware environment, minor modifications to the TCP-Processor will most likely be re-
quired for operation on a different hardware platform. All of the research relating to this
dissertation used the FPX platform as the underlying hardware environment.
5.1 Field-programmable Port Extender
The Field-programmable Port Extender (FPX) [74, 73] is a research platform that supports
the processing of high-speed network traffic with reconfigurable devices (Figure 5.1). All
processing on the FPX is implemented in reconfigurable logic with FPGAs. One FPGA on
the system is called the Reprogrammable Application Device (RAD) and is implemented
with a Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E (earlier models of the FPX use the XCV1000E) [78].
The RAD can be dynamically reconfigured to perform user-defined functions on packets
traversing through the FPX [124]. The second FPGA device on the FPX is called the Net-
work Interface Device (NID) and is implemented with a Xilinx Virtex XCV600E FPGA.
The NID, which is statically programmed at power-up, controls data routing on the FPX
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platform and is also responsible for programming the RAD. The system contains five par-
allel banks of memory that include both Zero Bus Turnaround (ZBT) pipelined Static Ran-
dom Access Memory (SRAM) for low-latency access to off-chip memory and Synchronous
Dynamic RAM (SDRAM) to enable buffering of a gigabyte of data. Network interfaces
allow the FPX to interface at speeds of OC-48 (2.4 gigabits per second). The RAD device
can be remotely reprogrammed by sending specially configured control cells to the device.
The external interfaces of the FPX cards are positioned on the bottom left and top
right of each card. This design feature allows the devices to be stacked on top of each
other by rotating each successive device 180 degrees, which aligns the external interfaces
with each other. Complex network traffic processing applications, like those that scan and
remove Internet viruses, can be implemented by coordinating activities amongst multiple
stacked FPX devices.
5.2 Washington University Gigabit Switch
The Washington University Gigabit Switch (WUGS) [129] is an eight port ATM switch
interconnected by an underlying switching fabric. Data paths on the switch are 32 bits
wide. The backplane of the switch drives each of the eight ATM ports at a data rate of 2.4
Gbps to achieve an aggregate bandwidth of 20 Gbps.
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Figure 5.2: Washington University Gigabit Switch Loaded with Four FPX Cards
Each of the eight ports supports several different types of adapter cards. The current
set includes a Gigabit Ethernet line card, a Gigabit ATM line card, an OC-3 ATM line
card, an OC-48 ATM line card, the Smart Port Card (SPC), the Smart Port Card II (SPC2),
and the Field-programmable Port Extender (FPX). The SPC and SPC2 contain a Pentium
processor and Pentium III processor respectively, and can execute a version of the Unix
operating system which supports software-based packet processing [27]. Figure 5.2 shows
a WUGS switch populated with four FPX cards, two OC-3 line cards, and two GLink line
cards.
5.3 NCHARGE
A suite of tools called NCHARGE (Networked Configurable Hardware Administrator for
Reconfiguration and Governing via End-systems) remotely manages control and configura-
tion of the FPX platform [128]. NCHARGE provides a standard Application Programming
Interface (API) between software and reprogrammable hardware modules. Using this API,
multiple software processes can communicate to one or more FPX cards using standard
TCP/IP sockets.
The NCHARGE tool set also includes a web interface which allows remote access
and control of FPX hardware to be accomplished using a standard web browser. The web
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Figure 5.3: FPX-in-a-Box System
interface uses a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) script to execute small stub routines
which communicate with NCHARGE over the standard sockets interface. This allows
the commands issued via the web interface to operate in conjunction with other programs
communicating with NCHARGE.
5.4 FPX-in-a-Box
The FPX platform can be used either in conjunction with a WUGS switch or independently
as part of a standalone solution. The FPX cards have a network interface port on both the
top and bottom, enabling stacking of other FPX or line cards under and over them. The
FPX-in-a-box system (Figure 5.3) provides a simple backplane which supports two stacks
of FPX cards with a line card placed at the top of each stack. The provides a small footprint
system which is capable of performing complex network processing at OC-48 data rates
without requiring a underlying switch fabric. Systems needing complex flow processing
can be implemented by stacking multiple FPX cards and distributing circuits across the
multiple FPGA devices.
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5.5 Protocol Wrappers
FPX cards process Internet packets using a set of Layered Protocol Wrappers [14, 12, 13].
Each protocol wrapper performs processing on a different protocol layer for inbound and
outbound traffic. These protocol wrappers create a framework that allows upper layer pro-
tocol processing to be isolated from any underlying protocols. The protocol wrapper library
includes an ATM Cell wrapper, an AAL5 Frame wrapper, an IP protocol wrapper and a
UDP protocol wrapper. The Cell Wrapper validates the Header Error Checksum (HEC)
field in the ATM cell header and performs routing based on the cell’s Virtual Channel Iden-
tifier (VCI) and Virtual Path Identifier (VPI). The Frame Wrapper performs Segmentation
and Reassembly (SAR) operations converting cells into packets and packets back into cells.
The IP Wrapper performs processing of IP packets. The TCP-Processor circuit interfaces
with the IP, Frame and Cell Wrappers for processing network traffic. Figure 5.4 diagrams
the protocol processing hierarchy.
The IPWrapper sends and receives IP packets utilizing a 32-bit wide data bus for
carrying data and several associated control signals. These control signals include a start of
frame (SOF) signal, a start of IP header (SOIP) signal, a start of payload (SOP) signal, and
an end of frame (EOF) signal. Packets themselves can be broken down into five sections as
described in Table 5.1.
The IPWrapper is hard-coded to process only the traffic that enters on VCI 50 (0x32)
or VCI 51 (0x33). Because of this feature, all network traffic processed by the IPWrapper
must arrive on VCI 50 (0x32) or VCI 51 (0x33). This includes TCP traffic to be processed
by the TCP-Processor and control traffic used to remote command and control various
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Table 5.1: IP packet contents
Data Control signals Comment
ATM VCI SOF first word of packet
preamble dataen zero or more words inserted
before the start of the packet
IP header dataen, SOIP, EOF IP header information
IP payload dataen, SOP, EOF IP payload information
trailer dataen contains AAL5 trailer fields
circuit designs. In order to process data on a VCI other than 50 (0x32) or 51 (0x33),
VHDL code changes will be required in the lower layered protocol wrappers.
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Chapter 6
TCP-Processor Internals
The TCP-Processor is a subcomponent of the StreamExtract application discussed in the
next section. The TCP-Processor interfaces with the previously described layered protocol
wrappers and provides protocol processing for TCP packets. The TCP-Processor is specif-
ically concerned with reassembling application data streams from individual TCP packets
observed on the interior of the network. This section will focus on the design, layout and
operation of the TCP-Processor.
The source code for TCP-Processor is located in the directory vhdl/wrappers
/TCPProcessor/vhdl found in the streamextract source v2.zip distribu-
tion file. The following VHDL source modules can be found there and comprise the core
of the TCP-Processor technology:
tcpprocessor.vhd- Top level TCP-Processor circuit. The external interface includes
configuration parameters, clock and control signals, inbound and outbound 32-bit
UTOPIA interfaces which provides access to raw ATM cells, two separate SRAM
interfaces, a single SDRAM interface, and four output signals tied to LEDs. The
TCPProcessor component interfaces the lower layer protocol wrappers with the core
TCP-Processor.
tcpproc.vhd- This module encapsulates the individual components which make up the
TCP-Processor. Network traffic travels between the external interfaces and the vari-
ous subcomponents.
tcpinbuf.vhd- The TCPInbuf component provides inbound packet buffering services
for the TCP-Processor when back pressure or flow control is driven by downstream
components. This module also ensures that data loss occurs on packet boundaries.
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tcpengine.vhd- The TCPEngine component performs TCP processing. It communi-
cates with the state store manager to retrieve and store per-flow context information.
statestoremgr.vhd- The StateStoreMgr performs context storage and retrieval ser-
vices. It exposes a simple external interface and handles all complex interactions
with SDRAM.
tcprouting.vhd- The TCPRouting module routes packets previously processed by the
TCPEngine to either the client monitoring circuit, the outbound TCPEgress module,
or to the bit bucket. Additional control signals indicate how each packet should be
routed.
tcpstats.vhd- The TCPStats component collects statistical information from other
components and maintains internal event counters. On a periodic basis, it generates
a UDP statistics packet and sends it to the configured destination address.
tcpegress.vhd- The TCPEgress module merges statistics traffic from the TCPStats
component, bypass traffic from the TCPRouting component, and return traffic from
the client monitoring application. TCP checksum values can also be regenerated
for TCP packets returning from the client monitoring application to support flow
modification.
The components of the TCP-Processor directly correspond to the various source
files. To simplify the layout of the circuit, each component is completely contained in a
single, unique source file. Figure 6.1 diagrams the components of the TCP-Processor and
their relative significance in the VHDL hierarchy.
6.1 Endianness
The TCP-Processor was developed with little endian constructs. When accessing memory,
the least significant byte is stored at the lowest address. In addition, the least significant bit
is the lowest bit of the vector (usually bit zero) in all signal vectors. This is the most intuitive
method for representing data and is used throughout the TCP-Processor and associated
circuits. The TCP-Processor works with network headers using little endian constructs,
even though network byte order is a big endian format.
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Figure 6.1: Hierarchy of TCP-Processor Components
6.2 Packet Parameters
The TCP-Processor supports packet lengths of 1500 bytes or less. When the circuit is
presented with packets larger than 1500 bytes, the viability of the operation of the circuit
is not guaranteed. The circuit could likely handle larger packets, but would be subject to
lockups when packet lengths exceed the buffering capacity of internal FIFOs.
The TCP-Processor does not support IP fragments. IP defragmentation is a lower
layer protocol function which should occur within the IPWrapper. The IPWrapper does not
contain any logic to reassemble IP fragments into complete packets, or even validate the IP
packet length. The behavior of the circuit is undefined when processing IP fragments.
6.3 Flow Control
Within the confines of the TCP-Processor, it is assumed that whenever the TCA signal is
driven low, the sending component can continue to send data until the end of the current
packet is reached. This behavior contrasts with how the other protocol wrapper circuits
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manage flow control signals. The advantage of this behavior is that it simplifies the logic
associated with processing TCA signals. The disadvantage is that it requires larger buffers
and/or FIFOs in order to store the additional data after deasserting TCA. This behavior is
internal to the TCP-Processor and affects components within the TCP-Processor and any
client monitoring application which interfaces with the TCP-Processor. When interfacing
with the IP Wrapper, the TCP-Processor conforms to its flow control semantics.
6.4 External Memories
The TCP-Processor utilizes SDRAM memory module 1 to maintain per-flow context in-
formation. This task completely consumes this memory module and it should therefore
not be used for any other purpose. SDRAM memory module 2 is not used by the TCP-
Processor and is available for other features, such as IP packet defragmentation or TCP
packet reordering. The two SRAM banks capture packet data for debugging purposes. By
eliminating the debugging feature, both of these high speed memory devices could be used
for other purposes.
6.5 Configuration Parameters
The TCP-Processor uses several configuration parameters to control its operational behav-
ior. The following list describes each of those parameters in detail, along with possible
values and the effect that parameter has on the operation of the TCP-Processor circuit:
num pre hdr wrds- Passed to the IPWrapper component where it is used to determine
the start of the IP packet header. Known possible values for this parameter are 0: for
ATM environments, 2: for ATM environments with a two word LLC header, 4: for gi-
gabit Ethernet environments, and 5: for gigabit Ethernet environments with a VLAN
tag.
simulation- Indicates whether or not the TCP-Processor circuit should operate in simu-
lation mode. When set to 1, it skips memory initialization (the zeroing of external
memory). Additionally, it performs all accesses to external SDRAM at address loca-
tion zero. This parameter enables the quick simulation of network traffic because it
avoids the initialization of large external memories. This parameter should be set to
0 when building circuits to operate in hardware.
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skip sequence gaps- When set to 1, this parameter indicates that the TCPEngine should
skip sequence gaps and track the highest sequence number associated with every
flow. If a sequence gap occurs, the TCPEngine sets the NEW FLOW flag to indicate
that data in this packet represents a new stream of bytes. The FLOW IDENTIFIER
and the FLOW INSTANCE NUMBER remain the same as the previous packet as-
sociated with the same flow. This information can be used by the monitoring ap-
plication to determine the occurrence of a sequence gap. When set to 0, the TCP-
Processor drops out-of-sequence packets until packets with the appropriate sequence
number arrive.
app bypass enabled- Utilized by the TCPRouting module which determines where to
route packets. When set to 1, retransmitted packets, non-classified TCP packets (see
next configuration parameter), and non-TCP packets are allowed to bypass the client
monitoring application and pass directly to the TCPEgress component. When set to
0, all packets are routed to the client monitoring application.
classify empty pkts- Indicates whether or not TCP packets which contain no user data
should be classified. Performance of the circuit can be improved by avoiding classi-
fication of these packets because it takes longer to classify a packet and associate
it with a flow than it takes for these small packets to be transmitted on an OC-
48 (2.5Gbps) link. When enabled, all TCP packets are classified. This parame-
ter should be enabled if the client monitoring application is tracking the connection
setup/teardown sequences or is trying to process bidirectional traffic and match ac-
knowledgment numbers with corresponding sequence numbers of traffic in the op-
posite direction.
cksum update ena- When set to 1, the TCPEgress component validates the TCP check-
sum for all TCP packets passed in by the client monitoring application. If the TCP
checksum value is determined to be incorrect, a correcting suffix is added to the end
of the packet which will replace the erroneous checksum value with the proper check-
sum value. When set to 0, no checksum processing is performed by the TCPEgress
component.
stats enabled- Indicates whether or not a statistics packet should be generated at a periodic
time interval. When set to 1, the generation of statistics packets is enabled and con-
forms to the following configuration parameters. When set to 0, statistics information
will not be kept nor transmitted.
stats id- This 8-bit wide configuration parameter can be used to differentiate statistics gen-
erated by multiple TCP-Processors. For example, a certain configuration consists of
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three different instances of the TCP-Processor circuit. All three are sending statistics
information to the same collection facility. This configuration parameter differenti-
ates the statistics information among the three different TCP-Processor circuits.
stats cycle count- This 32-bit wide configuration parameter indicates the interval, in clock
cycles, between the sending of a UDP packet containing statistics information col-
lected during the previous collection interval. This parameter is highly dependant
on the frequency of the oscillator used to drive the RAD. During simulations, this
parameter can be set to a very small number so that statistics packets are generated
on a much more frequent basis.
stats vci- This 8-bit wide configuration parameter specifies the VCI on which the statistics
packet should be generated. By altering this value, statistics packets can be routed
differently than normal monitored traffic.
stats dest addr- This 32-bit wide configuration parameter specifies the destination IP ad-
dress for the statistics packets.
stats dest port- This 16-bit wide configuration parameter specifies the destination UDP
port number for the statistics packets.
6.6 TCP Processor
The TCPProcessor component provides the top level interface for the TCP-Processor and is
implemented in the tcpprocessor.vhd source file. The lower layered protocol wrap-
pers within this component are integrated with the various TCP processing components.
Figure 6.2 contains a layout of the TCPProcessor circuit along with groupings of the main
signal bundles and how they are connected among external interfaces and internal compo-
nents.
6.7 TCP Proc
The TCPProc component, implemented in the tcpproc.vhd source file, is an integra-
tion point for the core components of the TCP-Processor circuit. The TCP-Processor con-
sists of several manageable modules to isolate the various functionalities of the compo-
nents. It consists of the following six components: TCPInbuf, TCPEngine, StateStoreMgr,
TCPRouting, TCPEgress, and TCPStats. Well-defined interfaces allow data to transition
among these components. The interface specification will be described in later sections.
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Figure 6.3 describes a layout of the TCPProc circuit along with some of the main intercon-
nections between components.
The external interface of the TCPProc component connects two SRAM memory
interfaces. Inside the TCPProc component, there are three possible connection points for
the two SRAM devices: two in the TCPInbuf module and one in the TCPEgress module.
To accommodate this difference, the TCPProc maintains a virtual NOMEM1 memory de-
vice. It drives selected NOMEM1 signals to give the appearance that the memory device
is always available, but writes to the device never take place and reads from the device
always result in the value of zero. By changing the connections within the TCPProc cir-
cuit, selected subcomponent interfaces can connect to external memory devices and others
can connect to the virtual device. This allows for the capture of network traffic at various
locations within the circuit which aids in debugging.
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6.8 TCP Input Buffer
TCPInbif, implemented in the tcpinbuf.vhd source file, is the first component to pro-
cess network traffic that enters the TCP-Processor. It provides packet buffering services for
the TCP-Processor when there are periods of downstream delay. Back pressure induced
by downstream components via a flow control signal tells the TCPInbuf component not
to release any more packets into the TCP-Processor Engine. In addition, the TCPInbuf
component ensures that only fully formed IP packets are passed into the downstream TCP-
Processor components. The TCPInbuf component always asserts the upstream flow control
signal, indicating that it is always ready to receive data. If its internal buffers are filled
to capacity, then TCPInbuf manages the dropping of packets from the network instead of
deasserting the TCA flow control signal. Figure 6.4 describes the layout of the TCPInbuf
component.
As network traffic enters the TCPInbuf component, it is first processed by the input
state machine. The state machine determines whether the packet should be dropped (be-
cause the Frame FIFO is full) or should be inserted into the Frame FIFO. A separate packet
length counting circuit counts the number of 32-bit words associated with the packet which
are inserted into the Frame FIFO. At the end of the packet, this length value is written to the
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Length FIFO. If only a portion of the packet was successfully written to the Frame FIFO
(because the FIFO filled up while inserting words), then only the length associated with the
number of words actually inserted into the Frame FIFO is passed to the Length FIFO.
The output state machine utilizes one of two different methods to retrieve data from
the FIFOs and forward it downstream: uncounted mode and counted mode. It uses the
uncounted mode when there are no packets queued in the Frame FIFO. This mode does
not induce and store and forward delay for the packet while the packet length is being
computed, which is a performance benefit. When the output state machine detects a non-
empty Frame FIFO and empty Length FIFO, it enters the uncounted processing mode.
Packet data words are clocked out of the Frame FIFO and passed to the output interface
of the TCPInbuf component. When TCPInbuf reads the final word of the packet from the
Frame FIFO, it then reads the length of the packet from the Length FIFO.
The output state machine enters the counted mode after there has been some down-
stream delay in the system and one or more packets are queued up in the Frame and Length
FIFOs. It also enters this mode when it is in the idle state and data is present in both the
Length and Frame FIFOs. It reads the packet length first from the Length FIFO. Bits 8
through 0 indicate the length in units of 32-bit words. Bit 9 is a special drop flag which
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Figure 6.5: SRAM data Formats
indicates whether or not the packet should be dropped. This flag is set whenever an in-
complete packet is inserted into the Frame FIFO. If the drop flag is set, then the specified
number of words is read from the Frame FIFO and discarded. If the drop flag is zero,
the the specified number of words is read from the Frame FIFO and passed to the output
interface of the TCPInbuf component.
The packet storage and SRAM signals manage two separate SRAM devices used to
capture packet data for debugging purposes. After reset, both SRAM memory devices are
initialized to zero. The control circuits are configured to use locations 1 through 262,143
as a ring buffer. Packets passed to the outbound interface are written to the first SRAM
interface and inbound ATM cells from the external RAD interface are written to the second
SRAM interface. When the termination criteria has been met, the memory update logic is
put into a mode where it stores the current memory write address to location zero. In this
manner, the 262,143 32-bit packet data words can be captured prior to the detected event.
Packets (frames) and cells are stored in the standard format required by the SRAMDUMP
utility. Figure 6.5 illustrates the layout of the 36-bit SRAM memory for both of these
formats.
6.9 TCP Engine
The TCPEngine component is the workhorse component of the TCP-Processor and is im-
plemented in the tcpengine.vhd source file. It contains all of the complex protocol
processing logic. Figure 6.6 shows a breakdown of the major logic blocks and data flow
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through the component. Network traffic travels left to right. Flow classification and interac-
tions with the state store manager are handled at the bottom of the diagram. The input state
machine and output state machine are noted by separate boxes at the left and right sides
of the figure. Additional state machines manage interactions with the state store manager.
The state store request/response/update block of logic contain these interactions.
The TCPEngine has evolved over time and contains remnants of logic for features,
such as the direction signal and multiple hash computations, which are no longer utilized.
VHDL code for these features remains for possible future implementation. Since this doc-
ument describes a version of the TCP-Processor which contains this unused logic, its pres-
ence is noted.
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The first series of processes described in the tcpengine.vhd source file generate
event signals which are passed to the TCPStats component. These signals pulse for one
clock cycle to indicate when the associated event counter should be incremented.
The input state machine is the first component to process IP packets when they
enter the TCPEngine. It tracks the main processing state for the TCPEngine component
while processing inbound packet data. The individual states refer to the part of the packet
being processed. IP header processing states include version, identifier, protocol, source
IP, destination IP, and option fields. TCP header processing states include ports, sequence
number, acknowledgment number, data offset, checksum, and option fields. Data0 and
data1 states represent processing of TCP payload data. The circuit enters the copy state
when it encounters a non-TCP packet and copies the packet to the Frame FIFO. The length
and CRC states refer to the AAL5 trailer fields which are tacked on to the end of the
packet. The circuit enters the WFR state when it is waiting for a response from the state
store manager.
The next section of logic deals with extracting protocol-specific information from
the protocol headers. This information includes the IP header length, an indication of
whether or not the protocol is TCP, the TCP header length, the current header length, the
value of various TCP flags, the source IP address, the destination IP address, and the TCP
port numbers.
The TCPEngine next computes a hash value based on the source IP address, the
destination IP address, and the source and destination TCP ports. Many different hashing
algorithms have been used throughout the development of the TCP-Processor and source
code still exists for several of them. The current hash scheme is hash3 which combines
the results of a CRC calculation over the various input values. The hash algorithm is con-
structed so packets in the forward and reverse directions hash to the same value. This is
accomplished by XORing the source fields with the destination fields in an identical man-
ner. The resultant hash value is 23 bits wide, which corresponds to 223 or 8,388,608 unique
hash values. This hash value is passed to the state store manager which performs the flow
classification operation.
The next section of logic deals with operations required to initiate a flow lookup
operation via the state store manager. A request state machine handles the required state
transitions. After initiating the request, the state machine enters a hibernate state waiting
for the end of input processing for the current packet. This ensures that multiple state store
manager lookup requests are not made for one single packet. Table 6.1 lists the sequence
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of data words the state machine passes to the state store manager when initiating a request
for per-flow context information.
Table 6.1: State Store Request Sequence
Request data
Request word (32 bit field)
1 ”000000000” & computed hash value
2 source IP address
3 destination IP address
4 source TCP port & destination TCP port
The following section contains logic to manage the per-flow context data returning
from the state store manager. A response state machine tracks this response data. There
are three paths that that the context data can traverse through the state machine. It enters
the first when the state store manager returns a new flow context record. The second path
corresponds to a valid flow context lookup of an existing flow, and the context data enters
the third path when a per-flow context lookup is not performed, requiring a place holder.
Table 6.2 shows the state transitions along with the data returned from the state store man-
ager. Bit 31 of the first response word indicates whether or not the response corresponds to
a new flow (value 0) or an existing flow (value 1). The returned flow identifier is a 26-bit
value. The low two bits of the flow identifier (bits 1-0) are always zero. Utilizing the whole
flow identifier as a memory address for the SDRAM on the FPX platform provides access
to a separate 32-byte section of memory for each unique flow. Bit 2 of the flow identifier
is a direction bit. If unidirectional traffic alone is being monitored (i.e., traffic propagating
the network in a single direction), then the value of this bit will always be zero. This also
implies that 64 bytes of data can be stored for each unidirectional flow. If bidirectional
traffic is being monitored, then the flow identifiers of outbound and inbound traffic asso-
ciated with the same TCP connection will differ only by the value of this bit. There is no
correlation between the value of this bit and the direction of the traffic. The only conclusion
that can be drawn is that packets with flow identifiers that have the bit set are traversing the
network in the opposite direction of packets with flow identifiers that have the bit cleared.
The next section of logic contains processes which perform TCP specific proto-
col processing functions for the TCP-Processor. This includes a process which loads
state/context information into the app state FIFO. When the state machine enters the NIL
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Table 6.2: State Store Response Sequence
New flow Existing flow
Response Response data Response data
word State (32 bit field) State (32 bit field)
1 Idle ”000000” & flow id Idle ”100000” & flow id
2 Instance x”000000” & instance Sequence current sequence num
3 Instance x”000000” & instance
states, zero values are written into this FIFO instead of valid data. This occurs when pro-
cessing non-TCP packets. The contents of this FIFO will eventually be passed to the client
monitoring application via the flowstate signal lines. Four data words are written to this
FIFO for every packet processed. The data words either contain zeros or valid context
information, depending on the type of packet being processed and the TCP-Processor con-
figuration settings. Other logic in this section of code computes a byte offset to the first byte
of new data for the flow and computation of the next sequence expected sequence number.
Logic also exists to send updated per-flow context information to the state store
manager. The updated context information includes the next expected sequence number for
the flow and an indication of whether or not the connection is being terminated. A signal
can also be passed to the state store manager indicating that an update is not being generated
and the state store manager should return to its request processing state. Additional signals
indicate whether or not this packet is associated with a new flow, keep track of the flow
identifier, and compute the length of the TCP payload. The checksum calculation logic,
next in the source file, selects the appropriate words of the IP header, TCP header, and TCP
payload to be used in the TCP checksum calculation.
The following section of logic writes control information into the control FIFO.
The control FIFO contains information relating to the validity of the TCP checksum, an
indication of whether or not this is a TCP packet, the offset to the next byte in the TCP data
stream, the number of bytes in the last data word of the packet, a new flow indication, an
indication of whether or not the sequence number is in the proper range, an indication of
whether or not the packet should just be forwarded (i.e., for retransmitted packets), and an
end-of-flow indication. Figure 6.7 provides a layout of this data.
The next process is associated with writing packet data into the data FIFO. The data
inserted into this FIFO includes 32 bits of packet data, a start of frame indication, a start of
IP header indication, an end of frame indication, a start of IP payload (start of TCP header)
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Figure 6.7: Control FIFO data format
39 38 37 36 35 34 33 32 31 0
32 bits of packet datasta

rt 

of 

fra
m

e
sta

rt 

of 

IP 

he

ad

er

va

lid

 

by
tes

en

d o

f fr

am

e
sta

rt 

of 

IP 

pa

ylo

ad

TC

P 
str
ea
m

 

da

ta 

en

ab

le
da

ta 

en
ab
le
Figure 6.8: Data FIFO data format
indication, a TCP stream data enable signal, a regular data enable signal, and a valid bytes
vector indicating how many bytes contain stream data. The valid bytes vector is offset
by one, so the value ”00” indicates one valid byte, ”01” indicates two valid bytes, ”10”
indicates three valid bytes, and ”11” indicates four valid bytes.
The remainder of the TCPEngine VHDL code retrieves data out of the three FIFOs,
performs some final data modifications, and passes the information out of the TCPEngine
component and onto the TCPRouting component. This whole process is driven by the out-
put state machine which, upon detecting a non-empty control FIFO and app state FIFO,
initiates the sequence of events to read information from the FIFOs and pass it to the ex-
ternal interface. It sends control signals to the control, data, and app state FIFOs to start
extracting their contents. As data is retrieved from the data FIFO, computations are carried
out to generate the valid bytes signal which indicates the number of valid TCP bytes (zero,
one, two, three, or four) contained on the packet data bus. Data read from the app state
FIFO is passed to the flowstate vector. An offset mask and a length mask are added to this
set of data which specify a mask of valid bytes for the first and last words of the stream
data that should be considered part of the TCP data stream by the client monitoring appli-
cation. The offset signals are used to determine where in the packet the client monitoring
application should start processing TCP stream data.
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6.10 State Store Manager
The StateStoreMgr component provides simple interfaces for accessing and updating per-
flow context information stored in external SDRAM and is implemented in the state-
storemgr.vhd source file. The StateStoreMgr provides two separate interfaces for ac-
cessing per-flow context information. The first is used by the TCPEngine, presenting a
per-flow hash value along with the source IP, destination IP, and source and destination
TCP ports. The StateStoreMgr navigates to the existing context record for that flow, or
allocates new memory to hold context information for the flow. The second interface is
unused. It was originally developed to provide the back end of the TCP-Processor access
to per-flow context information and supported flow blocking and application state storage
services. This second interface is not utilized in this version of the TCP-Processor, but
much of the logic remains in place for possible future use.
A version of the TCP-Processor which supports flow blocking and application state
storage can be found at the following URL: http://www.arl.wustl.edu/pro-
jects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp/source/streamcapture source.zip.
Please note that the StreamCapture version of the TCP-Processor is an older version of the
source.
The TCPEngine is highly extensible due to the fact that the logic which manages
the per-flow context memory is separate, allowing for the creation of different lookup,
retrieval and memory management algorithms without requiring complex changes to the
TCPEngine. The SDRAM memory controller1 utilized by the StateStoreMgr provides three
separate interfaces: a Read only interface, a Write only interface and a Read/Write inter-
face. Figure 6.9 shows the layout of the StateStoreMgr state machines and their interaction
with other components. As previously stated, the second request/update interface is un-
used. The data bus to the SDRAM controller is 64 bits wide and the data bus exposed
by the StateStoreMgr is 32 bits wide. In order to handle the transition between the two
different bus widths, a separate 8x64 dual-ported RAM block is utilized in each of the
interfaces.
The first process of the statestoremgr.vhd source file generates pulses re-
flecting internal events which are passed to that TCPStats module. The TCPStats module
maintains statistical counters and events including the occurrence of a new connection, the
occurrence of a reused connection (i.e., an active flow context record has been reclaimed
1developed by Sarang Dharmapurikar
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and is being used to keep state information for a different flow), the occurrence of a termi-
nated flow (i.e., an existing TCP connection has been closed and no longer requires state
storage resources).
Two major sections make up the remainder of the StateStoreManager logic. The first
section handles frontside processing associated with interface 1 and the second sections
handles backside processing associated with interface 2. Interface 1 is connected to the
TCPEngine and performs the flow classification, context storage and retrieval operations
required by the TCP-Processor. Interface 2 is not used in this instance, but contains logic for
performing flow blocking and application state storage services. Enhancements have been
made to Interface 1 which have not been incorporated into Interface 2. Before attempting to
utilize Interface 2, the inconsistencies between the two interfaces will have to be resolved.
The operations of interface 1 are driven by the request1 state machine. Upon de-
tecting a request, the state machine traverses through states to save the additional request
data. It enters a delay state waiting for a memory read operation to complete. Once data
returns from external memory, the state machine’s sequence of states return results to the
requestor. An additional state handles the processing of a context update message. Some
states contained within this state machine, which support the retrieval of client monitor-
ing application context information not supported in this version of the TCP-Processor, are
never reached.
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The next four processes capture flags are stored in SDRAM. Two of these flags
indicate whether or not the inbound and outbound traffic is valid. The other two flags
indicate whether or not the inbound or outbound flow has been terminated. These four
flags help the StateStoreMgr to determine the operational state of the context record of a
particular TCP flow (i.e., whether or not the record is idle, active for inbound traffic, active
for outbound traffic, or whether traffic in either direction has been shut down). It should
be noted that the inbound and outbound traffic directions do not correspond to the specific
direction of the traffic, rather that inbound traffic is moving in the opposite direction of
outbound traffic. Across multiple TCP flow context records, the inbound traffic in each of
these flows may actually be moving through the network in different directions.
The subsequent two processes manage the exact flow context matches between the
context record stored in external memory and the four-tupple of source IP address, desti-
nation IP address, and source and destination TCP ports passed in by the requestor. The
match1 circuit performs the match for outbound traffic and the match2 circuit performs the
match for inbound traffic (i.e., the match2 circuit swaps the source and destination param-
eters).
The following processes store individual data items from the context record returned
from external memory. They store the current sequence numbers for both outbound and
inbound traffic along with the instance identifier for that flow. As the per-flow context data
clocks in from memory, these data values are pulled off of the SDRAM read data bus.
The instance identifers are maintained for each flow record. Every time a different TCP
connection associates with a flow record, the instance identifier of that record increments.
This behavior provides a simple mechanism for downstream stream monitoring clients to
quickly know when a flow record is reclaimed and a different TCP connection is mapped
to the same flow identifier (i.e., memory record).
The next set of processes stores data items passed in as part of the initial request or
computed along the way. The flow hash value, one of these data items, is used as the initial
index into the state store manager hash table. The direction flop determines the direction of
the flow based on which of the two flow matching processes returns a successful match. The
upd direction stores the packet direction during update processing. This allows the request
engine to start processing another lookup request. As the source IP addresses, destination
IP addresses, and the TCP port values pass in from the requestor, they are saved and used
in later comparisons by the match processes.
The response1 engine generates a response to the requesting circuit. Based on the
current processing state, results of the match operations, and the value of the valid flags.
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The response sequence differs depending on whether or not there was a successful per-flow
record match. If an existing flow record is not found, the response1 engine returns a flow
identifier and an instance number. If an existing flow record is found, the response1 engine
also returns the current sequence number. Table 6.2 shows the returned data in both of
these scenarios.
A read state machine manages the interactions with the SDRAM controller read in-
terface. It sequences through PullWait, TakeWait and Take states as defined by the memory
controller (developed by Sarang Dharmapurikar). Prepare and Check states ensure that the
frontside and backside engines are not trying to operate on the same per-flow record at the
same time. Since the backside engine is not used in this incarnation of the TCP-Processor,
these states will never be entered. The read engine uses the aforementioned states and
drives the SDRAM controller signals to affect a read operation.
Figure 6.10 illustrates the memory layout of a bidirectional per-flow context record.
The structure contains many unused bytes which can be utilized in conjunction with future
circuit enhancements. The source IP address, the destination IP address and the source and
destination TCP ports are stored within the per-flow record so that (1) an exact match can
be performed to ensure that the per-flow record corresponds to the flow being retrieved and
(2) the direction of the traffic (either outbound or inbound) can be determined. The per-
flow record stores the current sequence number for both outbound and inbound traffic and
an 8-bit instance identifier. This instance value increments each time a new flow is stored in
a context record. Four 1-bit flags indicate whether or not outbound traffic is valid, inbound
traffic is valid, outbound traffic has ended and inbound traffic has ended.
The next couple of processes indicate whether or not the frontside engine is active
and if active, reveals the memory address of the per-flow record being accessed. When both
the frontside and backside engines are utilized, these signals ensure that both engines don’t
try to manipulate the same context record, potentially leaving the record in an inconsistent
state. In addition, three counters keep track of the take count, the app count, and the update
count. The take count refers to the data words returned from SDRAM. The app count refers
to the application-specific context information stored in the context record. The storage of
application-specific context information is not utilized in this version of the TCP-Processor.
The update count keeps track of memory update processing.
The SDRAM controller utilized by the StateStoreMgr contains a 64-bit wide data
bus. The external request/response interface uses a 32-bit wide data bus. An internal dual-
ported memory block moves data between these two busses. This memory block is called
frontside ram. Two engines control the movement of data in and out of the memory. As
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Figure 6.10: Per-Flow Record Layout
data is clocked in from external memory, the frontside ram A engine writes this data into
the frontside ram. This data is written 64 bits at a time which matches the width of the
memory interface. The frontside ram A engine also reads data out of the frontside ram
where it is written to the external memory device. If the application context storage feature
were enabled, then read operations utilizing the frontside ram B engine would read appli-
cation data from the frontside ram to be used in the response sequence to the TCPEngine.
The logic still exists for this task to support possible future enhancements which would
require additional context storage. Currently, the state which drives this operation is never
entered. Updates to the per-flow context record are written to the frontside ram utilizing the
frontside ram B engine. Figure 6.11 shows the various interactions with the frontside ram.
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The write state machine manages interactions with the write interface of the memory
controller. This state machine also initializes memory after reset. The write state machine
enters a series of states which request the memory bus and write zeros to all memory
locations of the external memory module. This initializes memory to a known state prior
to any per-flow context record storage or retrieval operations. The write engine ensures the
correct interaction with the write interface of the memory controller.
The next group of processes increments a memory address utilized during memory
initialization and a flag to indicate that initialization has completed. Additionally, there are
signals to hold the update information passed in via the external interface. This information
includes the new sequence number and a finish signal which indicates that the TCP con-
nection is being terminated. The final process of the frontside section maintains a counter
utilized when writing data to external memory.
The remainder of the source file consists of a list of processes associated with the
backside request/response interface. The actions these processes take closely mirror the
actions taken by the frontside interface. Because of this similarity, and the fact that the
backside interface is not used in this implementation of the TCP-Processor, the details of
the operation of these processes and signals will not be presented.
6.11 TCP Routing
The TCPRouting component routes the packets and associated information that arrive from
the TCPEngine component and are implemented in the tcprouting.vhd source file.
These packets can be routed to either the client monitoring interface (the normal traffic
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flow), the TCPEgress component (the bypass path), or the bit bucket (i.e., dropped from
the network). Figure 6.12 shows the layout of the TCPRouting component.
The first process in the tcprouting.vhd source file generates the statistics event
signals passed to the TCPStats component. These signals keep track of the number of
packets passed to each of the output interfaces. Additionally, a two-bit vector keeps an
accurate count of the TCP stream bytes passed to the application interface. This count does
not include retransmitted data. The next group of processes contains flops which copy all
inbound data to internal signals. These internal signals are used when passing data to the
output interfaces. One state machine in this component tracks the start and the end of a
packet. The processing states include idle, data, length, and crc states. The final two states
indicate the end of an IP packet. Since the TCPEngine contains a store and forward cycle,
packets are always received by the TCPRouting component as a continuous stream of data.
The next two processes determine whether or not the TCPRouting component en-
ables the client application interface, the bypass interface, or neither interface (i.e., drop
packet). Information passed in from the TCPEngine and the current configuration setting
are used to make this decision. The TCPRouting component generates two enable signals
used by subsequent processes which actually drive the output signals.
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Figure 6.13: TCP Outbound Client Interface
The remainder of the TCPRouting processes drive output signals to either the client
application interface or the bypass interface. These processes look at the current processing
state and the value of the aforementioned enable signals to determine whether or not to
connect the internal data signals to the output interfaces.
6.11.1 Client Interface
Figure 6.13 illustrates a waveform showing the interface signals from the TCP-Processor
to the client TCP flow monitoring application. The interface consists of 12 output signals
(data, dataen, sof, soip, sop, eof, tde, bytes, newflow, endflow, flowstate, and flowstaten)
and one input signal (tca) used for flow control purposes. A high sof signal initiates packet
data processing. In conjunction with this signal, the newflow and/or endflow signals in-
dicate whether this packet is the start of a new flow or the end of an existing flow. It is
possible for both the newflow and endflow signals to be high for the same packet. This
can occur if the first packet processed for a particular flow has the RST or FIN flags set.
The flowstate and flowstaten signals are also driven in conjunction with the sof signal. The
data bus contains the 32-bit ATM header (minus the HEC) associated with the packet. The
dataen signal is low for the first word of the packet, but is driven high for all successive
data words.
Following the initial clock cycle of the packet, zero or more lower layer protocol
header words inserted prior to the start of the IP header may exist. In this example, there
is one such header word labelled OPT. The soip signal indicates the start of the IP header.
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Only IPv4 packets are supported, which means there will be at least 20 bytes of IP header
data. If IP header options are present, they occur prior to the sop signal. The sop signal
indicates the start of the IP payload. In this example, the sop signal corresponds to the
start of the TCP header. The TCP header is 20 bytes or larger, depending on the number of
included TCP options.
The packet in Figure 6.13 contains the five character text string HELLO in the TCP
payload section of the packet. The client application processing the TCP stream content
utilizes the tde and bytes signals to determine which data bytes to process as stream content.
The tde (TCP data enable) signal indicates that the information on the data bus is TCP
stream data. The four-bit-wide bytes vector indicates which of the four data bytes are
considered part of the TCP data stream for that flow. When retransmissions occur, it is
possible that the bytes vector will indicate that none of the data bytes pertain to TCP stream
data.
The eof signal indicates the end of the packet. Upon detection of a high eof signal,
two subsequent trailer words containing AAL5 length and CRC information associated
with the current packet need to be processed.
Every TCP packet provides four words of flowstate data. Figure 6.14 illustrates the
exact format of these data bytes. The flow identifier is always the first word of flowstate
information. Bit 31 indicates that the flow identifier is valid. The next data word contains
the TCP data length in bytes, the TCP header length in words, and a flow instance number
that can be used to help differentiate multiple flows which map to the same flow identifier.
The next word contains the next expected TCP sequence number for this flow. This value
can be useful when performing flow blocking operations. The final word contains a word
offset to the continuation of TCP stream data with respect to this flow along with byte
masks for the first and last words of the flow.
6.12 TCP Egress
The TCPEgress component, implemented in the tcpegress.vhd source file, merges
traffic from different sources into one unified packet stream. This packet stream is passed to
the outbound IP wrappers for lower layer protocol processing. Three separate FIFOs buffer
traffic from the different sources during the merge operation. The TCPEgress component
performs additional processing on the inbound traffic from the TCP flow monitoring client
to validate and possibly update TCP checksum values. By recomputing the TCP check-
sum, the TCP-Processor supports client TCP processing circuits which modify TCP stream
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Figure 6.14: Flowstate Information
content. This can be accomplished by either inserting new packets (possibly a packet to
terminate the TCP flow), or by modifying an existing packet. The IPWrapper supports
special trailer words which indicate modifications that need to be made to the packet. The
TCPEgress component does not take these changes into consideration when performing its
checksum calculation. If the client uses this mechanism to modify the packet (either header
or body), the calculated checksum value will be incorrect and the packet will eventually be
dropped. To operate properly, the TCPEgress component must receive properly formatted
TCP/IP packets (excluding the checksum values).
Like the previous components, the tcpegress.vhd source file begins with a
process that generates statistics events passed to the TCPStats component. Statistics are
kept on the number of packets processed from the client interface, the number of packets
processed from the bypass interface, and the number of TCP checksum update operations
performed.
The next set of processes in the source file copies input signals from the statistics
and bypass interfaces and flops them into a set of internal signals. These internal signals
are then used to write the packet contents to the stats and bypass FIFOs. The stats, app
and bypass FIFOs all contain packet data in the same format. Figure 6.16 illustrates this
format. A set of processes which clocks inbound packets from the client interface through
five separate signals creates a five cycle delay which is utilized later to make checksum
results available before the end of the packet is reached. The logic is straightforward and
involves no additional processing on the packets.
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Figure 6.16: TCPEgress FIFO Format
The next section of logic performs the TCP checksum validation operation. An
input state machine tracks progress through the various parts of the IP packet. This state
machine has similar states and state transitions to the input state machine contained within
the TCPEngine component (which also performs a TCP checksum validation operation).
Signals compute the length of the IP header and the data length of the TCP packet. This
information is used to properly navigate the packet and compute the checksum value.
The set of processes which actually performs the checksum calculation acts sep-
arately on the upper and lower 16 bits of the packet since data is clocked 32 bits at a
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time. The results of these separate checksum calculations are combined to produce the fi-
nal checksum result. Following the checksum calculations, a series of processes holds the
new checksum value, a determination as to whether the packet checksum is valid, the offset
to the checksum value, and the checksum value contained in the packet.
The next group of processes clocks packets from the client application interface
into the application FIFO. A simple state machine controls the sequence of events and
determines whether the recomputed checksum value should be added to the end of the
packet as an update command to the IPWrapper. If a checksum update is required, the state
machine enters the Cksum and Delay states which supports inserting the update command
into the packet trailer.
The next section of code contains the output state machine which pulls data out of
the three internal FIFOs and passes packets to the outbound IPWrapper interface. The state
machine prioritizes the traffic in the three FIFOs so packets are always retrieved from the
stats FIFO first, the bypass FIFO second, and the app FIFO third. The last read signal en-
sures that the output state machine reads a complete packet from the various FIFOs. Timing
issues can arise when the state machine attempts to read the last word of a packet from a
FIFO and the FIFO is empty because of the delay between when the read command is is-
sued and when the data is returned from the FIFO. The last read signal helps the processes
to prevent deadlocks.
The final set of TCPEgress processes controls interactions with the SRAM memory
module. It writes outbound packets to the SRAM device until it fills up with 256k words
or packet data. The SRAMDUMP utility retrieves this packet data from memory. Packets
are stored in the standard frame format as shown in Figure 6.5 on page 82. All of SRAM
is initialized to zero after receiving a reset command. The TCPEgress component will not
start processing packets until the memory initialization is complete. Utilizing the simu-
lation configuration parameter allows simulations to run quickly by skipping the memory
initialization operation.
Packets passed from the client monitoring application to the TCP-Processor must
be formatted in the same manner as packets passed to the client monitoring application.
The major difference between the format of packets passed to the client and the format of
packets passed back from the client is that not all of the control signals are required for
packets returned from the client. As seen in Figure 6.17, only the data, dataen, sof, soip,
sop and eof signals are necessary. Other than dropping the remaining signals, the interface
specification is identical to that of packets delivered through the outbound client interface
of the TCP-Processor.
100
DATAEN
DATA
SOF
VCI
IP
Ver
IP
Ident
IP
TTL
IP
Src
IP
Dst
SOIP
SOP
EOF
XXX
TCP
Ports
TCP
Seq
TCP
Dst
TCP
Win
TCP
Cksm HELL O Len XXXCRCOPT
Figure 6.17: TCP Inbound Client Interface
6.13 TCP Stats
The TCPStats component collects statistical information from other components, maintains
internal event counters, and generates UDP-based packets on a periodic basis containing
a summary of the event counts during the previous collection period. This logic is imple-
mented in the tcpstats.vhd source file.
The first two processes in the tcpstats.vhd source file maintain a collection in-
terval triggers and a cycle counter. The counter is a free running clock which resets when-
ever the the interval period (defined by configuration parameter) is reached. Composed
of four separate 8-bit counters, the counter eliminates the need for a single 32-bit-wide
carry chain. The trigger fires when these four counter values match the state cycle counter
configuration parameter.
The next group of TCPStats processes contains 16, 24 and 32-bit event counters. It
maintains a separate counter for each statistics variable maintained by the TCPStats com-
ponent. When the trigger fires, these counters are reset, indicating the end of the collection
period.
The packet state machine cycles through the processing states required to generate a
UDP packet containing a summary of the statistics information gathered over the previous
collection period. The trigger signal initiates the generation of the statistics packet. Once
started, the process cannot be stopped and the state machine traverses through all of the
states required to send the packet.
The next process stores the value of each statistic counter in a temporary holding
location while the statistics packet is being generated. When the trigger fires, signalling the
end of the collection period, all of the current counter values are saved before being reset
to zero. This provides a consistent snapshot of all the counters in a single clock cycle.
The next process generates the outbound UDP-based statistics packets. Informa-
tion on the packet formats and data collection tools can be found at the following URL:
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http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp
/statscollector.html
Figure 6.18 shows the processing states and the associated packet information re-
lating to the statistics packet. To add additional statistics to this packet, the developer will
has to modify the UDP packet length (the high 16 bits of the Cksum word), the stats count
(the low 8 bits of the Hdr word), and insert the new statistics parameters at the end of the
current parameters.
The exact sequence of statistics values is listed below:
•cfg1: simulation
•cfg2: application bypass enabled
•cgf3: classify empty packets
•cfg4: checksum updated enabled
•cfg5: skip sequence gaps
•ssm1: new connections
•ssm2: end (terminated) connections
•ssm3: reused connections
•ssm4: active connections
•inb1: inbound words
•inb2: inbound packets
•inb3: outbound packets
•inb4: dropped packets
•eng1: inbound packets
•eng2: TCP packets
•eng3: TCP SYN packets
•eng4: TCP FIN packets
•eng5: TCP RST packets
•eng6: zero length TCP packets
•eng7: retransmitted TCP packets
•eng8: out-of-sequence TCP packets
•eng9: bad TCP checksum packets
•eng10: outbound packets
•rtr1: inbound packets
•rtr2: client outbound packets
•rtr3: bypass outbound packets
•rtr4: dropped packets
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•rtr5: TCP data bytes
•egr1: inbound client packets
•egr2: outbound client packets
•egr3: inbound bypass packets
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•egr4: outbound bypass packets
•egr5: TCP checksum updates
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Chapter 7
StreamExtract Circuit
The StreamExtract circuit provides primary processing of network packets in multi-board
TCP flow monitoring solutions. As the name implies, it extracts TCP byte streams from
the network traffic and passes to a separate device for additional processing. Network
traffic enters the circuit through the RAD Switch interface and is processed by the Con-
trol Cell Processor (CCP) and the TCP-Processor. The StreamExtract circuit connects to
the TCP processor as the client TCP flow monitoring application. This component en-
codes/serializes the data provided through the client interface and passes it out through the
RAD Line Card interface. This traffic can then be routed to other hardware devices which
perform TCP stream processing. Data returns via the RAD Line Card interface in this
same format to the StreamExtract circuit where it is decoded/deserialized and returned to
the TCP-Processor. After egress processing by the TCP-Processor, network traffic passes
to the RAD Switch interface. Additional information regarding the StreamExtract circuit
can be found at the following web site: http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects
/fpx/fpx internal/tcp/stream extract.html
Figure 7.1 shows the layout of the StreamExtract circuit. The top level rad stream-
extract entity interfaces directly with the I/O pins on the FPX platform, the VHDL code
for which is located in the rad streamextract.vhd source file. All external signals
are brought through this interface. A one-clock-cycle buffer delay is added to all of the
UTOPIA I/O signals which carry network traffic. The sram req fixup process ensures that
the CCP module has priority access to the dual ported SRAM memory interface. This
means that external access will be available to memory, even when another component
locks up while controlling the memory device.
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The remainder of the source glues the various components together. The SDRAM
sequencer and SRAM interface memory controllers provide multiple interfaces and sim-
plify access to the external memory devices. All of the I/O signals are then passed into the
StreamExtract module.
7.1 StreamExtract Module
The StreamExtract module component encapsulates the interaction between the TCPPro-
cessor and the StreamExtract components. Both the TCPProcessor and the StreamExtract
components contain two SRAM interfaces which can be used to capture network traffic for
debugging purposes. Since there are only two SRAM devices on the chip, the StreamEx-
tract module contains two NOMEM dummy memory interfaces which connect to two of
the four memory interfaces. These NOMEM interfaces act like memory devices which are
always available, but the data is never written anywhere and read operations always return
the value zero.
The streamextract module.vhd source file also contains all of the configu-
ration information for the circuit. After modifying the configuration signal values in this
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file, the circuit must be rebuilt in order for the changes to be incorporated. The specific
function of each configuration parameter and possible values are described in the Config-
uration Parameters section on page 76.
7.2 StreamExtract
The StreamExtract component connects the TCPSerializeEncode and TCPSerializeDecode
components to the external StreamExtract interfaces. These components encode the client
interface of the TCP-Processor and enable transport to other devices.
7.3 LEDs
The four RAD-controlled LEDs on the FPX platform provide a limited amount of infor-
mation about the operation of the StreamExtract circuit. LED1 connects to a timer which
causes the LED to blink continuously once the circuit is loaded. The rest of the LEDs in-
dicate the current status of various flow control signals. LED2 illuminates when the flow
control signal from the TCPEngine to the TCPInbuf component is low. LED3 is illumi-
nated when the flow control signal from the TCPRouting to the TCPEngine component is
low. LED4 illuminates when the flow control signal from the outbound IPWrapper to the
TCPEgress module is low. During normal operation, these three LEDs are off, or at most
flash only for a very brief time period. A continuously lit LED indicates that a portion of
the circuit is locked-up and is not passing data.
7.4 Serialization/Deserialization (Endoding/Decoding)
The TCPSerializeEncode component processes data from the outbound client interface of
the TCP-Processor. It encodes the information in a self-describing and extensible manner
which supports transmitting it to other devices. Likewise, the TCPSerializeDecode compo-
nent receives the encoded information and regenerates the signals required by the inbound
client interface of the TCP-Processor. Figure 7.2 shows the mechanics of the encoding
and decoding operations. The encoding operation compresses the packet data and extra
information from the client interface signals from the TCP-Processor and groups it into
several control headers which are prepended to the network packet. This information is
then divided into ATM cells and transmitted through a 32-bit UTOPIA interface to other
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Figure 7.2: Packet Serialization and Deserialization Technique
devices. The decoding operation reverses this process, taking a sequence of ATM cells and
reproducing an interface waveform identical to the one generated by the TCP-Processor.
The control header formats are described in detail utilizing standard C header file
constructs. Every control header starts with an 8-bit CTL HEADER which includes the type
and the length of the control header, the layout of which is shown in Figure 7.3. The self-
describing format of the control header makes it possible for additional control headers to
be defined and added in the future without requiring a rewrite of existing circuits. This
common header format allows current circuits to easily bypass control headers they don’t
understand. The following code sample illustrates a C style coding of the currently defined
header types.
/* Control Header Type Definitions */
#define CTL_TYPE_UNUSED 0 #define CTL_TYPE_IP_HEADER 1
#define CTL_TYPE_TCP_HEADER 2 #define CTL_TYPE_PAYLOAD 3
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#define CTL_TYPE_COOKIE 4 /* other headers types */
#define CTL_TYPE_RESERVED 15
struct {
unsigned char Type :4; /* Type code */
unsigned char Length :4; /* Header length */
/* (number of words to follow) */
} CTL_HEADER;
Every packet encoded by these routines is an IP packet, since the TCP-Processor
receives only IP packets. All encoded packets have the same sequence of control headers
after the encoding process including: a cookie control header (which acts as a record mark),
an IP control header, possibly a TCP control header (depending on whether or not this is a
TCP packet), and finally a packet control header. The following code sample illustrates the
layout of each of these headers:
/* cookie control header */ #define CTL_COOKIE 0x40ABACAB
/* IP control header */ struct { /* 1st clock */
unsigned int HdrType : 4; /* standard header (Hdr.Length = 0) */
unsigned int HdrLength : 4; /* SOF is always high for the first word */
/* of the payload */
/* DataEn is always high for the 2nd through */
/* the nth word of the payload */
unsigned int SOIPOffset : 6; /* # of words past SOF to assert SOIP signal */
/* SOIP is high for one clock cycle */
unsigned int SOPOffset : 4; /* # of words past SOIP to assert SOP signal */
/* SOP remains high until the EOF signal */
unsigned int EOFOffset : 14; /* # of words past SOP to assert EOF */
} CTL_IP_HDR;
/* TCP control header */ struct { /* 1st clock */
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CTL_HEADER Hdr; /* standard header (Hdr.Length = 3 or 0 */
/* depending on value of ValidFlow) */
unsigned char spare1 : 3; /* spare */
unsigned char ValidFlow : 1; /* Indicates whether or not the flow ID */
/* has been computed for this packet */
/* if this value is zero, then the */
/* Hdr.Length field is set to 0 and no TCP */
/* control information follows this header */
unsigned char TDEOffset : 4; /* # of words past SOP to assert TDE signal */
/* TDE remains high until the EOF signal */
unsigned char StartBytes : 4; /* Valid bytes at start */
unsigned char EndBytes : 4; /* Valid bytes at end */
unsigned char Instance; /* Flow instance */
/* 2nd clock */
unsigned short StartOffset; /* Offset from TDE to where to start */
/* supplying ValidBytes data */
unsigned short TCPDataLength; /* Number of TCP data bytes contained */
/* within packet */
/* 3rd clock */
unsigned int NewFlow : 1; /* Indicates that this is the start of a */
/* new flow */
unsigned int EndFlow : 1; /* Indicates that this is the end of an */
/* existing flow */
unsigned int FlowID :30; /* Flow Identifier */
/* 4th clock */
unsigned int NextSequence; /* Next sequence identifier */
} CTL_TCP_HDR;
/* packet control header */ struct { /* 1st clock */
CTL_HEADER Hdr; /* standard header (Hdr.Length = 0) */
unsigned char spare; /* spare */
unsigned short DataLength; /* Number of data words to follow */
/* 2nd -> nth clock */ /* payload data words */
} CTL_PAYLOAD;
7.4.1 TCPSerializeEncode
The tcpserializeencode.vhd source file contains all of the circuit logic required
to encode signals from the TCP-Processor client interface into a protocol which transports
easily to other devices. Figure 7.4 shows the three separate state machines that drive the
110
TCPSerializeEncode
Client
Application
Traffic Input
State
Machine
Data
FIFO
Output
State
Machine
Header
FIFO
Header
State
Machine
& Header
Processing
Encoded
Traffic
Figure 7.4: TCPSerializeEncode Circuit Layout
operation of this circuit: an input state machine, a header state machine, and an output state
machine.
The first several processes in the source file consist of inactive counters. These
counters were utilized during debugging and are not required for correct operation of the
circuit. The first active process in the source file copies the signals from the TCP-Processor
client interface to internal signals. The input state machine tracks the beginning and the
end of every packet. The next process utilizes this state information to insert packet data
into the data FIFO. Because the TCP-Processor contains a store and forward cycle, there
are no gaps in the in the data. More specifically, all words of a packet arrive on consecutive
clock cycles. For this reason, the input data processing does not need to watch the data
enable signal for detecting valid data.
The next series of processes extract or compute information necessary to produce
the control headers of the encoded data format. This information includes offsets from the
start of the packet to the IP header, the IP payload, the end of packet, and the TCP payload
data. In addition, the data delivered via the flowstate bus is stored. The header state machine
drives the generation of the flowstate headers from the information collected and computed
by the previous processes. The control logic which inserts the control headers into the
header FIFO follows the state machine.
The output state machine generates the outbound ATM cells of the encoded format.
Processing begins when the output state machine detects a non-empty header FIFO. The
process generates ATM adaptation layer zero (AAL0) cells since the encoding format as-
sumes that no cells will be lost during transmission between multiple devices. These ATM
111
TCPSerializeDecode
Application
Traffic
Cell State
Machine
&
Cell
Processing
Encoded
Traffic
Input State
Machine
&
Packet
Processing
Figure 7.5: TCPSerializeDecode Circuit Layout
cells contain header information read out of the header FIFO and then packet data read out
of the data FIFO.
The final set of processes contains logic for saving the encoded packet data con-
tained in ATM cells to external SRAM. This feature aids in debugging encoding, decoding
or data processing problems. All of SRAM initializes to zero prior to packet processing.
The information stored in SRAM is identical to the encoded data transmitted out the RAD
Line Card interface by the StreamExtract circuit.
7.4.2 TCPSerializeDecode
The tcpserializedecode.vhd source file contains the logic for the TCPSerializeDe-
code circuit. This circuit takes packets which have been encoded into ATM cells and
reproduces the waveform required by the TCPEgress component of the TCP-Processor.
Figure 7.5 illustrates the basic layout of this circuit.
The first process in this source file copies the inbound interface signals into internal
signals used for the rest of the data processing. The cell state machine processes every
ATM cell, differentiating between the cell header and the cell payload. It passes the cell
payload downstream for additional processing.
The input state machine tracks the progress through the encoded control headers and
the packet payload. It must detect the cookie control header as the first word of an ATM
packet to initiate processing. If the cookie is detected, the state machine enters the header
processing state. It transitions into the payload state when it detects the payload control
header.
The next group of processes extract information out of the control headers and gen-
erate the associated packet control signals: such as the start of IP header, the start of IP
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payload, the start of frame, the end of frame, and the data enable signal. They produce
these output signals by counting down a packet offset count until the appropriate signal is
generated.
As with the TCPSerializeEncode circuit, the TCPSerializeDecode circuit contains
logic to write inbound ATM cells to SRAM memory. All of SRAM initializes to zero prior
to packet processing. The information stored in SRAM is identical to the encoded data
received by the StreamExtract circuit via the RAD Line Card interface.
7.5 Implementation
The StreamExtract has been implemented in FPGA logic and is currently operational.
This circuit includes the TCP-Processor logic along with the previously mentioned encode
and decode logic which supports data movement between multiple FPGA devices. The
StreamExtract circuit has a post place and route frequency of 85.565 MHz when targeting
the Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E-8 FPGA. The circuit utilizes 41% (7986/19200) of the slices
and 70% (112/160) of the block RAMs. The device is capable of processing 2.9 million
64-byte packets per second and has a maximum data throughput of 2.7Gbps.
Figure 7.6 shows a highly constrained circuit layout of the StreamExtract circuit on
a Xilinx Virtex 2000E FPGA. The layout consists of regions roughly corresponding to the
various components of the circuit. The control processor contains logic for processing ATM
control cells which facilitate the reading and writing of external memory devices connect to
the FPGA. This component is used for debugging purposes only and is not a required part
of the StreamExtract circuit. Presenting the physical circuit layout in this manner provides
a good comparison of the amount of FPGA resources each component requires.
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Chapter 8
TCP-Lite Wrappers
TCPLiteWrappers1, composed of the TCPDeserialize and TCPReserialize circuits, provide
an environment in which TCP flow processing applications can operate. The TCPDeserial-
ize circuit converts the encoded data stream generated by the TCPSerializeEncode circuit
into the original client interface waveform produced by the TCP-Processor. The TCPRe-
serialize circuit re-encodes the output of the client TCP processing circuit for transmission
to other devices. The output format of the TCPDeserialize circuit is identical to the input
format of the TCPReserialize circuit. Likewise, the input format of the TCPDeserialize
circuit is identical to the output format of the TCPReserialize circuit. Given the common-
ality of these interfaces, the pair of the TCPDeserialize and TCPReserialize circuits have a
net zero effect on data that they process and could be inserted multiple times into a given
application.
The source for the TCPDeserialize and TCPReserialize circuits can be found in
both the distributions for PortTracker and Scan. The source files are identical in both
distributions.
8.1 TCPDeserialize
The TCPDeserialize circuit is different from the TCPSerializeDecode circuit because the
TCPSerializeDecode circuit only needs to reproduce a subset of the client interface signals
as required by the inbound TCPEgress component. The TCPDeserialize component needs
to faithfully reproduce all of the original TCP-Processor client interface signals. For this
reason, the TCPDeserialize circuit contains additional logic functions when compared to
1The TCPLiteWrappers moniker was created by James Moscola. Previously, TCPLiteWrappers were
unnamed.
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the TCPSerializeDecode circuit. Aside from the few extra signals and the processses that
drive them, these two circuit components are identical. The tcpdeserialize.vhd
source file contains the source code for the TCPDeserialize circuit.
8.2 TCPReserialize
Although similar, the TCPReserialize circuit is different from the TCPSerializeEncode cir-
cuit because the TCPSerializeEncode circuit assumes that all packet data will be received in
consecutive clock cycles. This condition does not hold true for the TCPReserialize circuit
which contains extra logic to deal with gaps in packet transmission.
The tcpreserialize.vhd source file contains the source code for the TCPRe-
serialize circuit. As stated previously, the layout, behavior, processes and signals for this
circuit are almost identical to those of the TCPSerializeEncode circuit. Please refer to the
documentation on the TCPSerializeEncode circuit in order to understand the operation of
the TCPReserialize circuit.
8.3 PortTracker
The PortTracker application processes TCP packets and maintains counts of the number
of packets sent to or received from selected TCP ports. This circuit clarifies the dis-
tribution of packets among the various TCP ports. This circuit also provides an excel-
lent example of how to utilize the TCPLiteWrappers when the client TCP stream pro-
cessing application is not concerned about maintaining state information on a per-flow
basis. The source for the PortTracker application can be found at the following URL:
http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp
/source/porttracker source.zip. The directory structure layout, circuit layout,
and build procedures for this application are similar to that of the StreamExtract circuit.
Figure 8.1 shows a layout of the PortTracker application components, including the
main data flow and the interactions with SRAM devices that capture traffic to aid in the de-
bugging process. The rad porttracker component is the top level design file and interfaces
directly to the I/O pins of the RAD. The VHDL code for this component can be found in
the rad porttracker.vhd source file. The component passes control cells and nor-
mal network packets into the circuit via the RAD Switch interface. This network traffic
routes first to the Control Cell Processor (CCP) which allows remote access to the SRAM
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devices. Encoded TCP stream data enters the circuit via the RAD Line Card interface.
Network data from both of the external interfaces is passed into the PortTracker Module
for processing. The SRAM Interface components expose multiple memory access ports,
allowing for request multiplexing. This makes it possible for multiple components to share
the same memory device.
8.3.1 PortTracker Module
The VHDL code for the PortTracker Module can be found in the source file, port-
tracker module.vhd. This component acts as the glue which holds all the subcompo-
nents of the PortTracker circuit together and provides data routing and signal connections
between the subcomponents and the external interface. The RAD Switch interface passes
data to the IPWrapper which converts the inbound cells into IP packets which are then
passed to the ControlProcessor. The ControlProcessor passes outbound traffic back to the
IPWrapper which converts packets back into ATM cells for transmission out of the RAD
Switch interface. Encapsulated TCP stream data enters through the RAD Line Card inter-
face and goes to the TCPDeserialize circuit. The TCPDeserialize circuit passes annotated
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TCP packets to the PortTrackerApp circuit which scans network traffic for packets sent to
or received from various TCP ports. Network traffic is then routed to the TCPReserialize
circuit which re-encodes the network packets for transmission out of the RAD Line Card
interface.
The PortTracker Module contains the same configuration parameters that define the
operation of the PortTracker application. These configuration parameters are identical to
those described in the StreamExtract circuit. Refer to the previous Configuration Param-
eters section on page 76 for details on each of the configuration parameters.
8.3.2 PortTrackerApp
The implementation for the PortTrackerApp can be found in the porttracker.vhd
source file. The PortTracker application is a very simple circuit and a good example of
how to implement a basic TCP packet processing application. The first process copies the
inbound data into internal signals used in subsequent processes. The istcp signal indicates
whether or not the current packet is a TCP packet. The hdr count signal is a remnant from
previous logic and is not used in the application. The port flop process performs all of the
work for the PortTracker application. The SOP and istcp signals indicate the presence of
the TCP port number on the data bus. When this situation occurs, the source and destination
TCP ports run through a series of if statements which determine the type of packet being
processed. The result of the port comparisons, drives a port type signal. Packets are always
associated with the lowest port match (either source or destination) and are only counted
once. The PortTrackerApp passes the various port type signals to the ControlProcessor for
collection and generation of statistics packets.
The last group of processes in the PortTrackerApp copies the internal packet data
signals to the external interface. Additionally, a running counter and a process uses this
counter to flash the RAD LEDs. These LEDs indicate that the circuit has been loaded into
the FPGA on the FPX platform.
8.3.3 ControlProcessor
The ControlProcessor component is described in the control proc.vhd source file.
Figure 8.2 shows the flow of data through the circuit. The first several processes copy
inbound network data into internal signals and load the packets into the Frame FIFO. Once
a complete packet has been written to the Frame FIFO, one bit is written to the control
FIFO to indicate that a complete packet is ready for outbound transmission.
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The next couple of processes maintain the interval timer which drives the generation
of the trigger event. This operation is very similar to that of the TCPStats module of
the TCP-Processor. The trigger event initiates the saving of all statistics counters and the
transmission of a statistics packet.
The next group of processes maintain statistics counters for each of the port ranges
tracked by this circuit. These counters are saved and reset when they receive the trigger
event.
The packet state machine manages the transmission of outbound traffic. Upon de-
tection of the trigger event, the state machine traverses a sequence of states that generate
the statistics packet and send it out via the outbound interface. When it detects a non-
empty condition for the control FIFO, it reads a network packet from the frame FIFO and
transmits it out of the output interface.
The next process takes a snapshot of all the statistic counters and saves the current
values when the trigger event fires. This allows the counters to reset and continue counting
the generation of the statistics packet.
The format of the statistics packet follows the same general format as mentioned in
Appendix C on Page 183. The PortTracker application generates a statistics packet with a
stats identifier of five (5). The exact sequence of statistics values transmitted in the statistics
packets is:
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•cfg1: simulation
•numFTP: number of FTP packets
•numSSH: number of SSH packets
•numTelnet: number of telnet packets
•numSMTP: number of SMTP packets
•numTIM: number of TIM packets
•numNameserv: number of Nameserv packets
•numWhois: number of Whois packets
•numLogin: number of Login packets
•numDNS: number of DNS packets
•numTFTP: number of TFTP packets
•numGopher: number of Gopher packets
•numFinger: number of Finger packets
•numHTTP: number of HTTP packets
•numPOP: number of POP packets
•numSFTP: number of SFTP packets
•numSQL: number of SQL packets
•numNNTP: number of NNTP packets
•numNetBIOS: number of NetBIOS packets
•numSNMP: number of SNMP packets
•numBGP: number of BGP packets
•numGACP: number of GACP packets
•numIRC: number of IRC packets
•numDLS: number of DLS packets
•numLDAP: number of LDAP packets
•numHTTPS: number of HTTPS packets
•numDHCP: number of DHCP packets
•numLower: number of packets to/from TCP ports ≥ 1024
•numUpper: number of packets to/from TCP ports > 1024
8.4 Scan
The Scan application processes TCP data streams and searches for four separate digital sig-
natures of up to 32 bytes in length. This circuit provides TCP stream content scanning fea-
tures which support detection of signatures that cross packet boundaries. This circuit also
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provides an excellent example/model/starting point of how to utilize the TCPLiteWrappers
when the client TCP stream processing application needs to maintain context information
for each flow in the network. The source for the Scan application can be found at the fol-
lowing URL: http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal
/tcp/source/scan source.zip. The directory structure layout, circuit layout, and
build procedures for this application are similar to that of the StreamExtract and Port-
Tracker circuits. Additional information regarding the Scan circuit can be found at the
following web site: http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx
/fpx internal/tcp/scan.html
Figure 8.3 shows a layout of the components which make up the Scan application.
It illustrates the main data flow along with interactions it has with memory devices which
capture traffic to aid in the debugging process and store per-flow context information. The
rad scan component is the top level design file which interfaces directly to the I/O pins
of the RAD. The VHDL code for this component can be found in the rad scan.vhd
source file. The RAD Switch interface passes control cells and control packets into the
circuit. This data goes first to the Control Cell Processor (CCP) which allows remote
access to the SRAM devices. Encoded TCP stream data enters the circuit via the RAD
Line Card interface. Network data from both of the external interfaces is passed into the
Scan Module for processing. The SRAM Interface component exposes multiple memory
access ports to provide request multiplexing so that multiple components can share the
same memory device.
8.4.1 Scan Module
The VHDL code for the Scan Module is in the scan module.vhd source file. This com-
ponent acts as the glue which holds all the subcomponents of the Scan circuit together and
provides data routing and signal connections between the subcomponents and the exter-
nal interface. The RAD Switch interface passes data to the IPWrapper which converts the
inbound cells into IP packets which are then passed to the ControlProcessor. The Control-
Processor passes outbound traffic back to the IPWrapper which converts packets back into
ATM cells for transmission out of the RAD Switch interface. Encapsulated TCP stream
data enters through the RAD Line Card interface which passes it to the TCPDeserialize
circuit. It passes annotated TCP packets to the ScanApp circuit which scans network traffic
for four separate digital signatures. Network traffic is then routed to the TCPReserialize
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Figure 8.3: Scan Circuit Layout
circuit which re-encodes the network packets for transmission out of the RAD Line Card
interface.
The Scan Module also contains the configuration parameters which define the op-
eration of the Scan application. These configuration parameters have identical names and
functions to those described in the StreamExtract and PortTracker circuits. Please refer to
the previous Configuration Parameters section on page 76 for details on each of the config-
uration parameters.
8.4.2 ScanApp
The implementation for the ScanApp can be found in the scan.vhd source file. Figure 8.4
shows the internal logic layout of the ScanApp. The main flow of network traffic goes left
to right. The output state machine controls the operation of the stream comparison logic.
The StateStore component stores the most recent 32 bytes of stream data for each flow in
external memory. It loads this per-flow context information into the string comparison logic
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prior to processing a packet. After packet processing, it saves this context information to
memory. It also possesses logic to control the replacement of search strings.
The first couple of processes of the ScanApp perform component maintenance tasks.
These tasks include controlling the TCA flow control signal for inbound data. The TCA
signal de-assertes whenever the data FIFO becomes 3/4 full or the control or header FIFOs
become 1/2 full. They also copy inbound data into internal signals used later in the circuit.
The input state machine manages the processing of inbound packets into the Scan
circuit. Based on the input processing state, it writes packet data into the data FIFO and
flowstate information and control signals into the header FIFO. When it detects the end of
a packet, it writes a single bit to the control FIFO which indicates that a complete packet is
available for downstream processing.
The next group of processes handles the processing of header information, issuing
requests to the StateStore to retrieve per-flow context information, and processing the re-
turned context information. The request state machine drives the sequence of operations
required to interact with the StateStore. Upon detecting a non-empty header FIFO, the state
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machine progresses through states which retrieve flowstate information from the header
FIFO. Depending on information it retrieves from the header FIFO and the packet’s rela-
tion to the previous packet (is this packet part of the same flow or not), the state machine
will enter the WFR (wait for response) state, waiting for completion of the per-flow context
retrieval from the StateStore. It enters the WFO (wait for outbound processing) state last,
which ensures that data is held in internal buffers until outbound processing is initiated.
The hfifo control process controls the reading of information out of the header FIFO. The
req signals process stores up to four words of flowstate information read from the header
FIFO. The state store request process drives the StateStore request signals which initiate
the reading of per-flow context information. The retrieval active flop indicates whether or
not a retrieval operation of per-flow context information is active for this packet. Context
information returned from the StateStore is saved in a set of signal vectors, prior to being
loaded into the comparator.
The output state machine drives the processing of the stream comparison engine and
the delivery of network traffic out of the component. When it detects a non-empty condi-
tion for the control FIFO and the request state machine is in the WFO state (indicating that
StateStore request processing has completed for the next packet), the output state machine
initiates outbound packet processing. It enters a delay state in order to wait for data to be
clocked out of the data FIFO. The first four words of a packet have special states (First,
Second, Third and Fourth). This supports the special processing required to combine the
flowstate information with the network packet. The Payload state manages the processing
of the remainder of the packet. The Last1 and Last2 states handle processing of the AAL5
trailer which occurs at the end of the network packet. A couple of additional processes con-
trol the reading of data from the data and control FIFOs. The next process drives internal
signals with packet data, flowstate data, and associated control signals.
The next three processes store information required by the StateStore update logic
after completion of packet processing. They use separate signals to store this information
so that the front end processing (input and request state machines) can initiate processing
of the next packet. These signals store the flow identifier associated with this packet, a
determination of whether or not an update is required, and an indication of whether or not
this is a new flow. If either the update required or the new flow signals are set, the update
state machine will store the current flow context to memory via the StateStore component.
The next group of processes maintains the check string which contains the most
recent 36 bytes of the TCP data stream for this flow. The valid byte count signal keeps
track of how many new bytes of data (0, 1, 2, 3, or 4) are added to the check string.
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The build check string process maintains an accurate representation of the most recent
36 bytes of the TCP data stream. While processing the first word of the packet, the
build check string process loads the check string with data either retrieved from the State-
Store or initialized to zero. Subsequently, whenever there is valid TCP stream data on the
data bus, the check string is updated accordingly. Since data is clocked in four bytes at a
time, the process maintains a 36-byte check buffer so that it can perform the four 32-byte
comparisons on each clock cycle, shifting each comparison by one byte.
The next section of logic performs update operations to the StateStore. The update
state machine controls this action. The update sequence starts when the update state ma-
chine reaches the end of a packet and either the upd required signal or the upd newflow
signal indicate that context information should be saved. Once begun, the sequence contin-
ues to cycle to a new state on each clock cycle until it is complete. This sequence involves
sending the flow identifier, followed by four 64-bit words of per-flow context information.
The ss out signals temporarily store the last 32 bytes of the check string. This allows the
check string to be loaded with the context information of the next packet without having
to wait for the context update operation to complete. The state store update process drives
the StateStore signals utilized to save the new per-flow context information.
The next section of logic contains the stream comparison logic. A TCAM approach
performs the actual comparisons where each comparator contains a value and a mask. It
performs the match, checking to see if the following equation is true:
((check string XOR value) NAND mask) == (all ones)
The first process controls all of the matching operations by indicating whether a match
should be performed on this clock cycle. The next process maintains the match1 value
and match1 mask values. These values update when the set state and set id signals are
set. The 256-bit string 1 match operation is divided into eight segments in order to reduce
the fan-in for the match found signal. Each of these eight processes match a separate 32
bits of the match1 string and produce a separate match found1 signal. The match process
performs four separate matches, each offset by one byte in order to achieve full coverage
for the matching operation. An identical set of processes manages the matching operations
for strings 2, 3, and 4.
The next processes drive the outbound signals by copying the internal packet signals.
This induces an extra clock cycle delay in the data, but helps to improve the maximum
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operating frequency by providing an extra clock cycle for these signals to traverse the
FPGA.
The next group of processes illuminates the LEDs whenever one of the match strings
is detected in a TCP data stream. The first process maintains a free-running counter which
is used by the subsequent processes to define the duration that a LED should be lit on
the occurrence of a string match. This is required for the LED to be visible (illuminating
the LED for 1 clock cycle has no visible effect). The led1 count and the led1 ena signals
manage the illumination of LED 1. When all of the match1 found signals are set, the
led1 count signal stores the current counter value and illuminates the LED by setting the
led1 ena signal. The LED remains illuminated until the counter wraps and returns to the
value saved in the led1 count signal. LEDs 2, 3, and 4 operate the same way.
The next series of processes manage the modification of the search strings. The set
state machine controls the sequence of events which waits for the SET ENA signal to be
asserted. The first word of SET DATA contains the number of the string to be modified.
The next eight clock cycles contain the string value and the final eight clock cycles contain
the string mask. The set count signal counts through the eight clock cycles associated with
the string value and mask. The set value signal holds the new match value and the set mask
holds the new match mask. If it receives an incomplete set sequence, the set state machine
returns to the idle state and ignores the command.
The query state machine manages the querying of the current match string val-
ues and masks. The ControlProcessor component driving the QUERY ENA signal and
providing the identifier of the string to query on the QUERY DATA signals initiates the
query request. On receiving the QUERY ENA signal, the ControlProcessor saves the cur-
rent match string value and mask values into the qry value and qry mask signals. During
the next eight clock cycles, The ControlProcessor clocks the match value over the RE-
SPONSE DATA signals. It then clocks the match mask over the same response signal lines
during the subsequent eight clock cycles. The ControlProcessor uses the RESPONSE ENA
and RESPONSE LAST signals as extra control information to frame the query response.
The final process of the source file manages miscellaneous output signals. These
include the output LEDs and a set of match signals which are used by the ControlProcessor
to collect string match statistics.
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8.4.3 ControlProcessor
The control proc.vhd source file describes the ControlProcessor component and the
overall flow of data through the circuit. The first several processes copy inbound network
data into internal signals and load the packets into the frame FIFO. Once a complete packet
has been written to the frame FIFO, one bit is written to the control FIFO to indicate that a
complete packet is ready for outbound transmission.
The next couple of processes maintain the interval timer which drives the generation
of the trigger event. This operation is identical to that of the ControlProcessor module of
the PortTracker application. The trigger event initiates the saving of all statistics counters
and the transmission of a statistics packet. The next group of processes maintain statistics
counters for each of the four string matches which are tracked by this circuit. On reception
of the trigger event, the ControlProcessor saves and resets these counters.
The packet state machine processes match string set commands, match string query
requests, and manages the transmission of all outbound traffic (including the forwarding
of inbound traffic, responses to commands and queries, and generated statistics packets).
Upon detection of the trigger event, the state machine traverses through a sequence of states
which generate the statistics packet and send it out via the outbound interface. When the
state machine detects a non-empty condition for the control FIFO, it reads and processes a
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network packet from the frame FIFO. If the packet is determined to contain a command or
query for the Scan application, then the state machine traverses a sequence of states which
either process the match string set command or the match string query command. The state
machine makes this determination by looking at the source and destination ports of the
incoming packet. If both of these port numbers are equal to 0x1969, then the packet state
machine will enter the command/query processing states. The state machine also looks at
the first word of the UDP payload to see if it contains the magic value of 0x23a8d01e. If
this magic value is detected, then the next word is assumed to be the command word which
determines whether this command is a set or a query. Results of the set or query operation
generate an outbound packet. The state machine transmits all other traffic out of the output
interface. An additional couple of processes control the reading of packets from the frame
and control FIFOs. The last read signal marks the end of a packet and is used by the frame
FIFO output control process along with the ffifo ack signal to ensure that all packet data is
read from the frame FIFO.
The next process takes a snapshot of all the statistic counters and saves the current
values when the trigger event fires. This allows the counters to reset and continue counting
while the statistics packet is being generated and transmitted.
The format of the statistics packet follows the same general format as mentioned
in Appendix C on Page 183. The Scan application generates statistics packet with a stats
identifier of two (2). The exact sequence of statistics values transmitted in the statistics
packets is listed below:
•cfg1: simulation
•scn1: number of occurrences of match string 1
•scn2: number of occurrences of match string 2
•scn3: number of occurrences of match string 3
•scn4: number of occurrences of match string 4
The output process drives the outbound signals with network packets. There are
four basic packet types. The first is statistics packets, the second is a response to the set
command, the third is a response to the query command, and the fourth is passthrough
traffic. The ControlProcessor statistic packet generation logic is identical to the statistic
packet generation logic contained in the PortTracker and TCP-Processor circuits, except
for the individual statistics values. In order to simplify some of the command processing
logic, all inbound packets to the ControlProcessor are assumed to be control packets. For
all of these packets, the output process replaces the source IP address with the destination
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IP address and inserts the specified stats source IP address into the source IP address field
of the packet. Additionally, the packet length of the UDP header is changed to 0x54 to
correspond to the length of a response/confirmation packet. During the command state, the
request/response bit is set in the control word. The result of the query operation is output
during the WFR and the Response states. The layout of the Scan control packet format can
be seen in Figure 8.6. All other inbound packet data is forwarded to the output interface in
a normal fashion.
Following the output process, there are a couple of processes which aid in the pro-
cessing of control packets. These processes count the number of IP header words, store the
destination IP address so that it can be used to replace the source IP address, and generate
statistics packets. The final two processes drive the SET and QUERY interface signals to
the ScanApp component. These signals actually control the set and query operations.
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8.4.4 StateStore
The StateStore component provides per-flow context storage services for the Scan appli-
cation. It exposes simple request, response and update interfaces to the application. In
addition, this component handles all interactions with the SDRAM controller to store and
retrieve data. The StateStore is modelled after the StateStoreMgr of the TCP-Processor, but
is greatly simplified because it does not perform any of the flow classification operations.
It only provides data storage and retrieval services for the Scan application. In order to
simplify the operation of the StateStore component, 64-bit wide interfaces are utilized for
both the response and update data.
Figure 8.7 shows the layout of the StateStore component. Its three state machines
drive all of the operations of the StateStore. The source VHDL code for the StateStore
component is in statestore.vhd.
The first process in the source file drives the response interface signals. It copies
data returned from SDRAM to the response interface signals and passes it to the ScanApp
component. The next couple of processes implement the read state machine. Upon receiv-
ing a request from the ScanApp, the state machine sequences through the states necessary
to perform the memory read operation and receive the response. The read engine drives
the read control signals of the SDRAM controller. The SS REQ DATA signal contains the
flow identifier of the context to retrieve. This flow identifier is used as a direct address into
memory and the read engine initiates the 32-byte read operation starting at this address.
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This flow identifier (memory address) is stored in the read addr signal for the duration of
the read operation. Once the presence of the read response has been signaled by the mem-
ory controller, the take count signal counts the data words returned from memory. As this
data is being returned from memory, it is copied to the response signals and passed to the
ScanApp component.
The update state machine processes data associated with an update request. This
component requires a separate state machine and buffer because write data cannot be writ-
ten directly to the SDRAM controller without first setting up the write operation. Upon de-
tection of an update command, the new context information is written to the writeback ram
for buffering while the write operation is being initiated. The update count signal tracks
the number of received words from the ScanApp and is also used as the address of where
to write the data in the writeback ram block.
The write state machine manages write operations to the SDRAM controller. The
initial sequence of states out of reset perform memory initialization tasks by writing zeros
to all memory locations. After memory initialization is completed, the write state machine
enters the Idle state, waiting for update requests. On receipt of the SS UPD VALID signal,
the state machine enters the Req state to initiate the write request to SDRAM. Based on
responses from the SDRAM controller, the write state machine traverses through the re-
maining states of the write operation. The next process controls the reading of the updated
per-flow context information from the writeback ram. It uses a separate interface so that
writes to the writeback ram can occur at the same time as read operations. The write engine
drives the SDRAM controller interface signals. Operations include the initialization (ze-
roing) of all memory locations and the writing of context information to external memory.
The write addr signal holds the address of the appropriate context information storage loca-
tion in memory for the duration of the write operation. Following the write addr signal, the
processes that control the memory initialization operation provide an incrementing mem-
ory address and a completion flag. The next process counts the number of words read from
the writeback ram and written to external SDRAM. This count value is used as the read
address for the writeback ram. The final process in the source file drives the ready signal.
It indicates when the memory initialization operation completes.
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Chapter 9
Analysis
The TCP processing circuits analyzed live Internet traffic for this phase of the research.
Network Technology Services, which manages the campus network at Washington Univer-
sity, provided a live copy of all campus Internet traffic to the Applied Research Laboratory
for this analysis. The Washington University network has approximately 19,000 active
IP addresses and uses two separate Internet connections which provide 300Mb/s of total
bandwidth. In addition, the University maintains an 84Mb/s connection to Internet2, a
high-speed network interconnecting 206 universities throughout the United States. Traffic
flowing over these three Internet connections was aggregated and passed to the FPGA-
based TCP flow processing circuits via a Gigabit Ethernet link.
9.1 Test Setup
The test environment used for Internet traffic processing and data collection includes a
WUGS-20 switch and a Linux PC. The WUGS-20 switch is populated with four FPX
cards which perform data processing, two Gigabit Ethernet cards (one for injecting Inter-
net traffic and the other for exporting statistics), and a G-Link card which is used for switch
configuration operations. Figure 9.1 is a diagram of the test setup. Figure 9.1A is a photo-
graph of the hardware used to process Internet traffic and Figure 9.1B illustrates the flow
of data through the hardware.
Live Internet traffic enters the WUGS-20 switch via a Gigabit Ethernet connection.
Both inbound and outbound traffic arrive on a single network feed. The Gigabit Ether-
net network card passes data packets StreamExtract circuit for processing by the TCP-
Processor. The StreamExtract circuit passes annotated TCP packets to the PortTracker
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circuit which collects statistics on the amount of TCP traffic used by various well-known
TCP ports. The PortTracker circuit then passes the encoded data is then passed to the Scan
circuit which scans TCP data streams for selected digital signatures. Each circuit transmits
statistics information to an external computer which performs data collection and charting.
9.2 Data Collection
A Linux PC connected to the WUGS-20 switch gathers statistics packets generated by
the StreamExtract, PortTracker and Scan circuits. Software applications running on this
PC collect, store, process, and chart the information contained in the statistics packets.
The StatsCollector (Appendix C, Page 184) application receives these packets first. The
purpose of the StatsCollector is to accurately time stamp each packet and store the entire
contents of the packet to a disk file. The StatsCollector maintains a separate disk file for
the statistics generated by each circuit. In addition, it creates a new statistics data file each
day to facilitate the maintenance and processing of the raw data. The data contained in
these daily files can easily be plotted using the gnuplot graphing utility. The StatsCollector
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circuit also retransmits the original packet so that other statistics processing applications
can operate on data in real-time.
A Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agent (Appendix C, Page 186)
specifically designed for this project runs on the data collection PC. This agent receives the
retransmitted statistics packets and maintains individual counters for each item in the pack-
ets. These counters are made available as Management Information Base (MIB) variables
via standard SNMP queries. The Multi-Router Traffic Grapher (MRTG) is a utility which
produces real-time updating charts by reading SNMP MIB variables on a periodic basis.
A configuration file defines the operation of the MRTG application, specifying which MIB
variables to plot and the format, legends and titles of each chart (Appendix C, Page 187).
Figure 9.2 shows a diagram of the statistics data collection and processing.
9.3 Results
The testing analyzed Internet traffic for a five week period from August 20th, 2004 and to
September 25th, 2004. Figure 9.3 shows IP traffic transiting the Internet drains during a
24 hour period. This daily traffic pattern is representative of the observed traffic during the
entire collection period. A cyclical traffic pattern exists with peak traffic rates occurring
between 12:00 noon and 5:00 pm and a trough occurring between 3:00 am and 8:00 am.
The testing detected peak traffic rates of 300Mbps. While this traffic load does not tax the
throughput capabilities of the circuit, it does demonstrate data processing on live Internet
traffic at rates above what software-based TCP data stream analyzers can presently handle.
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The remainder of this section takes a closer look at some of the more interesting
traffic patterns detected with the TCP processing hardware circuits. The TCP-Processor
detected several denial of service attacks and other unexpected traffic patterns during live
Internet traffic processing. Additionally, the flow scanning circuits detected the presence
of worms, viruses and spam throughout the collection period. The TCP processing circuits
detected denial of service attacks and virus signatures in network traffic at data rates above
what existing software-based TCP flow processors can operate. These circuits also ana-
lyzed various TCP packet types in order to provide a better understanding of Internet traffic
patterns. This knowledge will aid in the design of more efficient data processing systems in
the future. Finally, the tests produced HTTP (port 80) and NNTP (port 119) traffic profiles
which illustrate how some traffic closely follows general network usage patterns and the
other traffic is time invariant.
The TCP processing circuits make no distinction is made between inbound and out-
bound. It is therefore impossible to differentiate between attacks originating within the
Washington University network and attacks directed at the campus network. This type of
information could be gathered by either monitoring inbound and outbound traffic sepa-
rately, or by making modifications to the processing circuits.
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9.3.1 Denial of Service Attack
On August 28th, the TCP-Processor detected a TCP SYN denial of service attack on the
Washington University network and continued to process traffic normally throughout the
attack, as illustrated by the graph in Figure 9.4. The normal traffic pattern for this network
averages from 1,500 to 2,000 TCP SYN packets every second. This attack had a peak traffic
rate of 45,000 TCP SYN packets per second for a 30 second interval. The capture interval
of the collection is 30 seconds, which implies that the duration of the burst was likely less
than 30 seconds because there was no spill over of the burst into the next collection interval.
If all the packets associated with this attack occurred within a one second burst, then the
peak data rate would be 1.3 million packets per second.
The test uncovered several unusual characteristics of this attack. First of all, there
was a noticeable hourly stepwise increase in TCP SYN activity starting several hours prior
to the main attack. These increases in traffic suggest that this was a coordinated attack
triggered by time, with machines in different time zones initiating the attack at one hour
intervals. This stepwise increase in traffic resulted in sustained TCP SYN traffic of 8,000
136
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
00:00 03:00 06:00 09:00 12:00 15:00 18:00 21:00 00:00
pa
ck
et
s/s
ec
 (3
0 s
ec
 av
era
ge
)
Time of day
Washington University Internet Traffic Statistics for 09/10/2004
SYN Packets
FIN Packets
RST Packets
Figure 9.5: TCP SYN Burst
TCP SYN packets per second. Another interesting characteristic is the short duration of
the attack. In addition to the hourly ramp-up in TCP SYN packets, there was a single burst
of packets which lasted less than 30 seconds.
Another noteworthy result of the analysis was the detection of a daily burst of TCP
SYN packets which occurred every evening at 11:15pm. The burst was short lived and the
peak SYN rate was approximately 5000 packets per second for the 30 second collection
interval. In addition to the burst of TCP SYN packets, a burst of TCP RST packets is
present at the same time. Figure 9.5 shows a daily chart with a noticeable spike of TCP
SYN traffic at the end of the day. This daily attack behavior can result from computers
infected with viruses which perform a periodic, time-based attack. It is also possibly an
artifact of some kind of programmed maintenance, such as backups or updates to virus
filter definitions. The TCP-Processor provides a platform for performing anomaly detection
within multi-gigabit networks.
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9.3.2 Virus Detection
When used in conjunction with a content scanning hardware circuit, the TCP-Processor
enables the detection of Internet worms and viruses on high-speed network links. To
demonstrate this capability, the content scanning circuit was configured to search for two
frequently occurring viruses, Mydoom and Netsky.
The Mydoom virus, or W32/Mydoom.b@MM virus relies on email attachments
and peer-to-peer networks to spread from machine to machine. The virus infects Microsoft
Windows-based machines, overwriting the host file, opening up a back door, attempting a
denial of service attack, and further propagating itself. The denial of service against either
www.microsoft.com or www.sco.com fails to start most of the time due to a bug in the virus
itself.
The virus spreads primarily via email attachment and contains a Simple Mail Trans-
fer Protocol (SMTP) engine which randomly selects from a list of subjects and bodies in
order to trick the recipient into executing the attachment. One of the possible bodies con-
tains the text ”The message contains Unicode characters and has been sent as a binary
attachment.” The Scan circuit was configured to scan for this text. Figure 9.6 shows the
occurrence of this signature over a 24 hour period. The Scan circuit detected the virus
propagating at a rate of approximately five times every 10 minutes, with a peak of 15 de-
tections per 10 minutes. Figure 9.6 shows a time invariant distribution of detections for the
Mydoom virus.
The Netsky virus, or W32.Netsky.P@mm virus, is a mass mailing worm which
infects Microsoft Windows-based systems. The virus is a memory resident program which
exploits a well known vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer. It propagates via email
using the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) and using Kazaa network shares. The
Scan circuit detected the virus by searching TCP data streams for the string ”No Virus
found” which occurs in the body of the email used to spread the virus. While it is likely
that the majority of the detections were due to the Netsky virus, false positives are possible
considering the relatively short ASCII text string used as the digital signature.
Figure 9.7 shows a graph of the rate at which the Netsky virus was detected. The
circuit averaged approximately 12 detections per 10 minute window with peaks of 22 occur-
rences per 10 minute window. The virus transmissions were spread randomly throughout
the 24 hour period of the chart. The time invariant distribution of detections is common for
self-propagating viruses. This chart represents of the Netsky virus traffic observed over the
entire five week collection period.
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9.3.3 Spam
The TCP-Processor and associated content scanning circuits were also configured to search
for spam. To demonstration this capability, they scanned all TCP data streams for the word
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mortgage. Figure 9.8 displays a number of string detections that occurred in a 24 hour
period.
The Scan circuit detected the string approximately 2,000 times per 10 minute win-
dow during the middle of the day with a peak detection rate of over 3,500 occurrences per
10 minute window. The rate at which the string was detected roughly corresponds to the
overall traffic bandwidth throughout the day. The chart shows that the detection rate has the
same pattern as the traffic rate shown in Figure 9.3. The spam detection results are likely
skewed due to the occurrence of the string mortgage appearing in advertisements on web
pages. Based on the data collected (see Appendix D), Web traffic constitutes 50 times more
packets than email traffic and therefore will have a larger contribution to the chart.
9.3.4 Traffic Trends
Traffic patterns revealed as part of this research provide important insights into the nature
of Internet traffic. These insights can now be used to improve the operation and perfor-
mance of network switches, routers, and the TCP-Processor. The results have also been
compared with Internet traffic analysis performed by other researchers in order to validate
the operation of the TCP-Processor.
The data collected for this research confirms the findings of [112] which state that
over 85% of all IP packets on the Internet are TCP packets. Figure 9.9 shows a graph
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of both IP and TCP packets transmitted between Washington University campus network
and the Internet for a 24 hour period. Throughout the day there was a consistent number
of non-TCP packets while TCP traffic was subject to traffic fluctuations induced by usage
behavior.
The traffic analysis also shows that 20% to 50% of all TCP packets are zero length
acknowledgment packets, which supports similar findings in [112]. This statistic adds cred-
ibility to the TCP-Processor configuration option which skips TCP flow classification and
per-flow context retrieval operations when processing zero-length TCP acknowledgment
packets. Zero length packets are short packets (typically 40 bytes) which cause process-
ing delays for the TCP-Processor because the amount of time required to retrieve per-flow
context information is longer than the transmission time of the packet. Processing through-
put of the TCP-Processor is improved when the classification of these packets is disabled.
Since there is no data contained within these packets, TCP stream processing is not af-
fected when this optimization is enabled. Figure 9.10 shows a chart comparing the number
of zero-length packets to all TCP packets in a 24 hour period.
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9.3.5 TCP Flow Classification
One of the challenges associated with high-performance TCP flow processing systems is
accurately classifying TCP packets. The TCP-Processor circuit which processed the Wash-
ington University Internet traffic used a modified open-addressing hash table implementa-
tion to maintain per-flow context records. The experiment used a 64MB memory module
capable of storing 1 million 64 byte context records.
Figure 9.11 represents the total number of active flows processed by the TCP-
Processor. When it receives any TCP packet, the TCP-Processor creates a new context
record in the state store if a record does not already exist for that TCP connection. A TCP
FIN or TCP RST packet causes a context record to be placed in a disabled/unused state.
TCP connections which are not properly terminated remain as active records in the state
store. The TCP-Processor does not age out unused flow records in the current implemen-
tation. Instead, when hash collisions occur, the previous context record is replaced by a
context record for the flow associated with the current packet. This behavior leads to the
growth of the hash table over time caused by unterminated TCP connections which become
stale context records in the state store. Figure 9.11 shows that throughout the day, between
500,000 and 700,000 flow context records are active in the system. Because stale records
have the tendency to be forced out of the state store by new connections, the total number
of active flows in the system decreases during the most active part of the day.
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Figure 9.12: Flow Transitions
Figure 9.12 shows the number of new flow context records, terminated flow context
records, and reused flow context records. The number of new TCP flows closely corre-
sponds to the number of terminated flows. This behavior implies that the majority of the
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TCP connections on the Internet are short-lived. The spikes in new flows which occur oc-
casionally throughout the day cannot be paired with corresponding spikes in terminated
flows. These spikes are likely attributable to rogue traffic such as probes to random IP
addresses within the Washington University address space. If the target IP address of the
probe refers to an unutilized or unreachable address in the campus network, then a TCP
RST or TCP FIN packet will never be generated and the TCP-Processor will not remove
the state store context for that flow.
The number of reused flow table entries is attributable to a small number of flows
which continually collide with each other, causing a ping-pong effect where the presence
of a packet from one flow forces the replacement of the flow context record for the other
flow. The spikes in reused flow table entries are attributable to the same rogue traffic which
causes bursts in the creation of new flow context records. The same traffic which causes
spikes in the creation of new flows also causes spikes in reused flow entries.
9.3.6 Traffic Types
The PortTracker circuit (described on page 115) keeps track of the number of packets tran-
siting the network which either originate from or are sent to various well known TCP ports.
Two charts obtained from this data collection are presented here.
Figure 9.13 shows traffic patterns for Net News Transfer Protocol (NNTP). The
NNTP packets observed on the network are invariant with respect to time. In contrast to
the NNTP traffic, HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) packet rates vary widely throughout
the day. This variability is due to the interactive nature of HTTP Web traffic. Figure 9.14
represents HTTP traffic in a 24 hour period. This traffic pattern closely corresponds to the
daily traffic pattern as shown in Figure 9.3 and Figure 9.9.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
The TCP-Processor provides a pipelined TCP processing circuit which enables extensible
networking services to process TCP flows at multi-gigabit per second data rates. It also pro-
vides stateful flow tracking, context storage, TCP stream reassembly services, and supports
TCP flow manipulation for applications which operate on TCP data streams. In addition,
it is capable of processing millions of active TCP connections by storing per-flow context
information in an external memory module its modular design simplifies the modification
and integration of components. The TCP-Processor also scales to support higher band-
width networks by increasing parallelism, improving memory bandwidth utilization and
using new generations of hardware devices which support higher clock frequencies, greater
circuit densities, and increased I/O bandwidth. A serialization/deserialization module aids
in the development of complex TCP flow monitoring services by providing a simple and
efficient mechanism for passing annotated network packets and flow context information
between multiple devices.
The completeness of the implementation is constantly at odds with the real-time
processing requirements which dictate the rate at which data must be processed. The chal-
lenge is to develop a system which is stable and efficient, yet still maintains a robust feature
set. The TCP-Processor succeeds in providing a real-time TCP flow processor capable of
operating on high-speed network traffic.
10.1 Contributions
The TCP-Processor architecture describes a new methodology for processing TCP flows
within the context of high-speed networks. By utilizing a hardware-based approach, the
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architecture exploits pipelining and parallelism in order to provide an order of magnitude
increase in processing performance over existing software-based TCP flow processors. Un-
like other hardware-based TCP flow processors, the TCP-Processor was designed to sup-
port millions of simultaneous TCP flow contexts while processing data at multi-gigabit
line rates. To accomplish this, it defines a minimal amount of per-flow context information
which can be quickly swapped during the processing of packets from different flows. The
per-flow context storage and retrieval operations occur in parallel with packet processing
operations in order to maintain throughput at multi-gigabit per second traffic rates..
This research has resulted in the development of an architectural interface which
provides a modular interface for extensible networking services. The resulting hardware
interface simplifies the TCP state processing logic of the flow monitoring service. Instead
of generating a separate interface specifically for handling stream content, the interface
annotates fully formed network packets. It provides full access to protocol header fields to
flow monitoring applications without the need for additional interface signals. In addition,
since the network packets are passed through the circuit, no work is required to regenerate
network packets.
A modular framework supports the integration of various plug-in modules. These
modules support complex extensible networking services by providing a standard interface
framework for communication between modules. Complex TCP flow monitoring services
can now be developed by combining library modules with custom logic.
The TCP-Processor’s flow classification and context storage subsystem provide fast
access to per-flow state information required to process large numbers of flows in a single
circuit design. These components perform a 96-bit exact match classification for each
flow while simultaneously supporting a high rate of insertion and deletion events. This is
accomplished utilizing a modified open-addressing hash scheme in which hash buckets are
limited to a small fixed number of entries.
A reference implementation of the TCP-Processor protocol processing architecture
uses the Very High-Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Hardware Description Language
(VHDL). The circuit has a post place and route frequency of 85.565 MHz when targeting
the Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E-8 FPGA, utilizing 41% (7986/19200) of the slices and 70%
(112/160) of the block RAMs. The device can process 2.9 million 64-byte packets per
second and has a maximum throughput of 2.7Gbps.
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Extensible serialization and deserialization modules support the movement of data
from one device to another. These modules simplify the task of developing large and com-
plex systems by providing a standard way to transport results between devices. The seri-
alized data structures are self-describing and extensible so that new sections can be added
and backward compatibility can be maintained. Utilizing these modules, multiple devices
can be chained together to address complex network data processing requirements.
10.2 Value of Live Traffic Testing
Live traffic testing helped uncovered subtle, but critical design flaws. During the course of
this research project, malformed packets were encountered which caused state transition
sequences that were not originally accounted for during the design phase. In addition,
other logic and processing errors in the implementation came to light during this phase of
the project.
Live traffic testing also provided valuable insight into the types of anomalies one is
faced with when performing protocol processing operations, especially within the area of
high-speed networks. Some of the failure scenarios that were encountered involved packets
with invalid header fields, runt (or short) packets, and traffic patterns which resulted in
buffer overflows. One such problem involved an IP packet that had an incorrect header
length field. The header length field indicated that the IP header contained 14 words (56
bytes). The length of the entire IP packet was less than 56 bytes, which caused an invalid
state transition within the IP wrapper. This packet was passed into the TCP-Processor
with control signals which didn’t follow the interface design specification. This eventually
caused the TCP-Processor to suspend processing indefinitely due to a missed control signal.
Live traffic testing also helped uncover a race condition in the TCP engine which only
occurred after a certain packet sequence.
Hardware circuit testing can be performed using a verification testbench or Auto-
mated Test Equipment (ATE). These systems require a set of test vectors which are applied
to the inputs of the hardware circuit. The operation and output of the device under test
is then compared with the expected behavior in order to determine the correctness of the
circuit. The TCP-Processor performs protocol processing on network packets. The mas-
sive number of test vectors required to test all possible permutations of packet type, packet
size, packet content, and packet timing make it infeasible to use a verification testbench
to test more than a small number of scenarios. Live traffic testing provides at-speed pro-
cessing of massive volumes of data. In addition, a ring buffer can be used to store recently
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processed network packets. If a packet sequence causes problems within the circuit, the
packets which triggered the processing problems can be extracted from the ring buffer and
used in off-line simulations to track down and correct the problem and later be replayed
through the running hardware containing recent fixes.
One of the issues associated with debugging problems in real-time systems like
the TCP-Processor is the lack of visibility into the circuit when problems occur. Several
techniques were used to debug the TCP-Processor while processing live Internet traffic.
First, the flow control signals of the various components were tied to LEDs which would
illuminate whenever the flow control signal was asserted. This provided a simple visual in-
dication of which component stopped processing data when processing problems occurred.
Debugging efforts could then be focused on a particular subcomponent as opposed to vali-
dating the operation of the whole circuit. Secondly, the circuit was instrumented with data
taps at several locations throughout the circuit. This allowed network traffic to be captured
and saved to external memory at various places throughout the circuit. This data could then
be extracted and analyzed at a later time. By comparing data streams entering and leaving
an individual circuit component, a determination could be made regarding the correctness
of that component with regard to packet processing. Additionally, this captured data could
be converted into simulation input files which provided the ability to trace individual logic
transitions of a particular component in simulation using data sets which were causing
problems in hardware.
To aid in the debugging process, a set of tools was developed which supports net-
work traffic capture and the conversion of captured traffic patterns into simulation input
files (see Appendix B on page 175). These utilities work with both standard packet cap-
turing tools (tcpdump) and with custom network traffic capturing circuits. They provide
a variety of data conversion and display options which simplify data analysis. Simulation
input files can also be generated and used by the testbench to perform circuit simulations
using ModelSim.
10.3 Utility of the TCP-Processor
The novel idea for the TCP-Processor resulted from a desire to produce a high-performance
TCP processing engine which provides direct access to TCP stream content within high-
speed networking environments for large numbers of flows. The TCP-Processor success-
fully accomplishes this goal and provides a testbed for high-performance data processing
research. By allowing easy access to TCP stream content, the TCP-Processor enables other
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Figure 10.1: Remote Research Access
researchers to direct their attention toward developing data processing applications without
being distracted by the intricacies of protocol processing.
The TCP-Processor circuit design can itself be connected to the Internet and used
remotely. A remote development team can design and build a hardware circuit to perform
custom data processing. That circuit design can be loaded into FPGAs at a remote location
by connecting to a management station. A standard Sockets program can be written to send
data to the custom processing circuits. The TCP-Processor ensures that data sent over a
socket connection is delivered to the custom processing circuits. This configuration enables
FPGA development for organizations which may not normally have access to these types
of resources. Other networking research teams have already used this pattern of remote
access for testing, specifically Emulab [136] and Open Network Lab [130, 66]. Figure 10.1
shows how a development center can be connected to the Internet at a remote location.
This remote testing environment promotes resource sharing among remote develop-
ment groups. Researchers at different geographical locations can utilize the same hardware
infrastructure for testing. By interleaving access to the remote hardware, the testing needs
of large numbers of users can be supported by a small number of Internet connected de-
vices. FPGA development resources can be provided to anyone that has connectivity to the
Internet.
As was shown with the Grid [7], a remote testing environment provides an inex-
pensive mechanism for researchers to investigate FPGA-based data processing circuits for
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almost any type of data set. A standard Sockets program could be developed to send data
sets through a network to the remote FPGA devices. There, the TCP-Processor would ex-
tract the data set from the TCP connection and pass it to the data processing circuit. In this
manner, data processing algorithms can be developed, tested, analyzed and refined without
requiring the initial startup costs associated with FPGA development. If the new algorithm
provides a significant improvement over existing applications, then new systems can be
developed which contains custom hardware and the new processing algorithms. Possible
research areas include genome sequencing, image analysis, and voice and video processing
via FPGA-based digital signal processors.
In his popular 1990s book, Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy Through the Maze of
Computer Espionage [121], Clifford Stoll painstakingly tracks the activities of a network
intruder by monitoring characters flowing through a dial-up connection into a computer
system he was managing. With the dramatic increase in programmed attacks from worms
and viruses this method of detecting and tracking intrusions is extremely difficult. With the
proliferation of the Internet and exponential increase in communications speeds over the
past 20 years, the problem of preventing network intrusions along with limiting the spread
of worms and viruses has become more difficult. In order to protect critical infrastruc-
ture sectors, such as banking and finance, insurance, chemical, oil and gas, electric, law
enforcement, higher education, transportation, telecommunications, and water, the United
States government put forth a National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace [132]. This docu-
ment states the following:
”organizations that rely on networked computers systems must take proactive
steps to identify and remedy their vulnerabilities”
The TCP-Processor technology combined with intrusion detection circuits and appropri-
ate response mechanisms can provide an excellent tool to help mitigate network attacks
from cyberspace. While one technology cannot purport to solve all of the intrusion and
virus problems of the Internet, steps can be taken to limit the adverse affect that this rogue
network traffic has on users of the Internet. The combination of the TCP-Processor tech-
nology with header processing, content scanning, and rule matching circuits can provide
an effective intrusion detection and prevention system for use in high-speed networking
environments.
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Chapter 11
Future Work
There are several additional research projects which can be borne out of this research.
These work items include improvements to the TCP-Processor itself and also the develop-
ment and enhancement of integration components and applications. This chapter describes
each of these work items in more detail.
11.1 Packet Defragmentation
The Internet Protocol (IP) supports the fragmenting of packets when a single packet is
larger than the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU) size of a network segment. Efforts are
made at connection setup time to avoid fragmented packets by negotiating a MTU size for
the connection. While this negotiation process works well most of the time, situations do
arise where a packets get fragmented within the network. The Internet traffic captured in
conjunction with this research shows that roughly .3% of the IP packets were fragments.
While this is a small fraction of the overall traffic, these packets cannot be ignored by a
TCP flow processor. Since packet fragmentation occurs at the IP layer, defragmentation of
these packets must occur prior to TCP processing.
The IP Wrapper circuit incorporated into the TCP-Processor currently does not re-
assemble fragmented IP packets. Enhancements are required to this circuit in order to
reassemble packet fragments into the original fully formed packet. A circuit capable of
defragmenting packets contains the following components:
• Logic to maintain a lookaside list of current packet fragments which are in the pro-
cess of being reassembled.
• Memory to store packet fragments and retrieve them as necessary.
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• Memory management logic which is capable of aging out older packet fragments or
reclaiming memory from packet fragments which were never fully reassembled.
• Logic to reassemble packets after the receipt of all fragment segments and inject the
newly reassembled packet into the data path.
Packet defragmentation must occur prior to the processing of the TCP protocol,
which occurs in the TCP Processing Engine module (ref. Figure 4.4). The defragment
component can either be added to the IPWrapper or to the Input Buffer component of the
TCP-Processor. If implemented in the Input Buffer, common packet storage logic could be
shared with a Packet Reordering component.
11.2 Flow Classification and Flow Aging
An extension to the TCP-Processor technology involves integrating more sophisticated
packet classification algorithms. The existing flow classification algorithm uses a modi-
fied open addressing hashing technique with support for limited sized hash buckets. The
TCP-Processor technology can also be used with more refined algorithms for hashing the
4-tuple of source IP address, destination IP address, source TCP port and destination TCP
port. The flexibility of the TCP-Processor design simplifies the task of integrating alterna-
tive flow classification algorithms, such as trie-based, TCAM-based, or multidimensional
cutting algorithms.
The open addressing hashing technique using small fixed sized hash buckets is very
efficient with respect to processing time, but hash collisions during flow classification and
context retrieval lead to the incomplete monitoring of flows. As shown in the Results
Section on Page 141, without flow aging, the context storage area fills up over time which
leads to a situation where the state store operates with most of the context area occupied.
This in turn increases the probability of a hash collisions. The implementation of an age-
out algorithm can improve this behavior. A flow aging feature would mark records with
the time of the last activity on a particular flow. If a hash collision occurred with record
which had not experienced any activity for a predefined duration, then the old record would
be aged out and the new record could use vacated storage. This leads to more accurate
statistics involving the number of stale records left in the state store and the true number of
hash collisions among active flows.
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11.3 Packet Storage Manager
The TCP-Processor currently supports two modes of packet processing. The first tracks
TCP packets associated with the highest sequence number. If packets arrive out of se-
quence, then the stream monitoring application experiences a break in stream continuity.
The second mode actively drops out-of-sequence packets in order to ensure that all packets
are processed in sequence. To provide robust flow processing, a third mode of operation
needs to be supported which incorporates a packet storage manager into the TCP-Processor.
This packet storage manager would store out-of-sequence packets and re-injecting them
into the TCP flow processing circuit in the proper sequence.
The operation of the packet store manager needs to be tightly integrated into the
operation of the TCP processing engine. Information regarding where an individual packet
fits within the TCP data stream is determined by the TCP processing engine. Additionally,
context information relating to the current TCP stream sequence number is maintained by
the TCP processing engine and stored by the state store manager. A packet store manager
must communicate with these components in order to properly resequence packets.
Figure 11.1 shows the data flow between a Packet Store Manager and the TCP Pro-
cessing Engine. Upon detection of an out-of-sequence packet, the TCP State Processing
Logic flags the packet and stores the starting sequence number of the packet with the per-
flow context. The Output State Machine routes the packet to the Packet Store Manager
where it is saved in off-chip memory. When the packet arrives which advances the current
sequence number to that of the stored out-of-sequence packet, the TCP State Processing
Engine sends a signal to the Packet Store manager indicating that the previously stored
packet should be re-injected into the data path. The Packet Store Manager retrieves the
packet from off-chip memory and passes it to the TCP Engine for processing by Input
State Machine and the rest of the components.
11.4 10Gbps and 40Gbps Data Rates
The TCP-Processor was designed to scale and process traffic on higher speed networks.
Work is underway at the Applied Research Laboratory to develop the next generation net-
work switch research platform [131]. This new switch will process data at 10Gbps and
support advanced data processing features using the latest in FPGA technology. TCP-
Processor technology is designed to scale with advances in chip technology. Utilizing
current generation FPGA and memory devices, the TCP-Processor can process data at over
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Figure 11.1: Packet Store Manager Integration
10Gbps on this platform. Additional hardware resources allow for larger and more com-
plex flow processing applications to be supported when compared with the current FPX
platform.
Further performance improvements can be obtained by migrating to the latest FPGA
and memory devices. The Xilinx Virtex-4 FX140 FPGA has three times the number of
logic cells as the Xilinx XCV2000E FPGA used on the FPX platform. Larger quantities
of logic cells enables the TCP-Processor to employ wider bus widths and exploit higher
degrees of parallelism. In addition, the latest FPGA devices can operate at 400MHz clock
frequencies. Double data rate (DDR) SDRAM and quad data rate (QDR) SRAM memory
devices are currently available which support data transfers on both edges of the clock, thus
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doubling the available memory bandwidth. The performance of the TCP-Processor is cur-
rently limited by memory latency when processing packets less than 100 bytes in length.
The increased memory bandwidth of DDR memories will likely decrease the latency as-
sociated with retrieving per-flow context data. More significant performance gains can
be achieved by interleaving memory requests to improve memory bandwidth utilization.
When all of these performance enhancements are combined (see Table 11.1), a version of
the TCP-Processor can be constructed which is capable of processing data at OC-768 data
rates.
Table 11.1: Performance improvements and estimated data rates
Throughput
Improvement for 64byte packets
Virtex 2000E 1.5 Gbps 2.9 Mpps
(85MHz)
Virtex2 8000 2.9 Gbps 5.7 Mpps
(167MHz)
Virtex4 FX140 5.3 Gbps 10.3 Mpps
(300MHz)
Parallel TCP processing engines 10.7 Gbps 20.9 Mpps
(interleaved memory requests)
Two DDR memory devices 21.2 Gbps 41.8 Mpps
(quad data paths)
Two FPGA devices 42.8 Gbps 83.5 Mpps
11.5 Rate Detection
Analysis of the live Internet traffic has prompted the inclusion of additional work items.
The TCP-Processor currently processes TCP packets and collects statistics which are pe-
riodically broadcast to an external collection machine. Analysis of the collected statistical
data occurs at a later time, sometimes days after the data was collected. In order to improve
reaction times, a series of circuits needs to be developed which is capable of reacting in
real-time to changes in network traffic.
The first of these items involves the generation of a rate detection circuit. This
circuit would monitor the statistical event counters and test event rates against a threshold.
The rate detection circuit should be flexible enough to allow for runtime modification of
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the events which are monitored and of the event rate threshold values. For example, in a
TCP SYN denial of service attack, the rate detection circuit would detect the burst of TCP
SYN packets on the network when the TCP SYN count exceeded a predefined threshold
set by a network administrator. The output of the rate detection circuit would be a signal to
the appropriate response logic or the generation of an alarm.
An advanced rate detection circuit could implement more complex threshold logic
which would maintain a moving average of the current traffic pattern and trigger when
the current event rate exceeded the moving average by some percentage. Other complex
rate detection logic could remember periodic traffic patterns, like that shown in Figure 9.3,
where more traffic is expected during the middle of the day and less traffic is expected
between 3:00am and 9:00am. Thresholds could then be adjusted every hour corresponding
to the expected traffic pattern for that time period . This would provide more realistic event
detection as opposed to setting a maximum threshold value or high water mark.
11.6 Traffic Sampling and Analysis
The ability to save network packets during periods of abnormal network behavior has sig-
nificant benefit. Many network events are short-lived and by the time a network administra-
tor notices that something is amiss, the event has passed and traffic patterns have returned
to normal. Without the presence of an automated traffic capturing device, it is difficult to
reconstruct the events which transpired to cause a network outage. It is not feasible to con-
tinuously capture network traffic 100% of the time. In order to gain a better understanding
of a particular network attack, the capturing of network traffic must occur during the attack.
The previously mentioned rate detection circuit is ideally suited to signal a data
capture circuit to collect the next million bytes of network traffic and store them in memory,
typically a high-speed SRAM device. An alternative sampling methodology would be to
perform a random or periodic sampling of network traffic. This type of capture would
provide a broader selection of network packets over a larger time interval. Captured data
could then be moved to a long term storage device or be sent to a network administrator for
analysis. By analyzing exact packet sequences and timing data, information relating to the
source and cause of a malicious attack can be gathered. This information may be useful in
preventing future attacks.
A real-time data analysis circuit is the next logical companion to the packet capture
circuit. After packets are collected in response to an exceeded threshold, an analysis circuit
could then perform complex processing and interrogate the packet sequences to try and
157
detect patterns. For instance, sequential probing of network addresses by an attacker could
be discerned from the sampled network traffic. A denial of service attack against a single IP
address could also be detected by a traffic analysis circuit. Sophisticated analysis circuits
could coordinate information collected at multiple locations in the network in order to
produce a broader pictured of the attack profile. Analysis results could also be reported to
a central monitoring station.
The final component of the real-time analysis circuit would be a feedback mecha-
nism which could alter the behavior of networking equipment based on the results of the
analysis. The TCP-Processor could be enhanced with circuitry capable of rate limiting TCP
SYN packets or drop packets based on some criteria. During a denial of service attack, the
rate detection circuit would detect an increase in traffic and signal the sampling circuit to
capture network packets. After storing a subset of the network traffic, the analysis engine
would begin scanning the saved packets looking for patterns. In this particular example, a
TCP SYN attack is detected which originates from a single source IP address. The anal-
ysis circuit would then inform the TCP-Processing logic to rate limit TCP SYN packets
from the offending host. In addition, the analysis circuit would send an alert message to a
network administrator summarizing the current attack and the response action taken. This
sequence of events describes and automated response system capable of limiting the im-
pact of a network attack on an organization or network segment. The collection of these
enhancements would allow for in-depth analysis of network events and support real-time
responses to rogue network traffic.
11.7 Application Integration
The final work item that stems from this research is the development and integration of
other flow processing applications. These applications would connect to the TCP-Processor
to received TCP stream content and perform custom processing on the data. Due to the in-
band processing design of the TCP-Processor, these applications can also generate TCP
packets and alter TCP stream content.
A class of TCP processing applications which perform intrusion detection and pre-
vention functions are ideally suited for use with the TCP-Processor. These applications per-
form rules-based content scanning and protocol header filtering in order to classify packets
as rogue traffic. Upon detection of a computer virus, an intrusion detection system would
note the presence of the virus and let it pass through the network. An intrusion prevention
system would attempt to halt the spread of the virus. This can be accomplished by dropping
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the packet from the network and then terminating the TCP connection by generating TCP
RST or TCP FIN packets. A more sophisticated approach would be to disarm the virus by
altering or removing the virus from the the TCP data stream.
With the adoption of Internet SCSI (iSCSI) and the advent of network attached
storage (NAS) devices where data is accessed by communicating with NAS using the SCSI
protocol encapsulated in a TCP connection. The wide acceptance of this type of storage
mechanism implies that more and more data will be accessed through a network using
the TCP protocol. Applications based on the TCP-Processor technology will be able to
process the abundance of data stored on these devices at performance levels unattainable
using microprocessor based systems.
The amount of traffic on the Internet and the number of systems connected to the
Internet continues to grow at a rapid pace. The use of TCP Offload Engines (TOEs) will
only increase the amount of traffic on networks and speed at which data is pushed through
a network. In the future, applications based on the TCP-Processor or similar technology
will be required to effectively monitor and process TCP data within a network.
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Appendix A
Usage
This section describes in detail how to use the TCP-Processor circuit. It provides infor-
mation on how to compile, simulate, synthesize, place & route, and run the various TCP-
Processing circuits. This documentation assumes that the user is familiar with ModelSim,
Synplicity, Xilinx tools, cygwin, gcc, and a text editor for modifying files. These circuits
were developed utilizing ModelSim 5.8SE, Synplicity 7.2Pro, and Xilinx ISE 6.1i.
Figure A.1A shows a logical diagram of the encoding and decoding operations as
traffic is passed among the StreamExtract, the PortTracker, and the Scan circuits. Fig-
ure A.1B shows a physical layout of how the FPX devices can be stacked in order to match
the logical layout.
The circuits easily achieve a post place & route clock frequency of 55 MHz targeting
a Xilinx Virtex XCV2000E-6. A maximum clock frequency of 87 MHz has been achieved
for the StreamExtract circuit when targeting the -8 speed grade part.
A.1 StreamExtract
The distribution for the StreamExtract circuit can be found at the URL:
http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp
/source/streamextract source v2.zip. To install, unzip the distribution into
an appropriately named directory. Edit the file vhdl/streamextract module.vhd
and modify the configuration parameters as required by the target environment. See the
Configuration Parameters section on Page 76 for a full discussion on the various configu-
ration options and the effect that they have on the operation of the circuit.
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A.1.1 Compile
The compilation of the VHDL source is a very straightforward process. A Makefile com-
piles the code, assuming the machine has been properly setup with the aforementioned
tools, environment variables, licenses, and search paths. The command is:
$ make compile
This operation should complete successfully. If errors occur, they can be resolved using the
information provided in the error message.
A.1.2 Generating Simulation Input Files
Prior to simulation, generate a simulation input file. The easiest method is to use the
tcpdump [83] command to capture network traffic, such as HTTP web requests. This
can be accomplished with a laptop computer connected to a Linux machine which acts as a
gateway to the Internet. A tcpdump command like the one below will capture the network
traffic to a file.
$ tcpdump -i eth1 -X -s 1514 host 192.168.200.66 > tmp.dmp
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Change the tcpdump parameters in order to obtain the proper network capture. Specify
the -X flag to indicate a hexadecimal output format and the -s 1514 parameter to capture
the complete contents of each packet.
Next, convert the tcpdump output format into a ModelSim input file. This task
can be accomplished using the dmp2tbp application. Information on the dmp2tbp utility
along with links to the executable and source can be found at:
http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp
/dmp2tbp.html.
The output of the dmp2tbp program is a file called INPUT CELLS.TBP. This file
is used as an input to the IPTESTBENCH [14] program. Copy the INPUT CELLS.TBP
file to the sim directory and run the command:
$ cd sim
$ make input cell
This generates a ModelSim input file called INPUT CELLS.DAT. With this file, simula-
tions can be performed. Note that the dmp2tbp application inserts two header words
before the start of IP header so the NUM PRE HDR WRDS configuration parameter will
need to be set to a value of 2.
A.1.3 Simulate
Once the VHDL source code is compiled, and a simulation input file is generated, it is
possible to perform functional simulations. This is accomplished by entering the following
command:
$ make sim
This brings up ModelSim, a Signals window, a Waveform window, and runs the circuit
for 65 microseconds. If problems occur, check for errors on the command line and in the
ModelSim output window. Resolve any problems and rerun the simulation. At this point,
use the normal ModelSim functions to interrogate the operation of the circuit. Use the
ModelSim run command to simulate larger input files.
The StreamExtract testbench generates a file called LC CELLSOUT.DAT which
contains encoded TCP stream data. This file can be used as the simulation input for circuits
like the PortTracker and Scan application which use the TCPLiteWrappers.
162
A.1.4 Synthesize
Prior to synthesizing the circuit design, edit the vhdl/streamextract module.vhd
source file and change the configuration parameters to reflect the target environment. Most
notably, change the Simulation parameter to zero which indicates that all of memory should
be initialized and utilized during the operation of the circuit. At this point, either run Syn-
plicity in batch mode or interactive mode. For batch mode operation, enter the following
command:
$ make syn
For interactive mode, initiate execution of the Synplify Pro program, load the project file
sim/StreamExtract.prj, and click run. Regardless of the mode of operation, check
the syn/streamextract/streamextract.srr log file and look for warnings, er-
rors, and the final operation frequency. Edit the implementation options to target the correct
speed grade and clock frequency for the target device.
A.1.5 Place & Route
The place & route operations are executed in batch mode and are initiated by the following
make file:
$ make build
To change the target FPGA device, edit the file syn/rad-xcve2000-64MB/build
and change part variable to equal the appropriate device. To change the target clock fre-
quency, edit the file syn/rad-xcve2000-64MB/fpx.ucf, go to the bottom of the
document and modify the timespec and offset variables to correspond to the desired clock
frequency.
The final step in the build process is the generation of the bit file. Prior to using
the bit file, verify that the operational clock frequency of the newly created circuit meets
or exceeds the design constraints. The timing report for the circuit can be found in the
file syn/rad-xcve2000-64MB/streamextract.twr. If the circuit achieves the
desired performance levels, load the circuit into an FPGA and start processing traffic. The
bit file can be found at syn/rad-xcve2000-64MB/streamextract.bit.
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A.1.6 Setup
Now that the circuit has been built, it is ready to be loaded into an FPX device. To accom-
plish this task, use the NCHARGE application to perform remote configuration, setup and
programming of the FPX device.
Prior to sending traffic through the device, set up the NID routes as shown below.
Figure A.2 shows the virtual circuit routes between the NID and the RAD for the StreamEx-
tract circuit. Raw network traffic should be routed through the RAD SW interface over
VPI 0x0 VCI 0x32. In addition, control cell traffic (VPI 0x0 VCI 0x23) and statistic traf-
fic generated by the StreamExtract circuit (VPI 0x0 VCI 0x37) should be routed over the
RAD SW interface. The virtual circuit used by the statistics module can be changed via the
previously discussed StreamExtract configuration parameters. Encoded TCP stream data is
passed through the RAD LC interface using VPI 0x0 VCI 0x34.
A.2 Scan & PortTracker
Due to their similarity, the discussions on the Scan and PortTracker applications have been
grouped together. The distribution for the Scan circuit can be found at the URL:
http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp
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/source/scan source.zip
The distribution for the PortTracker circuit can be found at the URL:
http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp
/source/porttracker source.zip
Unzip the distributions into appropriately named directories. Edit the vhdl/scan
module.vhd and vhdl/porttracker module.vhd source files and modify the
configuration parameters as required by the target environment. See the previous section
on configuration parameters for a full discussion on the various parameters and the effect
that they have on the operation of the circuits.
A.2.1 Compile
The compilation of the VHDL source is a very straightforward process. A Makefile com-
piles the code. The command is shown below:
$ make compile
If errors occur, resolve the errors utilizing information provided in the error message.
A.2.2 Generating Simulation Input Files
Prior to simulation, generate a simulation input file which contains encoded TCP stream
data. The simulation of the StreamExtract circuit generates the appropriately formatted
simulation input file. Copy the sim/LC CELLSOUT.DAT file from the StreamExtract
project to the sim/INPUT CELLS LC.DAT file in the current project. A special input
file can be created to test the control and stats features by utilizing the same methods as
outlined in the StreamExtract project for creating an INPUT CELLS.DAT file.
A.2.3 Simulate
After compiling the VHDL source code and generating a simulation input file, functional
simulations can be performed. To accomplish this, enter the following command:
$ make sim
This brings up ModelSim, a Signals window, a Waveform window, and runs the circuit for
a short period of time. Longer simulation runs can be produced by using the ModelSim
run command to simulate more clock cycles.
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A.2.4 Synthesize
Prior to synthesis, edit the vhdl/scan module.vhd and vhdl/porttracker
module.vhd source files and change the configuration parameters to reflect the target
environment. Most notably, change the Simulation parameter to zero which indicates that
all of memory should be initialized and utilized during the operation of the circuit. At this
point, either run Synplicity in batch mode or interactive mode. For batch mode operation,
enter the following command:
$ make syn
For interactive mode, start up the Synplify Pro program, load the sim/Scan.prj or
sim/PortTracker.prj project file, and click run. Regardless of the mode of opera-
tion, check the syn/scan/scan.srr or syn/porttracker/porttracker.srr
log files and look for warnings, errors, and the final operation frequency. Edit the im-
plementation options to target the correct speed grade and clock frequency for the target
device.
A.2.5 Place & Route
The place & route operations are executed in batch mode and are initiated by the following
command:
$ make build
To change the target FPGA device, edit the file syn/rad-xcve2000-64MB/build
and change part variable to equal the appropriate device. To change the target clock fre-
quency, edit the file syn/rad-xcve2000-64MB/fpx.ucf, go to the bottom of the
document and modify the timespec and offset variables to correspond to the desired clock
frequency.
The final set in the build process is the generation of the bit file. Prior to using the
bit file, verify that the operational clock frequency of the newly created circuit meets or
exceeds the design constraints. The timing report for the circuit can be found in the file
syn/rad-xcve2000-64MB/scan.twr or syn/rad-xcve2000-64MB/port-
tracker.twr. If the circuit achieved the desired performance levels, load the circuit into
an FPGA and start processing traffic. The bit file can be found at syn/rad-xcve2000-
64MB/scan.bit or syn/rad-xcve2000-64MB/porttracker.bit, depending
on which application is being built.
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A.2.6 Setup
Now that the circuit has been built, it is ready to be loaded into an FPX device. The steps
required to perform this task are identical to those of the StreamExtract circuit. Next, set
up the NID routes. The NID routes for both the Scan and the PortTracker are the same.
Figure A.3 shows the virtual circuit routes between the NID and the RAD for the Scan and
PortTracker circuits. Network traffic carrying control and statistics information should be
routed through the RAD SW interface over VPI 0x0 VCI 0x32. Control cell traffic should
be routed to the RAD SW interface over VPI 0x0 VCI 0x23. Encoded TCP stream data is
passed through the RAD LC interface using VPI 0x0 VCI 0x34.
A.3 New Applications
Prior to starting development of a new TCP stream data processing application, it is im-
portant to analyze the environment, resources, and size of the target application. The
StreamExtract circuit, the PortTracker circuit, and the Scan circuit are three recommended
starting points for new application development. All of these projects are structured in a
similar manner so that the transitions from one environment to another are easily achieved
without requiring mastery of different interfaces, file structures, or build processes.
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The StreamExtract circuit should be utilized if a small footprint solution is desired.
This allows the TCP stream processing application to coexist in the same circuit as the
TCP-Processor, thus utilizing only one device. The PortTracker circuit is a good example
of a multi-device solution where the TCP-Processor operates on one device and the TCP
stream processing application operates on one or more other devices. Since a separate
device is utilized for the stream processing application, more FPGA resources are available
to perform processing. The Scan circuit is similar to the PortTracker circuit, except it
also contains additional logic to store and retrieve per-flow context information in off-chip
SDRAM devices. The Scan circuit also contains logic for processing external commands
formatted as UDP data packets.
Once the appropriate starting point for the intended TCP stream processing appli-
cation has been determined, the selected example circuit can be downloaded and extracted
in order to begin the desired modifications. If using the StreamExtract circuit as the start-
ing point, edit the file streamextract.vhd. Remove the TCPSerializeEncode and
TCPSerializeDecode components and replace them with components specific to the new
application. If the Scan or PortTracker circuits are selected as the starting point, edit the
module.vhd source file and replace either the ScanApp or PortTrackerApp circuits with
logic for the new application. Changes will also be required to the controlproc.vhd
source file to support different control and statistics features.
A.3.1 Client Interface
The client interface is identical for a TCP stream processing application based on either
the StreamExtract, PortTracker, or Scan circuits. Detailed information on this interface
was previously described on Page 95 in the section covering the TCPRouting component
of the TCP-Processor. This information covers the interface signals, a sample wave form,
and details on the data passed through the interface. Another excellent approach to gaining
familiarity with the client interface of the TCP-Processor (and TCPLiteWrappers) is to run
simulations with various data sets and inspect the various signal transitions.
A.4 Runtime Setup
The FPX cards on which the TCP processing circuits operate can either be inserted into
the WUGS-20 switch environment or the FPX-in-a-Box environment. Runtime setup and
configuration information is presented for both of these environments. While the circuits
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Figure A.4: Multidevice Circuit Layout
and the FPX cards are identical for both of these environments, there are configuration
differences due to the WUGS-20 backplane’s ability to route traffic from any port to any
other port. The FPX-in-a-Box solution, conversely, relies on the NID to perform all traffic
routing functions. The interaction between two FPX devices working together to provide a
TCP stream monitoring service is shown in Figure A.4. Network traffic processed by the
TCP-Processor is encoded and passed to a separate device for additional processing. This
second device processes the encoded TCP stream data and searches for digital signatures.
The encoded data is passed back to the TCP-Processor for egress processing and to forward
data on to the end system or next hop router. This final step is not required when performing
passive monitoring because the network packets do not need to be delivered to the end
system via this network path.
Figure A.5 shows a WUGS-20 switch configured to perform active monitoring of
inbound Internet traffic. A laptop computer initiates communications with hosts on the
Internet. These communications can include remote logins, file transfers and web surfing.
Traffic initiated on the laptop is passed through a network hub and routed to an OC-3 line
card installed at Port 1 of the switch. This traffic is passed directly to the OC-3 line card at
Port 0, transferred to a different network hub and routed to the Internet. Return traffic from
the Internet is passed to the line card at Port 0. This network traffic is routed to an FPX
card at Port 7 which is running the StreamExtract circuit. Encapsulated TCP stream data is
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Figure A.5: Active Monitoring Switch Configuration
passed to the PortTracker circuit at Port 6 and then to the Scan circuit at Port 5. After the
Scan circuit, this encoded network traffic is passed back to the StreamExtract circuit at port
7 which reproduces the original network data packets and passes them to the line card at
Port 1 for delivery to the laptop. Statistics information generated by the StreamExtract, the
PortTracker and the Scan circuits is passed to the OC-3 Line card at Port 3 which forwards
the statistics to a host machine which collects them. The statistics traffic is shown as a
dashed line in the figure.
The VCI routes which need to be configured on the WUGS-20 switch are shown in
Table A.1. The table is broken into four sections showing routes used for network traffic,
encoded network traffic, statistics traffic, and control traffic. The Scan circuit supports re-
mote management features and therefore requires control traffic. NID routing information
can be found in the previous sections dealing with each of the specific circuits.
Figure A.6 shows a WUGS-20 switch configured to perform passive monitoring
of network traffic. Mirroring, replication or optical splitting techniques can be used to
acquire copies of network traffic for passive monitoring. In this configuration, the traffic
to be monitored is passed into the GigE line card at Port 1. Traffic is then passed to the
StreamExtract circuit at Port 2 where TCP processing is performed. Encoded network
traffic is passed via VCI 52 to the PortTracker circuit at Port 4 and the Scan circuit at Port
6. Since this is a passive monitoring configuration, there is no need to route encoded traffic
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Table A.1: Routing Assignments for Active Monitoring Switch Configuration
Network Traffic
Port: 1 VCI: 50 => Port: 0 VCI: 50
Port: 0 VCI: 50 => Port: 7 VCI: 50
Port: 7 VCI: 50 => Port: 1 VCI: 50
Encoded Network Traffic
Port: 7 VCI: 52 => Port: 6 VCI: 52
Port: 6 VCI: 52 => Port: 5 VCI: 52
Port: 5 VCI: 52 => Port: 7 VCI: 52
Statistics Traffic
Port: 7 VCI: 55 => Port: 3 VCI: 50
Port: 6 VCI: 50 => Port: 3 VCI: 50
Port: 5 VCI: 50 => Port: 3 VCI: 50
Control Traffic
Port: 3 VCI: 50 => Port: 5 VCI: 50
back to the StreamExtract circuit for egress processing. Statistics information generated by
the StreamExtract, the PortTracker and the Scan circuits is passed to the GigE Line card at
Port 0 which forwards the statistics to the stats collection machine.
The VCI routes which need to be programmed into the WUGS-20 switch for the
passive monitoring configuration are shown in Table A.2. The table is broken into four
sections showing routes used for network traffic, encoded network traffic, statistics traffic,
and control traffic. The Scan circuit supports remote management features and therefore
requires control traffic. NID routing information can be found in the previous sections
dealing with the each of the specific circuits.
The runtime setup for TCP stream processing circuits operating within a FPX-in-
a-Box environment is different from that of a WUGS-20 switch environment. The main
reason for this is that the backplane for the FPX-in-a-Box solution only provides an elec-
trical signal interconnect between the two stacks of FPX devices and no routing services.
This means that all routing functions must be performed by the NID circuit on each of the
FPX devices.
Figure A.7 shows a configuration for performing passive monitoring utilizing a
FPX-in-a-Box environment. Similar to passive monitoring configurations in a WUGS-
20 switch environment, an external device is required to provide duplicated or mirrored
network traffic to the input line card (located at the top of the stack on the left). Network
traffic to be monitored is passed to the StreamExtract circuit for TCP processing. Encoded
171
GigE
Line Card
GigE
Line Card
Empty
Scan
Port 0Port 1
Port 2
Port 3
Port 7
Port 5Port 4
WUGS-20 Switch
Port 6
Stream
Extract
OC-3
Line Card
Switch Controller
50
50
52
Port
Tracker
50
Statistics
Collector
Network
Traffic
to be
Monitored
52
Empty
Figure A.6: Passive Monitoring Switch Configuration
Table A.2: Routing Assignments for Passive Monitoring Switch Configuration
Network Traffic
Port: 1 VCI: 51 => Port: 2 VCI: 50
Encoded Network Traffic
Port: 2 VCI: 52 => Port: 4 VCI: 52
Port: 4 VCI: 52 => Port: 6 VCI: 52
Statistics Traffic
Port: 2 VCI: 55 => Port: 0 VCI: 50
Port: 4 VCI: 50 => Port: 0 VCI: 50
Port: 6 VCI: 50 => Port: 0 VCI: 50
Control Traffic
Port: 0 VCI: 50 => Port: 6 VCI: 50
network packets are passed down to the PortTracker circuit and finally down to the Scan
circuit. The NID cannot currently be configured to act as a data sink for network traffic.
For this reason, a stream processing circuit (such as the Scan circuit) will have to be mod-
ified to not pass encoded network traffic out through the RAD LC interface. Without this
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Figure A.7: Passive Monitoring FPX-in-a-Box Configuration
modification, monitored network traffic can be reflected between FPX cards, potentially
causing operational problems by consuming available bandwidth.
The NID routing information for this configuration is also shown in Figure A.7. For
each of the FPX cards, the NID can route data from each of the SW, LC, RAD SW, and
RAD LC input interfaces to any of the same output ports. On FPX 0, the NID should be
configured to route VCI 51 (0x33) traffic from the LC interface to the RAD SW interface.
Additionally, VCI 50 (0x32) from the RAD SW interface and VCI 52 (0x34) from the
RAD LC interface should both be routed to the SW interface. Routes should be setup for
the FPX 1 and FPX 2 devices as indicated in the diagram.
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A.5 Known Problems
Below is a list of known problems with the current distribution. Most of these problems do
not reflect errors in the design or the code, but are due to changes in the tools provided by
Xilinx and Synplicity which are incompatible with previous versions of these same tools.
A.5.1 Xilinx ISE 6.2i
Xilinx changed the dual-port RAM block produced by CoreGen. The previous dual-port
block RAM memory device contained a version 1 implementation. The current dual-port
RAM memory device uses version 5 constructs. The vhdl/wrappers/IPProcessor
/vhdl/outbound.vhd source file directly references the version 1 component which
is no longer supported by newer versions of the tools. To circumvent this problem, build an
identically-sized version 5 component and add the vhd and edn files to the project. Xilinx
also changed the signal names with the new component. This can be resolved by editing
the outbound.vhd file and fix up the ram512x16 component and its implementations to
correspond to the version 5 CoreGen component.
A.5.2 Synplicity 7.5
Synplicity v7.5 is not compatible with the alias construct used in the vhdl/wrappers
/FrameProcessor/vhdl/aal5dataen.vhd source file because previous versions
of Synplicity had no problem with this VHDL construct. One workaround is to switch to an
older or newer version of Synplicity (version 7.3 or 7.6 for example). Another workaround
is to modify the source file to remove the alias construct and directly address the proper
signal names.
A.5.3 Outbound IPWrapper Lockup
There have been several occurrences of a situation where the outbound lower layered pro-
tocol wrappers stop processing traffic and de-assert the TCA flow control signal to the
TCP-Processor circuit. This problem has been observed when monitoring live network
traffic with a configuration similar to that shown in Figure A.6 where encoded traffic exit-
ing the Scan circuit is routed back to the StreamExtract circuit for egress processing. After
several days of processing traffic, the outbound IP Wrapper will de-assert the flow control
signal and lock up the whole circuit. It is not clear whether or not this lockup is due to
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invalid data being sent from the TCP-Processor egress component to the IP Wrapper or a
bug in the outbound lower layered protocol wrapper code. The exact sequence of events
which causes this problem has not been determined. One plausible explanation for this
problem is the presence of an IP packet fragment.
A.5.4 Inbound Wrapper Problems
During campus network traffic testing, it was discovered that AAL5 CRC errors are not
dealt with in the inbound AAL5 frame wrapper, nor in the inbound IP wrapper. The AAL5
frame wrapper performs the CRC calculation, and updates the CRC word which occurs
after the end of the network packet. A valid CRC computation results in this CRC value
being replaced with the value of zero. An invalid CRC computation results in a non-zero
value. The AAL5 frame wrapper passes this invalid CRC indication at the tail end of the
packet.
The IP wrapper does not look at the CRC calculation and assumes that all data it
receives from the AAL5 frame wrapper contain valid packets. The processing of an invalid
packet can confuse the state machine in the IP wrapper and cause severe problems for
downstream client processing logic.
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Appendix B
Generating Simulation Input Files
The ability to quickly and easily generate simulation input files is paramount to any de-
bugging effort. This section focuses on capturing network traffic and converting it into a
simulation input file used by ModelSim and the testbench logic. Simulation input files can
be generated by hand, but this is tedious work. The following subsections contain usage
information for the tcpdump, dmp2tbp, IPTESTBENCH, and sramdump applications
as well as the CellCapture circuit for generating simulation input files.
B.1 tcpdump
The tcpdump [83] utility captures and displays the contents of network packets arriving
on a network interface on a host machine. A tcpdump command like the one below will
capture the network traffic to a file.
$ tcpdump -i eth1 -X -s 1514 host 192.168.20.10 > tmp.dmp
Change the tcpdump parameters as needed to specify the proper host. Specify the -X
flag to indicate a hexadecimal output format and the -s 1514 parameter to capture the
complete contents of each packet. Below is sample of network traffic captured with the
aforementioned command:
16:04:34.151188 192.168.204.100.3474 >
hacienda.pacific.net.au.http: S 1180902188:1180902188(0) win 16384
<mss 1460,nop, nop,sackOK> (DF)
0x0000 4500 0030 e0a1 4000 7d06 52c9 c0a8 cc64 E..0..@.}.R....d
0x0010 3d08 0048 0d92 0050 4663 232c 0000 0000 =..H...PFc#,....
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0x0020 7002 4000 0151 0000 0204 05b4 0101 0402 p.@..Q..........
16:04:34.362576 hacienda.pacific.net.au.http >
192.168.204.100.3474: S 545139513:545139513(0) ack 1180902189 win
5840 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK> (DF)
0x0000 4500 0030 0000 4000 2b06 856b 3d08 0048 E..0..@.+..k=..H
0x0010 c0a8 cc64 0050 0d92 207e 2b39 4663 232d ...d.P...˜+9Fc#-
0x0020 7012 16d0 deb8 0000 0204 05b4 0101 0402 p...............
16:04:34.364557 192.168.204.100.3474 >
hacienda.pacific.net.au.http: . ack 1 win 17520 (DF)
0x0000 4500 0028 e0a3 4000 7e06 51cf c0a8 cc64 E..(..@.˜.Q....d
0x0010 3d08 0048 0d92 0050 4663 232d 207e 2b3a =..H...PFc#-.˜+:
0x0020 5010 4470 dddc 0000 2020 2020 2020 P.Dp..........
B.2 dmp2tbp
The dmp2tbp application has been developed to convert the tcpdump output format into
a simulation input file for use by ModelSim. A dmp2tbp command takes two parameters,
an input file which was generated by a tcpdump command and a target output file to
contain the IPTESTBENCH input data. The syntax of the application is shown below:
Usage: dmp2tbp <input dmp file> <output tbp file>
Links to the executable and source for the dmp2tbp application can be found at:
http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp
/dmp2tbp.html.
The converted output of the previous tcpdump sample trace is shown below. For
each IP packet, a two-word LLC header was prepended to the packet to match the packet
format of the switch environment. In order to account for these two header words prior
the start of IP header, the NUM PRE HDR WRDS configuration parameter will need to
be set to a value of 2. The LLC header information can easily be removed by editing the
dmp2tbp source file.
!FRAME 50
AAAA0300
177
00000800
45000030
e0a14000
7d0652c9
c0a8cc64
3d080048
0d920050
4663232c
00000000
70024000
01510000
020405b4
01010402
!FRAME 50
AAAA0300
00000800
45000030
00004000
2b06856b
3d080048
c0a8cc64
00500d92
207e2b39
4663232d
701216d0
deb80000
020405b4
01010402
!FRAME 50
AAAA0300
00000800
45000028
e0a34000
7e0651cf
c0a8cc64
3d080048
0d920050
4663232d
207e2b3a
50104470
dddc0000
20202020
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B.3 IPTESTBENCH
The ip2fake executable of the IPTESTBENCH [14] utility converts the output of the
dmp2tbp application into the simulation input file used by ModelSim. Rename the file
generated by the dmp2tbp program to INPUT CELLS.TBP and copy the file to the sim
directory. Run the following commands to convert the .TBP file to the ModelSim .DAT
input file:
$ cd sim
$ make input cell
A file called INPUT CELLS.DAT is generated which contains properly formatted packets
that can be used to perform simulations. The source code and make files for IPTEST-
BENCH are included with each circuit design in the iptestbench subdirectory.
B.4 sramdump
The sramdump utility reads data out of SRAM and writes the results to a disk file. To
accomplish this task, the sramdump application communicates with NCHARGE over a
TCP socket connection. NCHARGE in turn communicates with the Control Cell Processor
(CCP) circuit programmed into a FPX card. This communication utilizes ATM control
cells to read the SRAM memory of the FPX card. Results are passed to NCHARGE and
then the sramdump application via the return path. Figure B.1 shows a diagram of this
communication path. The sramdump utility requires that the CCP circuit be built into the
RAD application and that the CCP control cells (typically VCI 0x23) be correctly routed
through the switch, the NID and the RAD. Links to the executable and source for the
sramdump application can be found at: http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects
/fpx/fpx internal/tcp/sramdump.html.
The sramdump program automatically detects the endianess of the host machine
and formats output so that the resulting dump file is consistent, regardless which machine
on which the utility was run . There are various dumping options, a binary dump [useful
as input to other analysis programs], an ASCII dump [good for text data], a dump format
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Figure B.1: Operation of SRAMDUMP Utility
[shows both hexidecimal and ASCII representations of data], and an option to generate
IPTESTBENCH input files.
SRAM memory on the FPX platform is 36 bits wide. Depending on the appli-
caitons’s use of this memory, data can either be read out in 32-bit segments (ignoring the
upper 4 bits) or in 36-bit segments. When reading 36-bit data, the high nibble is normally
stored as a byte-sized value. The -e option will expand the output and represent this as a
4-byte quantity such that the low bit of each byte will represent the value of one of four
high bits. This formatting option makes it easier to interpret a series of 36-bit data values.
In order to generate data formatted as AAL5 frames for input into IPTESTBENCH,
data must be written in a special SRAM frame format. Likewise, in order to generate data
formatted as ATM cells for input into ModelSim, data must be written in a special SRAM
cell format. Figure B.2 shows the specific SRAM frame and cell formats. Output files
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Figure B.2: SRAM data Formats
generated using the -t F or -t C options can be used as the input file to IPTESTBENCH for
creating simulation input files for ModelSim.
Usage information for the sramdump application is shown below:
Usage: sramdump [OPTIONS]
-h <string> hostname of switch controller:
[illiac.arl.wustl.edu]
-c <num> card number (0 - 7): [0]
-b <num> memory bank (0 - 1): [0]
-a <num> address to start reading (in hex): [0]
-n <num> number of words to read: [1]
-o <string> output file: [sram.dat]
-t <char> output type (B-binary, A-ascii, D-dump,
F-frames, C-cells): [B]
-f <char> dump format (B-big endian, L-little endian): [B]
-w <num> dump column width: 4
-s <num> dump separations (spaces every n bytes): [4]
-l <num> length of word (32, 36): [32]
-e expanded 36 bit format
(high 4 bits expanded to low bit of 4 byte field)
-? this screen
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B.5 Cell Capture
The CellCapture circuit provides an easy mechanism for capturing traffic with an FPX
card. The circuit writes captured ATM cells to the SRAM0 memory device and then to the
SRAM1 memory device. Each SRAM unit contains 256 thousand 36-bit memory locations
which can store 18,724.5 cells. The CellCapture circuit will store the first 37,449 cells
that are passed into the RAD LC interface. Because the SRAM devices support memory
operations on every clock cycle, the circuit is capable of capturing traffic at full line rates
(writing data to memory on every clock cycle). The circuit synthesizes at 100MHz which
supports the fastest traffic rates possible on the FPX platform. Figure B.3 shows a layout
of the CellCapture circuit.
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The CellCapture circuit is structured in a similar manner to all other circuits de-
scribed in this document. Links to the project source for the CellCapture circuit can be
found at: http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal
/tcp/cell capture.html. The steps required to build an executable bit file from the
source are listed below:
$ make compile
$ make syn
$ make build
To utilize this circuit, route control cell traffic (VCI 0x23) into the RAD SW port
and route traffic to be captured (the VCI(s) of interest) into the RAD LC port. The RAD-
controlled LEDs 1 and 2 blink continuously to indicate that the circuit is operating. The
RAD-controlled LEDs 3 and 4 illuminate when SRAM bank 0 and 1 respectively, are full
of data. LED 3 will always illuminate before LED 4 because the circuit fills up SRAM
bank 0 before writing to SRAM bank 1.
After capturing network traffic, the sramdump utility can be used to retrieve the
captured data. The resulting data file can be converted into a ModelSim input file utiliz-
ing IPTESTBENCH. Attempts to read data from a SRAM before it is full of data will
cause the CCP read operations to SRAM take priority over the CellCapture writes. This
implies that inconsistent network captures may be produced if a SRAM read operation oc-
curs at the same time as a SRAM write operation. This circuit is designed to work with the
sramdump utility. Use the -l 36 -t C -e options with the sramdump command to generate
ModelSim input files.
B.6 Internal Data Captures
The internal data captures supported by many of the TCP-Processor circuits provide an
excellent method for gaining insight into the internal operation of the circuits. These data
captures can be extracted from the FPX devices utilizing the sramdump routine and con-
verted into simulation input files utilizing IPTESTBENCH. The TCPInbuf, TCPEgress,
TCPSerializeEncode, TCPSerializeDecode, TCPDeserialize, and TCPReserialize compo-
nents all support the storing of network traffic to SRAM memory devices. The TCPInbuf
and the TCPEgress components utilize the SRAM frame format for storing network traf-
fic. The TCPSerializeEncode, TCPSerializeDecode, TCPDeserialize, and TCPReserialize
components utilize the SRAM cell format for storing network traffic.
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Appendix C
Statistics Collection and Charting
This appendix contains information on software applications which collect, chart, and re-
distribute statistics information generated by the various circuits mentioned in this docu-
ment. These applications directly process the statistics packets generated by the hardware
circuits. The statistics packets are transmitted as UDP datagrams, with the packet payload
format shown in Table C.1.
Table C.1: Statistics Format
31 24 23 16 15 8 7 0
Statistics
Type
Statistics
Identifier
Packet
Number
Number of
Entries
32-bit statistics value 1
32-bit statistics value 2
32-bit statistics value 3
. . .
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C.1 StatsCollector
The StatsCollector is a C program which gathers statistics information and spools the data
to disk files. A new disk file is created every night so that the data sets can be easily man-
aged. The StatsCollector can also be configured to rebroadcast statistics packets to a maxi-
mum of five separate destinations. This aids in the dissemination of statistical information
to a wide audience. Figure C.1 shows an operational summary of the StatsCollector.
The source for the StatsCollector application can be found at the following web site:
http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp
/statscollector.html. Usage information for the StatsCollector application is
shown below:
Usage: statscollector [OPTION]
-p <num> UDP port on which to listen for
statistics information
-r <string>:<num> remote IP host & UDP port on which
to re-transmit stats (up to 5 remote
hosts can be specified)
-s silent - do not capture statistics to
disk file
-? this screen
The statistics files generated by the StatsCollector application have a specific file-
name format shown below:
stats%%&& YYYYMMDD
%% represents a one-byte (two-hex-digit)
number indicating the statistics type
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&& represents a one-byte (two-hex-digit)
number indicating the statistics identifier
YYYY is a 4-digit year
MM is a 2-digit month
DD is a 2-digit day
These files contain ASCII columns of numbers where each column represents a separate
statistics value and each row corresponds to a statistics update packet. This format can
be directly imported by programs such as Microsoft Excel and can be graphed utilizing
gnuplot. A sample perl script is shown below which generates a separate graph of active
flows for each daily data file in the current directory:
#!/usr/bin/perl
# list of stats files
my @file_list = <stats01*>;
# for each file in the directory
foreach $file (@file_list) {
# extract info from filename
my $type = substr($file, 5, 2);
my $id = substr($file, 7, 2);
my $year = substr($file, 10, 4);
my $mon = substr($file, 14, 2);
my $day = substr($file, 16, 2);
# generate gnuplot control file to create chart
open handle, "> tmp";
select handle;
print "set title \"Traffic Stats for $mon/$day/$year\"\n";
print "set output \"total_flows_$year$mon$day.eps\"\n";
print "set data style lines\n";
print "set terminal postscript eps\n";
print "set xlabel \"Time of day\"\n";
print "set ylabel \"Total Active Flows\"\n";
print "set key left\n";
print "set xdata time\n";
print "set timefmt \"%H:%M:%S\"\n";
print "set xrange [\"00:00:00\":\"23:59:59\"]\n";
print "set format x \"%H:%M\"\n";
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print "\n";
print "plot \"$file\" using 1:13 title "Active Flows\n";
close handle;
# execute gnuplot command to generate chart
system "gnuplot tmp";
# end loop
}
C.2 StatApp
The StatApp is a Java application created by Mike Attig (mea1@arl.wustl.edu) to perform
real-time graphing. The original StatApp program was modified to accept data generated
in the standard statistics format and chart the data in real-time. The following commands
can be used to compile and run the StatApp charting application. The port number should
be set to the UDP port number of the statistics packets, currently 6501.
$ javac *.java
$ java StatApp <port#>
Figure C.2 displays the output of the StatApp charting various statistics counters
from the TCP-Processor. A maximum of 10 data items can be charted in parallel. The
various signals are annotated in this diagram for easier reading. The source for the StatApp
application can be found at the following web site: http://www.arl.wustl.edu
/projects/fpx/fpx internal/tcp/statapp.html.
C.3 SNMP Support
A Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) agent aids in the dissemination of the
statistical information gathered in the various hardware circuits. This agent listens for
the statistics packets generated by the various hardware circuits, maintains internal coun-
ters for these statistics, and re-exposes this data as SNMP Management Information Base
(MIB) variables. This agent was designed to interface with net-snmp v5.1.1 (found at
http://net-snmp.sourceforge.net/).
The distribution for the SNMP agent along with the MIB declaration can be found
at the following URL: http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx
/fpx internal/tcp/source/gv snmp agent v2.zip.
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C.4 MRTG Charting
The Multi Router Traffic Grapher (MRTG) tool monitors traffic loads on network links.
MRTG generates Hyper Text Markup Language (HTML) web pages on a periodic basis
by polling pre-configured SNMP MIB variables. The Portable Network Graphics (PNG)
images are generated provide a visual representation of the traffic loads. This tool has
been used to generate graphs of the statistical information maintained by the previously
mentioned SNMP agent. A sample chart is shown in Figure C.3.
The MRTG charting of statistical information generated by the various hardware cir-
cuits was accomplished utilizing the following versions of MRTG and dependent libraries:
MRTG v2.10.13, libpng v1.2.5, gd v1.0.22, and zlib v1.1.4. Additional information re-
garding MRTG can be found at the following web site: http://www.mrtg.org/. The
MRTG configuration file utilized to chart the statistics information is located at the follow-
ing URL: http://www.arl.wustl.edu/projects/fpx/fpx internal
/tcp/source/mrtg v2.zip.
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Figure C.3: Sample MRTG Generated Chart
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Appendix D
Additional Traffic Charts
D.1 Statistics for Aug 27, 2004
D.1.1 Flow Statistics
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Figure D.1: Active Flows
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Figure D.2: New Flows
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Terminated Flows
Figure D.3: Terminated Flows
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Figure D.4: Reused Flows
192
D.1.2 Traffic Statistics
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Figure D.5: IP bit rate
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Figure D.6: IP Packets
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Non-IP Packets
Figure D.7: Non-IP Packets
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Figure D.8: Fragmented IP Packets
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Figure D.9: Bad TCP Packets
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Figure D.10: TCP Packets
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Figure D.11: TCP Packet Flags
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Figure D.12: Zero Length Packets
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D.1.3 Port Statistics
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FTP (port 20,21)
Figure D.13: FTP traffic
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HTTP (port 80)
Figure D.14: HTTP traffic
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HTTPS (port 443)
Figure D.15: HTTP traffic
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NNTP (port 119)
Figure D.16: NNTP traffic
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POP (port 109,110)
Figure D.17: POP traffic
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SMTP (port 25)
Figure D.18: SMTP traffic
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SSH (port 22)
Figure D.19: SSH traffic
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Telnet (port 23)
Figure D.20: Telnet traffic
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TFTP (port 69)
Figure D.21: TFTP traffic
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TIM (port 37)
Figure D.22: TIM traffic
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Other lower ports (<= 1024)
Figure D.23: Lower port traffic
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D.1.4 Virus Statistics
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Figure D.24: MyDoom Virus 1
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string: We are sorry your UTF-8 encoding
Figure D.25: MyDoom Virus 2
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string: represented in 7-bit ASCII
Figure D.26: MyDoom Virus 3
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string: Your Requested Info
Figure D.27: Spam
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string: No Virus found
Figure D.28: Netsky Virus
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D.2 Statistics for Sep 16, 2004
D.2.1 Flow Statistics
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Figure D.29: Active Flows
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New TCP Flows
Figure D.30: New Flows
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Terminated Flows
Figure D.31: Terminated Flows
209
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
00:00 03:00 06:00 09:00 12:00 15:00 18:00 21:00 00:00
TC
P 
Fl
ow
s/s
ec
 (3
0 s
ec
 av
g)
Time of day
Washington University Internet Traffic Statistics for 09/16/2004
Reused Flow Table Entries
Figure D.32: Reused Flows
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D.2.2 Traffic Statistics
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iP Bit Rate
Figure D.33: IP bit rate
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Figure D.34: IP Packets
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Non-IP Packets
Figure D.35: Non-IP Packets
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Fragmented Packets
Figure D.36: Fragmented IP Packets
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Retransmitted Packets
Out-of-Sequence Packets
Bad TCP Checksum Packets
Figure D.37: Bad TCP Packets
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TCP Packets
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Figure D.38: TCP Packets
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SYN Packets
FIN Packets
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Figure D.39: TCP Packet Flags
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TCP Packets
Zero Length TCP Packets
Figure D.40: Zero Length Packets
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D.2.3 Port Statistics
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FTP (port 20,21)
Figure D.41: FTP traffic
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HTTP (port 80)
Figure D.42: HTTP traffic
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HTTPS (port 443)
Figure D.43: HTTP traffic
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NNTP (port 119)
Figure D.44: NNTP traffic
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POP (port 109,110)
Figure D.45: POP traffic
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SMTP (port 25)
Figure D.46: SMTP traffic
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SSH (port 22)
Figure D.47: SSH traffic
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Telnet (port 23)
Figure D.48: Telnet traffic
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TFTP (port 69)
Figure D.49: TFTP traffic
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TIM (port 37)
Figure D.50: TIM traffic
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Other lower ports (<= 1024)
Figure D.51: Lower port traffic
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D.2.4 Scan Statistics
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string: schuehler
Figure D.52: Scan for HTTP
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string: Washington University
Figure D.53: Scan for Washington University
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string: mortgage
Figure D.54: Scan for mortgage
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string: schuehler
Figure D.55: Scan for schuehler
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